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Farming is, by its own nature, a risky enterprise. Farmers are subject to many 
exogenous risks, for instance, price and production volatility, and credit default risk. 
Although there exists insurance products that help mitigate these types of risks, most 
of them are offered in developed countries. Farmers in developing countries, in 
general, lack the financial instruments to cope with production uncertainty. Mexican 
farmers are no exception. Mexican farmers face multiple risks that have been largely 
understudied. Some of these risks are common to farmers in developed as well as in 
other developing countries, but a few of them are unique to Mexico due to its current 
state of events.  
The overall objective of this dissertation is to investigate risks faced by 
Mexican farmers. The specific objectives are: to provide a basic understanding of 
Mexican agriculture and the risks they face from production and markets; to 
investigate mechanisms for price risk management for Mexican farmers; to investigate 
the relationship between risk rationing and credit demand; and to investigate the 
impact of narcoterrorism on agriculture and rural life. 
  
 
This dissertation provides alternatives for risk management and new insights 
for understanding Mexican farmers’ risks. These alternative solutions and analysis are 
based on financial engineering theory; on a novel approach to risk rationing; on the 
dual process and the ecological psychology theories to understand fear and risk 
perception. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Farming is, by its own nature, a risky enterprise. Farmers are subject to many 
exogenous risks, for instance, price and production volatility, and credit default risk. 
Although there exists insurance products that help mitigate these types of risks, most 
of them are offered in developed countries. Farmers in developing countries, in 
general, lack the financial instruments to cope with production uncertainty. Mexican 
farmers are no exception.  
Mexican farmers face multiple risks that have been largely understudied. Some 
of these risks are common to farmers in developed as well as in other developing 
countries, but a few of them are unique to Mexico due to its current state of events.  
As an illustration of common risks, in most countries farmers make their 
planting decisions under harvest price uncertainty.  While some financial tools exist 
for eliminating price risk, not all farmers, particularly in developing countries, have 
access to them. Crop yield is also subject to risk, which depends on endogenous 
factors like farmers’ experience and resources, and on exogenous factors like weather, 
which unpredictable characteristic creates a major burden on yield. These risk factors 
can be mitigated trough insurance products where available. These risks are known to 
the farmers through personal experience, or through learning from other sources.  
They asses those risks based on historical probability, and make their appropriate 
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decisions accordingly. We say that farmers behave objectively if their risk assessment 
on an even is the same as the historical probability or obtained from an official, or 
expert, source. There are, however, some risks in which producers do not have enough 
information to form an objective probability assessment; or, if that information exists, 
their assessment does not correspond to that of historical probability or expert sources. 
That is, if information about a risk exists, farmers’ assessment on that risk would be 
different from what the objective assessment is. We say that these farmers behave 
under a subjective probability of risk. Subjective probability exists if farmers not 
having enough information, or data, of an event, estimate the probability of that event; 
or if they have empirical (historical) data of an event, they disregard them and instead 
create their own personal probability. Subjective risk assessment can be very different 
from the objective one. If the difference is too large, a producer would be reluctant to 
take a risk even though the actual probability of a risky event happening m may be 
very low. Subjective assessment of risk can exaggerate risk perception and create a 
behavior that does not correspond to the economic paradigm of utility maximization.  
An example where subjective risk is much larger than objective risk is the 
concept of risk rationing. Risk rationing can be explained as the voluntary refraining 
from participating in the credit market because the risk associated with the potential 
collateral loss is too large. In other words, farmers who are risk rationed would not 
request a loan to increase production, even though this would create higher expected 
income, because they fear losing their collateral. Risk rationed farmers would stay in a 
low income-low risk activity, even though they have access to credit and the capacity 
needed to generate higher income. This subjective risk restricts farmers to a low 
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income state. Some types of farm insurance can help farmers engage into the high 
income activity, but again, they may not be available in all countries. Another instance 
where subjective risk affects changes in producer’s behavior is social and political 
instability. The recent events of violence in Mexico, product of the narco war, lead us 
to inquire into their effects on agricultural production and rural life. It is undeniable 
that living in a violent environment, similar to what is happening in some parts of 
Mexico, affect people’s daily activities. It is surprising that there are not many studies 
on the effects of narco violence on agricultural production and rural life. This source 
of agricultural risk is particular to Mexico at the present time; here, social psychology 
intersects with economy.  Of course, many other countries have gone through periods 
of generalized violence and insecurity, but for the case of Mexico the number of 
kidnapping, carjacking, and homicides have increased dramatically affecting people 
that have never experience this type of crimes.  
How risks are perceived is widely debated. The model used in chapter 3 is an 
ontological approach to risk. Given known properties of probabilities, we can and do 
construct a model from first principles and that data is treated as given. This is 
consistent with Knight’s view of risk and objective distributions. Whether events will 
conspire from multiple sources to remove collateral is a different matter. Farmers 
facing near identical circumstances will view risks through different lenses. The 
alterability of actions is largely cognitive and based on perceptions of risk which are 
largely subjective.  Even more so to acts of terrorism, in which affect depends on the 
environment. People respond to the stimuli of their environment, and those stimuli are 
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processes different depending on each individual characteristics and personal 
experiences.  
The way farmers process information related to agricultural and other risks can 
result in different types of behavior related to production and daily life. A description 
of various risk factors faced by Mexican farmers is provided next along with our 
proposed analysis. 
Statement of Objectives 
The overall objective of this dissertation is to investigate risks faced by 
Mexican farmers. The specific objectives are: 
1. To provide a basic understanding of Mexican agriculture and the risks 
they face from production and markets.  
To achieve this objective, in chapter 2 we summarize key 
metrics of production, demographics, risk factors and perceptions 
obtained from a field survey of 370 farmers in the northeastern 
Huasteca region. Through this survey, we are able to understand the 
income characteristics of the farmers, how they diversify risk, 
willingness to adopt new technologies and take risks, and perception of 
insecurity caused by narcos.  We also measured the willingness to pay 
for risk contingent credit, currently unavailable, which can increase 
participation in the credit market even for risk rationed individuals.  
 
2. To investigate mechanisms for price risk management for Mexican 
farmers. 
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To achieve this objective, in chapter 3 we applied a financial 
engineering product called quanto to estimate option prices for the 
main commodities grown in the study region. We use secondary data at 
various locations to estimate the quantos prices. By incorporating 
futures, exchange rate and local basis risk, we came up with put (and 
call) prices for three different commodities at various locations in 
Mexico. This model, by taking into account all risk factors that affect 
local prices, provides a more complete model for price insurance than 
one that just looks into exchange rate and futures price risk. We also 
show that this model can be expanded to many other commodities as 
long as local prices are correlated to a futures price in a commodities 
exchange, and also that there are no exchange rate restrictions.  
 
3. To investigate the relationship between risk rationing and credit 
demand. 
To achieve this objective, we provide two non-mutually 
exclusive investigations. The first, in chapter 4, examines the results of 
two farm surveys, in Mexico and China, which serve as empirical test 
and evidence of risk rationing according to the current definition.  The 
second investigation, in chapter 5, provides an alternative theoretical 
model for risk rationing and validates it using field data. We provide a 
more general interpretation of risk rationing, and investigate the 
mechanisms to include risk rationed producers into the credit market. 
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4. To investigate the impact of narcoterrorism on agriculture and rural 
life. 
To achieve this objective, in chapter 6 we investigate, using 
field surveys, the violence perception and fear level on several 
dimensions of farmers living in a conflict area where narco violence is 
a new phenomenon. We used methods and theories from psychology to 
investigate the effects of widespread violence on small scale farmers; 
specifically, we look on the changes of daily life and rural community 
dynamics.  
The remainder of this chapter expands on these ideas. 
It is important to mention that although all analysis described previously are 
related to the same topic, Mexican farmers' risks, each chapter is self-contained in a 
given topic and can be read on its own without the need to read earlier chapters. For 
this reason, the reader may find that two or more chapters have redundant elements. I 
justify these redundancies partly because they are incorporated in the context of each 
chapter, and partly for the reason of self-containment described above. 
Chapter 2 provides a summary of our Mexican farmers’ survey. These results 
give a clear picture on the background of the farmers in our area of study. This chapter 
provides a summary of the characteristics of the farmers under this study. 
Demographic, production and lifestyle information are captured through a survey 
conducted in 2011. The region of our study was chosen for three main reasons. First, 
many people there live off agriculture and complement their income with other 
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productive activities. Most of these farmers are small landowners that have the choice 
of planting among three crops. Therefore, it provides an opportunity to analyze crop 
choice. Second, we have a working relationship with a local producers’ association, 
Interagro de las Huastecas, S.A. de C.V. (Interagro). Through the help of Interagro, 
the survey was completed without any problem in a short time. Our local partner 
provided logistic support, sampling selection and enumerators. Last, when this 
research took place, the region was going through a period of insecurity caused by the 
presence of drug cartels (narcos) and its consequent criminal activities. Such criminal 
activities and the presence of narcos, army and navy were new phenomena for local 
people. This provides the opportunity to estimate how much this new type of risk is 
perceived and how much it affects rural life and agricultural production. Although 
Mexico has national statistics about rural communities, they are not design to capture 
risk perception and actions, and the frequency of them is too far apart. The results 
presented in this chapter provide a deeper understanding of small scale farmers and 
their activities at a time where safety conditions have changed.  
Chapter 3 investigates and provides a solution to commodity price risk faced 
by Mexican farmers. Commodity price insurance products are easily available to 
farmers in developed countries. For instance, institutional futures markets provide 
agricultural producers and buyers with financial derivatives to hedge against price 
uncertainty. Corn farmers in the US have access to futures and options contracts 
through the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME). The exchange provides price 
disclosure and standardized contracts, which facilitates commercial operations. 
However, in most developing countries, with no organized futures exchange, 
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producers and buyers do not have direct access to these types of products. In its World 
Development Report of 2005, The World Bank acknowledged the importance of 
reducing price risk as a priority for economic development. Among the policy options 
described in the report to manage risk, the main ones are the piloting and adoption of 
market-based risk management instruments; and the creation of countercyclical safety 
nets for poor farmers (World Bank, 2005). However, in most instances the market 
instruments required is a derivative of a security (e.g. futures contract) denominated in 
a currency that differs from the target client. For instance, the Mexican government 
through a marketing program buys options at a futures market in the US in order to 
hedge farmers and buyers positions. Using US wheat futures and options contracts are 
analyzed as a hedging strategy in Pakistan (Faruqee, Coleman and Scott,1977) . Thus, 
not only is basis and price risk critical elements but also important is foreign exchange 
rate.  
The burden of mispricing publicly provided risk management ultimately rests 
with either the farmers whom are to be the beneficiaries (if the price is too high) or tax 
payers (if the price is too low), and without computational guidance this can become 
costly. In order to fulfill programs such as discussed in the World Bank report, 
techniques are required to properly price risk on a probabilistic basis. Policy makers 
must take into account not only the price risk of the foreign security, but swings in 
exchange rates and local basis. This requires a unique approach and the purpose of this 
paper is to describe and illustrate the pricing mechanism on an actuarial basis using 
options theory. This chapter addresses the two policy priorities outlined by the World 
Bank by illustrating how futures price, basis and foreign exchange affect local cash 
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prices and its derivatives. These two policy priorities can be met by means of the 
market-based quanto (Quantity Adjusting Option) pricing mechanism described in this 
thesis. 
The subject matter of this analysis deals with the price protection of grains in 
Mexico. Problems faced by Mexican farmers are typical of the problems faced by 
producers of the World Bank target countries. In general, they lack the financial 
infrastructure needed to insure their crops, like institutional futures markets or over-
the-counter (OTC) markets. How we deal with the Mexican case lays out some 
fundamental strategies that can be scaled up or down to address similar issues in other 
developing agricultural economies where price risk is largely determined offshore, that 
is, from futures markets that affect local prices, and the foreign exchange rate. 
In Mexico, the most common way for grain producers to hedge price risk is by 
participating into a government sponsored forward contracts called Agricultura por 
Contrato. Under this program, contract prices at various local markets are reached 
through negotiations between producers and buyers, mediated by the government. 
Local prices are calculated by adding to the closest futures price contract quoted at the 
CME transportation, storage and financial costs to commodities at relevant port of 
entry. Depending on the distance to these ports, the basis for each local market is 
calculated. The price at each port of entry is also calculated on the futures price at the 
CME plus local basis, which are published and thus publicly available in the US.  
Although the benefits of price guaranteed programs, like Agricultura por 
Contrato are evident, there are also problems in its reach. The program subsidizes any 
contract cost to both parties and provides a guarantee against counterparty default. 
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Farmers are not subject to basis risk under this scheme; any price movement against 
the farmer is covered by the government. Nevertheless, the requirements for producers 
to be part of the program can be overwhelming and consequently some producers may 
not meet the criteria. Because this program is not market driven but politically 
motivated, the success of it depends on its assigned budget. There are times when 
farmers are left out due to lack of funding (Echánove, 2011). Excluded farmers may 
engage into forward contracts directly with large grain buyers and processors, but 
without government sponsorship these contracts are subject to default risk. Also, not 
all grain contracts in México are supported through this program. Our proposed model 
is a market-based alternative for price insurance; which unlike government insurance 
programs are not subject to assigned budgets or other selection criteria.  
Chapter 4 of this thesis looks at the current definition of risk rationing and 
compares it to our survey results for Mexican farmers. A contemporaneous and similar 
survey of Chinese farmers by Vararuth (2012)
1
 was also included in our analysis to 
complement and further understand and test the conditions for risk rationing. This 
section gives the foundation for understanding this concept and the incidence in two 
culturally different countries. 
In this analysis, we provide a specific test of  the Boucher, Carter and 
Guirkinger (2008) (BCG) framework to determine the extent of  risk rationing 
amongst potential rural borrowers. Using data from 372 farmers in northeastern 
Mexico and complementing the results with 730 farm households in the Shaanxi 
                                                 
1
 Vararuth's (2012) survey was conducted independently of this thesis research. However, once the 
Mexican data was collected, it was decided that the results should be combined into a single 
document. This document is provided in chapter 4. 
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province of China, we investigate factors associated with risk rationed, quantity 
rationed and price rationed farmers. The analysis applies both a linear probability and 
logit model. We find that in Mexico 35% of our sample is risk rationed, 10% quantity 
rationed and 55% price rationed; while in China, the incidence of risk rationing in 
farmers to be 6.5%, 14% for quantity rationed and 80% for price rationed. Results 
from Mexico indicate that the level of education is important in determining quantity 
rationing; and the results from China support the hypothesis that financial poor are 
more likely to be quantity rationed.  In both countries, asset wealthy farmers are less 
likely to be risk rationed; however, income doesn’t appear to have an impact. We 
provide evidence that the elasticity of demand for credit is different among the three 
groups of farmers: risk rationed, quantity rationed and price rationed. In Mexico, risk 
aversion is correlated with being risk rationed; while in China prudence is also 
significantly correlated with risk rationing. Our results suggest that efforts to enhance 
credit access must also deal with risk and risk perceptions. With some exceptions, our 
investigation supports the theoretical model presented in Boucher, Carter and 
Guirkinger (2008). 
The concept of risk rationing rounds out the various sources of credit 
constraints that include quantity and price rationing. Quantity rationed are defined as 
those individuals who are not offered credit, either their credit is not approved or they 
refrain from requesting it for they believe they do not qualify. Price rationed are those 
individuals who qualify for, and are offered credit. When considered in full, supply 
side quantity and price rationing and demand side price and risk rationing round out 
all possible factors that might give rise to a positive shadow price on a farm 
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household’s credit constraint. At the heart of risk rationing is the partitioning of non-
borrowers into those that do not borrow because of collateral risk and those that do not 
borrow because of they have no need. Guirkinger and Boucher (2008) develop a 
model and show that collateral requirements imposed by lenders in response to 
asymmetric information can cause not only quantity rationing but also transaction cost 
rationing and risk rationing. In a related work Boucher, Guirkinger, and Trivelli 
(2009) used survey data from Peru to measure the incidence and impact of credit 
constraints in the formal credit sector. They find that risk rationed households account 
for a significant fraction of the sample as indicated above. They also provide examples 
of responses associated with risk rationing. Of these, the most common response in 
each of the surveys they conducted was “I don’t want to risk my land”.  
We believe risk rationing, as a topic of inquiry, is critically important in 
understanding borrower behavior and credit decisions in agricultural development, and 
find the models presented in BCG intriguing from the points of view of academic 
completeness and public policy guidance. Our surveys were instrumented to 
specifically test the conjectures and hypotheses of BCG and to examine further 
endogenous relationships that might prove important to a deeper understanding of risk 
rationing. Our approach uses the direct elicitation methodology (DEM), where a set of 
questions directly elicits the household’s status as either credit constrained versus 
unconstrained, and is similar to an approach recommended in Boucher, Guirkinger and 
Trivellini (2009).  Endogenous characteristics that we estimate econometrically 
include credit demand and credit demand elasticities, informal lending, property 
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rights, entrepreneurship, risk aversion, prudence, wealth, insurance markets and 
asymmetric information. 
Chapter 5 provides a different optic to understand risk rationing.  Based on the 
results from our field studies and from the current definition of risk rationing, I create 
a more general definition which I test and validate empirically. This new definition 
provides a clear understanding of what makes people risk rationed, and also provides 
suggestions on policy implications to move farmers out of the risk rationing state. 
I present a utility model of a risk rationed individual as defined by Boucher 
(2008), and illustrate the effects of higher moments in the utility function and the 
relationship with the risk aversion, prudence and downside risk aversion coefficients. 
The term Risk Rationed describes an individual that having the asset wealth to 
qualify for a credit, voluntarily refrains from it for fear of losing his collateral. This 
consideration of preserving wealth by means of minimizing the probability of falling 
below a threshold income level was first analyzed by Roy (1952). His Safety First 
model became the precursor of the Sharpe Ratio, which is widely used in investment 
decisions. This model is based on the first two moments of the distribution of returns. 
Similarly, Markowitz (1952), and Tobin (1958) provide risk models using mean –
variance analysis. Samuelson (1970) criticized the mean-variance model as being 
confined only when the distribution of the variable of interest is Gaussian or when the 
utility function is quadratic, which “leads to well-known absurdities”, namely, 
reducing risk aversion in wealth. However, the mean-variance model provides a good 
approximation when the risk is limited, i.e. near 0. If the variance of the distribution in 
question is sufficiently large as to have significant higher moments, then a two 
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moment approximation will not converge to the true solution and the inclusion of the 
higher moments will be needed for a better result.  
The inclusion of the third moment of a distribution in the utility function 
reflects the downside risk of a random variable. A positive skewness decreases 
downside risk, while a negative one increases it. Menezes el at. (1980), gives a general 
definition of increasing downside risk as the following: “one distribution has more 
downside risk than another if it can be obtained from the other by a sequence of 
probability transfers which unambiguously shift dispersion from right to the left 
without changing the mean and variance.” Cain and Peel (2004) studied the preference 
for gambles and stated that a risk-averse person has a preference for skewness; 
Moreover, a tradeoff exists among mean, variance and skewness. People are willing to 
trade a negative expected mean of returns for a positive skewness. According to Golec 
and Tamarkin (1998), the preference for skewness can be sufficiently large that even 
though people are faced with negative expected return and high variance on a gamble, 
they would still take the gamble as long as the skewness is sufficiently large. Peel 
(2012), on the other hand, provides examples where given different characteristics of 
lotteries and utility functions, risk-averse individuals do not necessarily prefer a more 
skewed distribution with equal mean or variance. However, investor’s preferences for 
skewness in returns are so common that there exist many mechanisms in the market to 
increase positive skewness of returns. Tsiang (1972) cites limited liability, prearranged 
stop-loss sales on stocks, and put and call options as examples of market mechanism 
to increase positive skewness of returns. Diminishing the magnitude of a financial loss 
and increasing the magnitude of the gain are ways to increase the skewness of returns. 
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Similarly, increasing the size of a loss and limiting gains decrease the skewness of the 
return distribution, and even make it negative, which is avoided by investors. This can 
occur if the income level of a firm is sufficiently low that it may be forced into 
bankruptcy and into liquidation of assets. The size of the loss in assets due to 
liquidations is related to the amount owed to creditors. If a firm’s loss due to asset 
liquidation is sufficiently large, it may exhibit a jump discontinuity at a critical income 
level. Falling below that level would force the firm to liquidate assets in order to meet 
its obligations. Mason (1974) provides evidence of a utility function with a 
discontinuity in the form of a vertical jump, representing a large loss in utility due to 
income falling below a critical level. He makes analogies that the threshold is some 
situation that will lead us into an undesirable state of nature and thus cause a large 
disutility, like a divorce or being declared bankrupt. In this model, people get utility 
from both: income (or any variable of interest), and the state of nature. The different 
states are defined by being above or below the threshold level. Mason also states that 
an individual may show risk loving behavior in order to avoid falling into the bad state 
of nature; for instance, an investor may increase his share of an asset as its variance 
increases, even when its expected return is low, as long as the minimum return is not 
lower than the threshold level. This behavior relates to Roy’s (1952) safety first 
criterion. Robinson and Lev (1986), referring to Mason’s model, provide an example 
of a firm facing liquidation costs as the source of a disutility jump. They explain that 
the firm’s decisions are to avoid falling below the threshold that causes the disutility 
jump. An investor may refrain from borrowing if the disutility caused by liquidating 
assets in the case of default is sufficiently large. 
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Chapter 6, the last paper of this thesis, addresses the current problem of 
widespread violence caused by narcos in Mexico. This is perhaps the first study on the 
effects of narco violence on agricultural production and rural life in Mexico. My 
interest on this subject began while preparing the farm survey for Mexico. I realized 
that the level of violence in the area of study increased dramatically in less than four 
years from virtually zero. In our survey, many people reported high anxiety level from 
fear of being a crime victim. Although most of the farmers we interviewed were small 
land holders, all of them were aware of the high violence level and most of them were 
concerned that they or a family member become victimized. Under the methodology 
developed by Slovic, I categorized the respondents in four groups using cluster 
analysis and compare their economic and demographic variables. I also analyzed the 
perception and reaction to violence using a psychology framework. 
The level of violence in Mexico caused by the ongoing war on drugs has 
escalated dramatically in scale and scope affecting all members of Mexican society in 
many parts of the country. Based on official data from several government agencies, 
from December of 2006, when then newly elected president Felipe Calderon declared 
the war on drugs, to December of 2012, the newspaper Zeta estimates the number of 
homicides related to the drug war at over 50,000 (Proceso, May 28, 2012). Although 
most of these casualties are believed to be members of the drug cartels and 
government forces, many victims have been civilians unrelated to any side of the 
conflict. For instance, one of the most violent cases of attacks to innocent civilians is 
the arson of a casino in the city of Monterrey in August 2011, resulting in the dead of 
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53 people. This attack was perpetrated by a drug cartel when the casino refused to 
make extortion payments (Excelsior, August 26, 2011).   
Among the risks derived from the drug war that affects civilians are 
kidnapping, extortion and carjacking. According to the Sistema Nacional de Seguridad 
Publica (2011) (National System of Public Safety), the official number of kidnaps in 
2006 was 80% higher than the previous year. This number rose by 27% in 2007. The 
same agency reported the official number of extortions in 2007 to be 3,123. 
Kidnapping and extortion, along with homicide, are also called high-impact crimes for 
the lacerating effect that they have on society. Being exposed to these kinds of 
traumatic events, including disasters and acts of terrorism, create cognitive, emotional 
and social effects on the victims (Alexander D., Klein S., 2009). Some of these effects 
range from sleep disturbances, worry, and irritability to severe ones like psychic 
numbing, and recurring thoughts about the stressor (T. Markesteyn, 1992).  
As dramatic as these events are, we are unaware of any studies that have 
investigated how narco violence impact the human psyche, the changes in risk 
perception, or how it affects life in general. More specific to this analysis is the effect 
of narco violence on agricultural productivity and rural life. By rural life we are 
interested not only in action but also perception, with the latter occurring at the 
emotional level.  I measure degrees of affect (a feeling of good and bad), defined by 
Slovic et al. (2007), of small farmers in the conflict zone. Specifically, I look in the 
emotions of farmers caused by the idea and actions of drug cartel members (narcos). 
Our area of study is located in a tri-state region in northeast Mexico, about 40 miles 
South from Tampico, where for the past years the level of drug related violence has 
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been overwhelming. Local police have been supported by convoyed federal forces. In 
some cases, local police have been investigated on corruption and complicity with the 
drug cartels. They are dismantled completely if enough evidence is found. When this 
happens, military forces take over their duty of patrolling and enforcing security. The 
cities of Tampico and Veracruz are cases where the military are in charge of the local 
security (Proceso, April 19, 2012).  
To investigate narco violence on economics and rural life we need to step back 
from traditional economic paradigms to gain an understanding of behavior itself. Thus, 
our study is more tied to psychology than economics, and in doing so we make some 
observations about behavior that are satisfying to both camps. In the psychological 
realm the problem posed is to know from which areas of psychology do we 
investigate. Two become clearly relevant, and we tie them together in a way which we 
have not previously seen done. The first is from the point of view of ecological 
psychology.  Ecological psychology evolved principally from Gibson (1986) about 
how organisms relate to their environment. The domain of his research in ecological 
psychology has not at all been in the social domain, as is our interest in this paper, but 
the physical domain (P. Kugler, M.T. Turvey (1987); M.T. Turvey (2009); R. Shaw 
(2003)). The second strand views people’s decision making as the interaction of two 
systems: the emotional and the analytical.  This method of understanding decisions is 
called Dual Process. Under this paradigm, people’s decisions are affected by their fear 
level, or the emotions invoked from an event; and also by their objective assessment of 
the probability of an event, a rational mechanism. This part of social psychology 
follows Slovic (2002, 2004); Slovic, Lichtenstein, and Fischhoff (1984); Finucane and 
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Holup (2006); Loewenstein, G., & O'Donoghue, T. (2005); Mukherjee K. (2010); 
Schulze W, & Wansink B. (2012). The two areas are different in several ways. Risk 
perceptions are for the most part non evolving, static events, where the ecological 
approach is dynamical. This does not mean that in terms of the researchers’ toolkit the 
two strands of psychology should not be viewed as being mutually exclusive, but 
simply needs to be looked at through a different lens to see the connection. We argue 
that the Dual Process theory can complement the ecological psychology model, and to 
an extent we can say that the Dual Process is contained in the ecological psychology 
framework.   
This paper within the thesis analyzes the relationship between psychometric 
measures of risk perception and socioeconomic variables of small farmers living in a 
drug conflict zone in Mexico. Farmers are classified into four groups, depending on 
their level of fear, and familiarity with living under risk and trust to authorities. For 
each of the four groups created I ran a multivariate regression on demographic, social 
and economic variables. In accordance to the literature, I find significant factors that 
determine group classification. Each of the groups is used as explanatory variables for 
determining stated changes in behavior due to violence. To our knowledge, this is the 
first study on small farmers’ risk perception and production in conflict areas, 
specifically in the drug conflict areas in Mexico. Our results show that the current war 
on drugs in Mexico is not only affecting the urban population as it is widely perceived, 
but it is also affecting low income farmers. The increase in risk perception due to 
criminal activity also has an effect on their risk taking behavior and adoption of new 
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production technology. Our results can help determine a strategy to lessen those risks 
perceptions and improve rural life. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
DESCRIPTION OF SMALL SCALE MEXICAN FARMERS 
 
Introduction 
This chapter provides a summary of the characteristics of the farmers under 
this study. Demographic, production and lifestyle information are captured through a 
survey conducted in 2011. The region of our study was chosen for three main reasons. 
First, many people there live off agriculture and complement their income with other 
productive activities. Most of these farmers are small landowners that have the choice 
of planting among three crops. Therefore, it provides an opportunity to analyze crop 
choice. Second, we have a working relationship with a local producers’ association, 
Interagro de las Huastecas, S.A. de C.V. (Interagro). Through the help of Interagro, 
the survey was completed without any problem in a short time. Our local partner 
provided logistic support, sampling selection and enumerators. Last, when this 
research took place, the region was going through a period of insecurity caused by the 
presence of drug cartels (narcos) and its consequent criminal activities. Such criminal 
activities and the presence of narcos, army and navy were new phenomena for local 
people. This provides the opportunity to estimate how much this new type of risk is 
perceived and how much it affects rural life and agricultural production. Although 
Mexico has national statistics about rural communities, they are not design to capture 
risk perception and actions, and the frequency of them is too far apart. The results 
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presented in this chapter provide a deeper understanding of small scale farmers and 
their activities at a time where safety conditions have changed.  
The survey took place in September 2011 in a region known as the Huasteca in 
the state of San Luis Potosi, Mexico; specifically, in the municipalities of Ebano and 
Tamuin. The survey can be found in the appendix of this dissertation. The area of 
study is located approximately 80 Km west of Tampico, bordering the states of 
Tamaulipas and Veracruz. Given the location near a tri-state border, and a strategic 
route to Texas from southern Mexico, this region has become a turf war zone between 
two drug cartels starting few years back. However, the level of violence escalated in 
2010, when the government killed a cartel’s leader. At the time of this survey, 
violence level was so widespread that it affected the daily lives of people not involved 
in criminal activities. Narcos would find in kidnapping and extortion profitable 
activities. The presence of federal forces on highways and towns became a common 
sight, to the extent that in Tampico, the Mexican army and navy took over the duty of 
patrolling the city dismantling the local police, corrupted by the narcos. 
The sampling and logistics were coordinated by our local partner. Interagro 
arranged the visits to the villages we surveyed. Those villages were selected to obtain 
a representative sample of farmers of that region. Our daily routine consisted in 
meeting the enumerators and Interagro’s field engineer at the association’s premises. 
The field engineer would arrange the trip to the population centers and inform us who 
to meet at each location in order to have a suitable meeting place and advertising of 
the survey to local farmers. The congregation place is generally a village main square 
or a public warehouse. Sometimes even the shade of some trees provided the 
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congregation point to conduct the study. Most of time, farmers were invited to 
participate in our survey through loudspeakers located in the main public areas and 
others located strategically throughout the village. This is the most common way of 
conveying news in those rural communities, thus everyone is attentive to 
loudspeakers’ messages. Many small scale farmers in Mexico belong to production 
cooperatives called ejidos. In some occasions we would talk to various ejidos’ leaders 
to invite their members. Although this method reduces randomness in our sample, we 
tried to counter it by randomly selecting ejidos and limiting the number of member 
allowed to take the survey. Interagro provided the list of all ejidos within a village and 
their number of members, with this information we made the sampling as 
representative as possible. Even though some farmers are members of Interagro, our 
sampling decision was not affected by its membership. We analyzed any differences 
between members and non-members for academic completeness. Local college 
students were hired as enumerators. They responded to an ad placed in the local TV 
station. The enumerators were trained in two days: one day at the office and one day 
on the field. The data collected from the first day was not used in these results; we 
treated that day as a learning experience. A typical day in the field would start at 8am 
and finish at 5pm, for safety considerations we didn’t stay in the villages past 5pm.   
372 small scale farmers were interviewed between September 13
th
 and 26
th
 of 
2011 in five different population centers in the region of Ebano and Tamuin, San Luis 
Potosi. The region of study is about 600 Km
2
, being Ebano and Tamuin the largest 
towns with populations of 41,000 and 38,000 people respectively. Among the 
population centers that we study, the largest has about 6,000 people, while the smallest 
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about 3,000. Each survey participant was given $100 pesos to answer the survey, 
about a day’s wage. This amount was divided into $80 pesos for completing the 
survey and $20 more if they agree to participate in a second survey a year later. The 
survey took about 45 minutes to complete. As a anecdotal account of farmer honesty, 
few participants did not want to accept the $20 pesos because they could not guarantee 
that they will be alive at the time of the second survey. 
All farmers showed willingness to participate in the survey. Some farmers 
have taken part in past surveys before, mostly surveys from governmental agencies 
related to social programs. In fact, in two occasions we coincided in the same village 
with employees from the federal government conducting surveys to women belonging 
to a social program called Oportunidades. 
 
Demographic Data 
Among all farmers interviewed, 86% are men and 14% female, ranging in age 
from 18 (legal age) to 87 years with an average of 53. 75% are married, 10% live 
under cohabitation, 5% are widowed and 8% are single. The divorce rate of the 
farmers is 2%, while the national average is 16%. 92% of farmers have children, being 
the average number of children 5 and the maximum 15. Among farmers who have 
children, 7.5% of them have 10 children or more. Although there are some families 
with more than 10 children, the average number of children, 5, is still very large 
compared to the national average (2.2). This average does not vary depending on the 
gender of the respondent (5.02 for women respondent and 5.08 for male respondent). 
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The average number of people in a household is 5 with a maximum of 17. The 
national average is lower at 3.9.  
Mexico, starting in 2011, requires students to complete high school by law; 
despite this, the education level of the farmers in our study is very low. Among people 
older than 23 years old, 16.4% never went to school at all, 39.7 % attended elementary 
school but did not finish.  Only 44 % completed elementary school, and 3.5% 
completed high school. From the sample, 3 people (0.8%) completed a technical 
degree, and 1 attended but did not finish technical school. However, government plans 
that in 2022, 100% of students in the country have access to high school. In Table 2.1, 
education is coded as follows: 0 = never attended school, 1 = some elementary school, 
2 = finished elementary school, 3 = some middle school, 4 = finished middle school, 5 
= some high school, 6 = finished high school, 7 = some college or technical school, 8 
= finished college or technical school.  
According to the national census (INEGI), 84% of the population in Mexico is 
catholic. The findings in our study are consistent with this rate, 80.91% of our sample 
responded to be Catholics. 20.67% attend only one religious celebration per month, 
and 86% attend on average once a week. Only 4% of the sample does not attend 
religious celebrations.  
Land tenure in our area of study is mostly private. Most farmers belong to 
ejidos, a communal production group where each member own a given number of 
hectares but they would work together as a commune, under that scheme, nobody 
could sell their land. However, nowadays ejido members have legal possession of their 
land and can sell it and use it as collateral for credit. Ejidos were created when 
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government allocated land to a group of landless farmers. Currently, no more land is 
expropriated to create ejidos. In our sample, 80% of farmers were given land as ejidos, 
9.5% bought their land, and 6.8% inherited it. Almost all farmers, 97%, are sole 
owners of their land, just 2% rent land and 0.5% or farmers own land in a partnership. 
As a result that most of land was allocated by the government to ejido members, 66% 
own 10Ha or less, and 91% own 15Ha or less. Farm size doesn’t change much. 
The use of technologies of production such as fertilizers and pesticides are 
common among these farmers. 77% of farmers reported to use fertilizers and 97% 
used pesticides. However, only 28% of farmers have irrigation, mostly flood 
irrigation. These farmers are located near irrigation canals.  
Agricultural credit is not very prevalent. 74% do not have agricultural credit, 
but those who borrow their average loan is 4,410 mxp, which is about 0.88% of the 
average total asset value. This refers to a loan taken by farmers to pay for production 
costs. Lines of credit do not seem to be included under agricultural credit. Lines of 
credit are included in total debt, not only on agricultural credit. Total debt stated 
includes lines of credit from buyers of agricultural suppliers, loans from friends or 
relatives, local lenders and associations. Among all farmers, 39% have any amount of 
debt. The average debt among all farmers is 8,250 pesos, ranging from no debt to 
150,000 pesos. Among all farmers with debt, the average debt is 23,101 pesos. Most 
of this debt comes from lines of credit from the suppliers, about 56%, followed by 
loans from financial institutions, 25% of borrowers borrowed from financial 
institutions. About 7% of all borrowers borrowed from local lenders. These farmers 
pay the highest interest rate, 62% on average ranging from 16 to 144%.  
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Table 2.1. Sample statistics of surveyed farmers. 
Variable mean min max 
Female 0.1370 0 1 
Age 52.7957 18 87 
Education 1.8428 0 8 
Children 0.9193 0 1 
Number of Children 4.9535 0 15 
Catholic 0.8091 0 1 
Religious celebrations 
per month 3.1580 0 30 
Farm size 10.8482 0 40 
Farming years 21.9752 1 68 
Irrigation 0.2795 0 1 
Fertilizers 0.7729 0 1 
Pesticides 0.9704 0 1 
Farm Revenue 44550.4 0 400000 
Total Revenue 64825.97 6000 450000 
Procampo 5653.737 0 27000 
Oportunidades 3312.637 0 70800 
Total Income 35107.34 4000 212000 
Debt 0.3951 0 1 
Debt amount 8250.57 0 150000 
Agricultural loan 0.256338 0 1 
Amount Ag. loan 4410.753 0 114000 
Total Asset Value 502596 12000 
250000
0 
 
 
Table 2.2.Debt source, amount owed and interest rate. 
  
Loan  
  
Interest Rate 
 
Source Number Average Min Max Average Min Max 
Friends 11 8181 800 50000 15 0 60 
Relatives 7 7357 500 18000 0 0 0 
Financial Institutions 20 30550 2000 150000 35 12 97 
Local Lender 9 32800 2000 100000 62 16 144 
Buyer 13 17730 3000 40000 40 18 72 
Supplier 70 20192 400 100000 36 12 132 
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Farmers were asked to rate several statements regarding borrowing habits from 
totally disagree to completely agree (1-5) using a Likert type scale. From these 
responses we find that 30% of farmers are afraid of borrowing formally from banks or 
buyers, while 50% stated that they are not afraid of borrowing formally. Most farmers 
have no outstanding debts with financial institutions or buyers (70%), while 12% 
claim to have outstanding debt with them. 73% claim that the interest rates charged by 
banks are much higher than the interest rate charged by friends and relatives. Almost 
all farmers (86%) state that they prefer to borrow from friends and relatives than 
formally at higher interest rates. 79% of farmers do not like to be indebted to financial 
institutions of buyers. Even if they could get a low interest rate from formal lenders, 
55% would still not borrow from financial institutions; instead they would rather 
borrow from a friend or relative. When asked to rate the statement that if they would 
reduce input use for production in case they cannot borrow, almost 60% either agree 
or completely agree to it. About 60% agreed that if they cannot borrow, they would 
look for a job. About 50% do not agree that their children’s education or healthcare is 
jeopardized by their inability to borrow; 34% believe education and healthcare are 
jeopardized by the lack of access to credit, while 18% are uncertain. Finally, when 
asked what they would do if they had all access to all the credit they needed 78% say 
that they would  stay in agriculture and increase production. 17% mention that they 
would start a non-agricultural business but stay in agriculture; only 2.4% would leave 
agriculture and start a non-agricultural business.  
In order to measure the willingness to give up farming, farmers were asked 
about the minimum salary that they are willing to accept in order to work full time and 
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leave their farm, either by selling or renting it.  87% of farmers are willing to take a 
job and leave their land, while 13% would not leave their land despite the monthly 
salary offered. Among those willing to take a job, they would accept an average 
monthly salary of 5,735 pesos. This salary is much higher than their farm revenues or 
total income; also, farm revenue and total income are higher for farmers willing to get 
a paid job than those unwilling. Farmers may be unwilling to take a paid job, even 
when it provides a higher (and steadier) income than farming, because of the utility 
they get from their land is higher than the utility obtained from a higher income. This 
may also be a reflection of the status quo bias; they are less willing to change their 
status quo or to give up something that they already own.  Even for willing farmers, 
the high salary suggests that farmers have an intrinsic value of being a farmer. This 
can be the result of the lifestyle that farming offers, being their own boss, or simply 
because of the feeling of security of holding land. Unwilling farmers are more likely to 
have procampo subsidy than willing farmers. The safe cash transfer that this subsidy 
program provides creates more stickiness in the willingness to leave their land, even 
though their total income, including subsidies, is lower than what most farmers are 
willing to accept for a steady salary. These preferences should be taking into account 
when analyzing farmers’ welfare 
 
Table 2.3.Farmers willing to take a paid job and leave their farm. 
Willing to  
Leave Land  
Percentage 
 of Total Age Education Min. Salary 
Total Income 
 (mxp) 
Percentage with 
Procampo 
0 13.47% 59 1.00 - 33,954 75.76% 
1 86.53% 51 1.94 5,735 40,481 63.03% 
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Farmers reluctant to give up their land for a steady job are usually older and 
have more children. These results are summarized in Table 2.3. It is worth to note that 
education is lower on those farmers unwilling to give up their land. From Table 2.4, I 
find that among people willing to give up their land for a steady job, 100% inherited 
their land, 93% bought their land, while 83% obtained their land from the government. 
It seems that it is more likely for someone to give up their land if they inherit or 
bought it rather than having obtained it through a government land reform program. 
However, most of people who received their land through the land reform are older 
and have the lowest level of education among all other forms of land origination.  
 
Table 2.4.Land origin and willingness to take a paid job and leave their farm. 
Land Origin Age Education Number of Children Willing to Leave Land 
Bought 45 2.34 3.79 93% 
Inherited 40 3.16 3.38 100% 
Given 55 1.61 5.47 83% 
Other 33 3.50 3.22 100% 
 
Among all farmers, the average farming experience is 22 years, ranging from 1 
to 68 years. The average farming experience for farmers who plan on growing corn as 
the main crop for next season is 22 years, for sorghum is 24 years and for soybeans is 
20 years. The difference in mean is significant for soybean and sorghum farmers. 
Similarly, the average farmer age given planned crop is 53 for corn, 56 for sorghum 
and 50 for soybeans. They are statistically different from each other.  
Farming experience and age is different depending on how farmers obtained 
their land. This may not be surprising, since expropriation of private land to distribute 
among landless is no longer possible. The last expropriation of private land took place 
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about 1997 in this region. Farmers who bought their land have on average 12 years of 
experience and 45 years of age, those who inherited their land have 14 years of 
experience and are 40 years old, those who received their land from the government 
(80% of all farmers) have on average 24 years of farming experience and are 55 years 
old. It seems that farmers who inherited their land started farming at the youngest age 
among the other groups (26 years old against 33 and 31 for farmers who bought and 
received it from the government respectively.   
Revenue from farming activities also depends on experience and age. After 
running a regression of farm revenue on farming years and age, I find that age affects 
farm revenue negatively, but experience affects it positively. However, the magnitude 
of the effect of age is greater than the effect of experience (-464 and 342 respectively). 
Age is statistically significant at p= 0.05, while experience is marginally significant at 
p= 0.19. As one ages, their physical and mental capacity also diminishes after reaching 
an optimal point. Considering this, I ran a second regression that includes age squared 
to capture the decreasing effect of age. The results have a positive value for farming 
years (p= 0.30), a positive and significant value for age (p= 0.12), and a negative and 
significant value for age squared (p= 0.05). This indicates that after a certain age, its 
effect on farm revenue start to decrease but the effect of experience remains positive.  
Farming experience has a positive effect on the willingness to adopt new 
technology. Using a series of questions related to the willingness to use new 
technology and the importance of hedging strategies, I created an index of risk 
aversion. Regressing this index on farming experience and age I find that experience is 
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positive and marginally significant at p= 0.28; while age is positive but not significant 
(p= 0.90)  
 
Income Structure 
Not surprising, most of farmer’s total income comes from farming activities 
(60%), but many farmers complement their income through government programs, 
remittances and labor work. In this region all farmers have the option of planting corn, 
sorghum and soybeans depending on their soil quality, access to water, risk taking 
behavior and expected revenue per hectare.  
In general, small farmers’ earnings are very low. The national average 
minimum wage in Mexico for 2011 was 1,740 pesos per month (INEGI). Some 
farmers do not earn this much from farming activities. The average farm revenue from 
our sample is 44,550 pesos per year, or 3,712 per month, more than double the 
minimum wage. However, if we look at farmers according to their land size the results 
tell a different story. Farmers who have less than 10 hectares have average revenues of 
29,747 pesos per year, those who have 10 hectares (mode) have sales of 40,825 / year, 
larger than 10 and up to 15 hectares the average revenue is 60,232, and for those 
farmers who have a farm larger than 15 hectares their average revenues is 61,019 
pesos. It is important to remember that these figures are farm revenues and not net 
profit.  
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Table 2.5.Mean farm revenue and farm size. 
 
Mean Farm Revenue 
Farm Size (Ha) Observations Year Month 
< 10 98 29,747 2,478 
10 148 40,825 3,402 
> 10, < =15 93 60,232 5,019 
> 15 33 61,019 5,084 
 
Farm revenue depends on the type of crop planted and technology used. 
Farmers whose main crop in 2011 was soybeans showed the highest farm revenue and 
farm revenue per hectare in that year. The average revenue per hectare of soybeans 
was 5,888 pesos; followed by sorghum with 3,217 pesos / ha; and corn with 2,856 
pesos / ha. In that year, 2011, most of people grew sorghum as their main crop (142 
people) then soybeans (140 people) and finally corn (68 people). For the following 
year, 2012, many people switched from soybeans to corn and sorghum. Perhaps the 
net income from soybeans in 2011 was not large enough to justify the higher risk of 
this crop. Irrigation plays a very important role in farm revenue. Average revenue per 
hectare for corn without irrigation is 2,418 pesos, with irrigation this amount increases 
to 4,675 pesos. For sorghum it is 2,863 and 8,450; and for soybeans 4,536 and 6,989. 
When only fertilizers are used without access to irrigation the revenue per hectare is 
only slightly higher than the average revenue per hectare without irrigation. Fertilizers 
may not work if there is no water available to the crops. Their effectiveness is 
dependent on weather conditions. However, when both fertilizers and irrigation are 
used the revenue per hectare increases by a large degree. For instance, corn revenue 
per hectare when irrigation is available and fertilizers used increased to 6,386 pesos 
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per hectare compared to 2,784 pesos when fertilizers are used but no irrigation. More 
dramatic is the case of sorghum, where the revenue per hectare with fertilizer and no 
irrigation is 2,842 pesos, but once irrigation is used it increases to 11,284 pesos, an 
increase of almost 4 times.  
 
Table 2.6.Mean farm revenue per hectare by crop for 2011. 
  
Mean Revenue per Hectare 
  Main 
Crop Observations 
All 
farmers 
Without 
Irrigation 
With 
Irrigation 
Fertilizer + 
 No Irrigation 
Fertilizer + 
Irrigation 
Corn 68 2,856 2,418 4,675 2,784 6,386 
Sorghum 142 3,218 2,863 8,450 2,842 11,284 
Soybeans 140 5,889 4,536 6,989 4,669 7,380 
 
Farm insurance is not widely adopted by these farmers. Even though 37% of 
farmers know about it, only 9.7% of them buy crop insurance. Crop insurance is 
generally available through grain buyers and through producers’ associations when 
farmers join the government’s price support program. In the survey, farmers 
responded their willingness to pay for an insurance product that guarantees minimum 
revenue per hectare for each of the three crops. This product is not yet available in the 
Mexican market. Farmers responded on their willingness to pay in a scale from 1 to 4 
for a range of prices that guarantees the average revenue per hectare for each crop. 
Insurance price ranged from 15% to 0.5% of payoff per hectare. For corn, 70% would 
not buy the revenue insurance at the 15% premium. Only when the premium 
decreased to 3% of the payoff, 65% of farmers showed a willingness to buy the 
insurance. Farmers showed a higher demand for sorghum revenue insurance. At the 
15% price premium, 60% were interested in buying the product, and at 8% premium 
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91% of farmers were willing to buy it. Similar results were obtained for soybean 
revenue insurance, 82% of farmers willing to buy the insurance at the price of 8% of 
payoffs. Although farm insurance is not very prevalent in Mexico, a great percentage 
of farmers showed interest in revenue insurance, with over 65% of farmers having a 
strong willingness to pay for this product for all crops.  
Non-farm income is also an important part of total income for some farmers. It 
comprises mainly government programs, remittances and labor work. One major 
government program aimed at agricultural production is called procampo. 251 farmers 
from our sample received procampo subsidy, 67% of total sample, under this 
production subsidy the government provides farmers a specific amount for hectare 
planted according to the crop planted. The average procampo received is 8,379 mxp 
per farmer, or about 25% of total farm income.  Farmers who did not receive 
procampo have similar farm income, without including subsidies, than those who 
received procampo. However, the total revenue for procampo recipients is slightly 
higher than non-recipients. Another major subsidy is called oportunidades. This 
program is a cash transfer aimed at women with children to help in their development 
and education. This program is conditional on children attending school. 52% of the 
sample households receive oportunidades. They have a significant smaller farm 
income than non-recipients of oportunidades, 54,140 and 35,559. This is consistent 
with the objective of the program to help the poorest families. Similarly, farmers who 
receive both programs (35% of sample) have the lowest average farm income at 
33,471. These two government programs are the main cash transfers for poor rural 
families. 
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In our sample, 16.4% of farmers do not receive any of these two subsidies. 
32% of households receive procampo only, 16% receive oportunidades only, and 
35.4% receive both subsidies. Those who do not have any type of subsidy have the 
shortest time farming (17 years) compared to recipients of procampo (23 years) and 
recipients of both subsidies (26 years). Farm revenue varies according to subsidies 
received. Farmers who do not have any of the two subsidies average 4,423 pesos per 
hectare in farm revenues. Those who receive only procampo average 4,898 pesos. If 
they only receive oportunidades, their average revenue is 4,062 pesos. However, if 
they receive both subsidies, their average revenue per hectare is 3,374. We can see that 
production subsidy improves the average revenue if the household only receives this 
subsidy. Farmers who receive oportunidades only have the second lowest revenue per 
hectare. This may reflect the fact that oportunidades is aimed at the poorest families, 
and thus those with the lowest productivity. Interesting to note is that households that 
receive the production subsidy along with oportunidades, have the lowest average 
revenue per hectare among all groups. Perhaps the use of the production subsidy is not 
being used appropriately.  
 
Table 2.7.Mean farm revenue per hectare by main crop in 2011. 
    
Main Crop 2011 
  
Subsidy 
 
Farm revenue / Ha Age Corn Sorghum Soybeans Other 
None 
 
4,423 49 20% 33% 38% 9% 
Procampo 4,898 54 12% 38% 49% 1% 
Oportunidades 4,062 51 32% 35% 25% 8% 
Both 
 
3,374 54 17% 42% 33% 8% 
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Table 2.7 shows the main crops planted in 2011 for each category of subsidy 
received. Since procampo is given to the farmer conditioned on planting a given crop, 
we would expect that most of these farmers would plant any of the three main crops. 
In this region only these three crops are subject to the procampo subsidy. 1% of only 
procampo recipients did not plant one of the three main crops. However, for 
households that received both subsidies 8% of them did not grow any of the three 
crops as their main crop in 2011. 42% of them planted sorghum as their main crop, 
which is deemed as the safest crop among the three. In contrast, 38% farmers who do 
not receive any of the two main subsidies planted soybeans as their main crop. 
Procampo only recipients planted on average the most soybeans as their main crop 
(49%). Households that do not receive procampo, but receive only oportunidades grow 
on average the least soybeans. This may be because they do not have a production 
incentive and thus try to avoid the riskier crops. 
The social program oportunidades provides cash transfer to low income 
families and those families that live in high poverty areas (Sedesol). Priority is given 
to women with children under 22 and to women of childbearing age, but all families 
whose income is under a threshold level can join the program. The purpose of this 
program is to increase human development through cash transfer conditional on 
children’s school attendance and proper food intake. Beneficiaries of the program 
need to comply with regular medical checkups conducted at their locations. The 
amount that oportunidades beneficiaries receive depends mostly on the number of 
family members under 22 years old. There is a maximum amount a family can receive 
regardless of the number of children. In the sample, the group that only received 
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oportunidades has the highest number of children among all other groups at 5.6. 
Beneficiaries of both programs, procampo and oportunidades, have on average 5.4 
children while non-beneficiaries of any program average 4.2.  
If we look at the respondents who are head of household, the results still hold 
for oportunidades recipients having the most number of children. Head of households 
who do not belong to any government program have the fewest average children 
(4.38) followed by procampo beneficiaries (4.69), beneficiaries of both programs 
(5.62), and finally oportunidades beneficiaries (5.87).  
Oportunidades beneficiaries who are head of household also have the largest 
number of children under 6 and between 6 and 18 years old. They average 0.92 
children under 6 years old, in contrast with non-beneficiaries at 0.74 children, a 
difference of 24%. Oportunidades beneficiaries have on average 1.95 children 
between the ages of 6 and 18, recipients of both programs average 1.96 children, while 
progresa beneficiaries average 1.31, and non-beneficiaries 1.45.  Looking not at the 
number of children the respondent has, but at the total number of children living at the 
respondent’s home, the figures give a larger difference. The children who are not the 
respondent’s children might be their grandchildren. The average number of children 
between 6 and 18 who live in a house where the recipient is a beneficiary of 
oportunidades is 1.82. This number increases to 2.05 if the household belongs to both 
programs. In contrast, the average is 1.1 if the household does not belong to any 
program or belongs to procampo only. This is a difference of 65 and 86% from 
oportunidades and recipients of both programs. Given that the amount received 
increases with the number of children up to a point, a possible unintended 
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consequence of this program could be an increase in the number of children among the 
poorest.  
 
Table 2.8.Number of children per household and subsidy type. 
  
Children Living at Home 
Subsidy Number of Children Under 6 Between 6 and 18 Older than 18 
None 4.38 0.74 1.45 1.13 
Procampo 4.69 0.59 1.31 1.23 
Oportunidades 5.87 0.92 1.95 1.17 
Both 5.62 0.80 1.97 1.21 
 
After controlling for other factors, the effect of belonging to oportunidades on 
the number of children is positive and significant (b = 1.32, p = 0.006). I ran a 
regression controlling for education, age, being catholic, farm size, farm income, total 
revenue, having procampo and having both procampo and oportunidades. Results are 
presented in table 2.6. Education is negatively related to number of children, although 
not at a significant level (p = 0.343). Age is positive and significant with a coefficient 
of 0.292 and a p-value of 0.00. Farm size, farm income, and total revenue are not 
significant in determining the number of children. The lowest p-value of them is 
0.605. Being part of procampo has a negative but not significant effect (b = -0.359, p =  
0.387), and belonging to both government programs, procampo and oportunidades, 
has a positive effect in the number of children (b = 0.802) while being statistically 
significant (p = 0.020). Catholic have fewer children than non-catholic, the coefficient 
of being catholic is -0.608 and the p-value 0.081. To check for robustness, I ran the 
same regression restricting the sample to people who have children and find that the 
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significance  hold for all variables except female, which in the restricted sample 
regression has a coefficient of 0.641 and a p-value of 0.100. 
Table 2.9.Regression of number of children on demographic variables and type of subsidy received. 
 Coefficient P-value 
Female 0.416 (0.294) 
Education -0.106 (0.343) 
Age 0.292*** (0.000) 
Age^2 -0.00186*** (0.003) 
Catholic -0.609* (0.081) 
Farm Size -0.00462 (0.868) 
Farm Income -0.00000402 (0.605) 
Total Revenue 0.00000322 (0.658) 
Procampo  -0.360 (0.387) 
Oportunidades 1.317*** (0.006) 
Both Subsidies  0.802** (0.020) 
Constant -4.490** (0.016) 
Observations 354  
p-values in parentheses 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Although these results do not imply causality, they provide the relationship 
among variables on number of children. Important to notice is that income in any 
form, liquid assets or land, do not have predictive power on number of children. The 
most important factor that determines the number of children is age, regardless of 
income level. These results also show that people who belong to oportunidades have 
on average 1.3 more children than non-recipients, but if they also belong to procampo, 
then their average number of children over non recipients of government programs 
increases by 0.8 children.  
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Insecurity Perception and Narco Violence 
Since December 2006, Mexico has been facing widespread violence caused by 
the war on drugs initiated by the newly appointed government of Felipe Calderon. 
Since then, drug related violence, narco violence, has escalated in scale and scope in 
many parts of the country. Some estimates about the number of homicides related to 
the drug war are over 50,000 (Proceso, May 28, 2012) Our area of study is no 
exception. This area did not experience widespread narco violence until 2009, after 
one of the cartel’s leaders was gunned down by the Navy the opposing cartel started a 
turf war that spread to this area. The nearby city of Tampico and its surrounding cities 
suffered much of the new types of crimes associated to drug cartels, kidnapping, 
extortion, homicide, and carjacking among others. Urban population, driven by the 
fear of being victimized, would change their daily life and in some cases would 
migrate to other, safer cities in Mexico and in the US. As a reference on the magnitude 
of the displaced population, Parametria, a consulting company, estimates the number 
of displaced people due to this war on drugs to be 1.6 million. (El Economista, Jan. 
7
th
, 2012). However, drug related crime is not limited to urban population, but as I 
show, it affects rural population across all income levels.  
Questions about insecurity were asked in the second part of the survey. The 
reason being that after spending time answering the first part of the survey and 
interacting with the interviewers, participants would be more likely to bond with the 
interviewers and thus be easier to open up to this sensitive topic. Participants were told 
at the beginning of the survey that they are not required to answer any question they 
don’t feel comfortable with. They were reminded of this right at the beginning of the 
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second part of the survey, of whenever the interviewer thought they hesitated in a 
question.  
The first question we asked in the second part of the survey is whether they are 
aware of the current war on drugs. 85.22% of respondents are aware of the war on 
drugs, 7.26% are not aware, and 7.53% are not sure about it. Those aware of the drug 
war also consider themselves to be well informed on the community events, regardless 
of their number of friends and the frequency in which they meet. Having many friends 
and meeting them frequently does not imply that information about current events in 
the community will flow between them, or that the quality of information is assured. 
The results also show that older people tend to be less informed than younger ones.  
Regarding insecurity level in their community, there is a clear trend that in the 
past two years it has increased. Participants responded to questions about how safe 
was living in their community in 2009, 2010 and 2011. They answered in a scale from 
1 to 5, 1 being totally unsafe, 5 totally safe, 3 unsafe, with 2 and 4 measuring 
intermediate levels. The average response for 2009 is 3.8, with 23% feeling unsafe, 
and 0.54% felling totally unsafe. For 2010 the average response is 3.2, with the 
number of people feeling unsafe rising to 41.89%, out of which 6.22% feels totally 
unsafe. The average response for 2011 is 2.8. 71.89% feels 2011 to be unsafe and 
11.62% feels totally unsafe.  
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Table 2.10.Safety level perception in the communities surveyed. 
 Year and Frequency (Percentage of Total 
Responses) 
Safety Level in their Community 2009 2010 2011 
1 Totally Unsafe 0.54 6.22 11.62 
2 Very Unsafe 1.35 11.62 25.41 
3 Unsafe 21.35 41.89 34.86 
4 Safe 68.11 36.49 24.05 
5 Totally Safe 8.65 3.78 4.05  
 
Although in the area, especially in urban centers, by 2009 narco violence was 
beginning to affect many parts of society, it seems that it did not reach rural areas, or 
at least our area of study, until 2010. However, it is evident that people feel more 
insecure in 2011 than in the previous years. 53% of people respond to be very worried 
about the crime level in their community, however, this percentage increases to 66% 
when asked how worried they are regarding crime on roads. The level of anxiety about 
crime is the consequence of the perceived level of violence. 67% of people rate the 
level of violence in their communities in 2011 to be high and very high; while 75.67% 
perceive the violence level on roads to be high and very high.  
Local police forces, in almost all cases, are unable to control narco violence 
because of the superior fire power of drug cartels and of their corrupting power over 
them. It is believed that federal forces, specially the Army and Navy, are harder, if not 
impossible, to corrupt by the drug cartels. For this reason, some cities are supported by 
federal forces in safety enforcing. Our sample supports this belief. 90% of the sample 
does not feel that the local police can respond and control narco violence; only 7.3% 
feel the same about the Mexican Army and Navy. That is, only 2.7% of the sample 
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believes strongly that local police can control narco violence, while 52.97% strongly 
believe the Mexican Army and Navy can control narco violence. Table 2.11 
summarizes these results. 
 
Table 2.11.Confidence that police and army/navy can respond and control violent acts as percentage of 
respondents. 
 County/State Police Mexican Army and Navy 
Not Confident at All 68.11 4.32 
Not Very Confident 21.89 2.97 
Somewhat Confident 7.30 39.73 
Very Confident 2.16 31.08 
Completely Confident 0.54 21.89 
 
Although most of people believe that the crime level has increased in the past 
years, only 18.82% of people know someone who has been a victim of violent crime 
in the past 12 months. Specifically in this survey, I asked farmers whether they know a 
friend, relative or family member or if themselves have been a victim of a crime in the 
past 12 months. By crime I listed the following: carjack, personal robbery, kidnap, 
extortion, and homicide. Although in this region most of these crimes are new and 
originally related to the drug cartels, not all crimes committed are attributable to them. 
The prevalence of insecurity and the widespread of fear in the region have contributed 
to the upsurge of local bands of criminals unrelated to drug cartels. Given the fear of 
confronting drug cartels, victims of crimes, assuming that all aggressors are members 
of a drug cartel, do not seek help from the police, making it easier for local criminals 
to commit high impact crimes. For the purpose of this research, the person who 
committed the crime is irrelevant. These crimes were rare in this region before the 
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drug cartels engaged into a turf war in 2009. That is, the widespread of these crimes 
originated from the presence of drug cartels in the region. 
Crime incidence by type of crime and relation to the victim is given next. I 
present some statistics on crime for the entire sample, and then for those who know a 
victim of crime as explained in the previous paragraph. These results are summarized 
in Table 2.12. For each crime I separated the responses into three groups: crime 
committed to friends, crime committed to relatives and family, and crime committed 
to the respondent. Obviously, except for homicide all other crimes have the three 
groups. Starting with carjack, 4% of the entire sample knows a friend victim of it, 
1.6% knows a relative or family member, and 1.07% state to have been a victim of it. 
For personal theft victims, 4.57% of the entire sample knows a friend victim of it, 
1.6% knows a relative or family member, and 0.8% state to have been a victim of it. 
For extortion, 1.07% of the total sample knows a friend victim of it, 0.54% knows a 
relative or family member, and 0.27% of the sample claimed to be a victim of it. For 
victims of kidnapping, 1.61% of the total sample knows a friend who was kidnapped, 
2.15% has a relative or family member who was kidnapped, and 0.27% of the sample 
claimed to have been kidnapped. In the case of homicide, 5.38% of the sample had a 
friend who was killed, and 0.54% of the sample had a relative of family member 
killed.  
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Table 2.12.Known victims by crime, as percentage of respondents. 
Crime Known Victim Entire Sample If Know Victim of Crime 
Carjack Friends 4.03% 21.43% 
 Relatives/Family 1.61% 8.57% 
 Self 1.07% 5.71% 
Personal Theft Friends 4.57% 24.29% 
 Relatives/Family 1.61% 8.57% 
 Self 0.80% 4.29% 
Extortion Friends 1.07% 5.71% 
 Relatives/Family 0.54% 2.86% 
 Self 0.27% 1.43% 
Kidnap Friends 1.61% 8.57% 
 Relatives/Family 2.15% 11.43% 
 Self 0.27% 1.43% 
Homicide Friends 5.38% 28.57% 
 Relatives/Family 0.54% 2.86% 
 
The last column of Table 2.12 shows the percentage of people who know a 
friend, relative or family member, or if himself has been a victim of the 
aforementioned crimes from the sample of people who know a victim of crime. 
For a given crime most people know a friend victim of it, followed by relatives 
or family, and then by oneself. This is true partly because people tend to have more 
friends than relatives. However, in our sample more people know a relative and family 
member to be a victim of kidnapping than a friend. Surprisingly, the most common 
known victim of crime is friends who were killed at 5.38% of the sample. Victims of 
carjack and personal theft are known more than victims of extortion and kidnapping. 
This is no surprising since personal theft and carjack are easier and quicker to perform 
than extorting and kidnapping someone. It is worth noticing that even though the 
sample is made up of low income farmers, some of them have experienced or known a 
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victim of crimes like kidnapping and extortion where affluent people are more likely 
to be the target. This results show that even in poor rural communities, people are not 
exempt of high impact crimes. 
The survey asked questions about the risk that they, and their own families, 
become a victim of the previously stated crimes, and also about the fear of that 
happening. Specifically, these questions asked about the likelihood and fear of being 
victimized in the next 12 months. As usual, the list of crimes was given and the 
participants responded on a 1 to 5 scale, ranging from not likely at all, to totally likely, 
in the case of likelihood of victimization; and from no fear at all to fear too much, in 
the case of fear of victimization. In the questions about victimization fear, I included 
two parts: one to measure how afraid the respondent is that he becomes a victim of 
crime; the other part measures how afraid is the respondent that a member of his 
family becomes a victim of those crimes. 
People are more afraid to have a family member victimized rather than 
themselves for all five crimes mentioned. The difference in fear level varies according 
to crime. In general, the more severe a crime is, the larger the fear difference becomes. 
For instance, fear of being robbed has the smallest difference, followed by fear of 
being physically assaulted. The crimes with the highest difference in fear are the high 
impact crimes in the following order: homicide, kidnapping and extortion. However, 
the absolute fear level for each crime does not necessarily indicate its degree of 
aversion. These responses incorporate the likelihood of being victimized for a given 
crime. Thus, even if a crime is deemed to be serious, the fear level may not necessarily 
be high when the likelihood of it is very low. Table 2.13 summarizes the results on 
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fear level and its differences for all crimes. Values are means of each category.  The 
difference is computed as the mean difference and not as the difference in means. 
 
Table 2.13.Fear level of victimization for each type of crime. 
Crime Fear of Becoming a 
Victim Yourself 
Fear a Family Member 
Becomes a Victim 
Difference 
Personal Theft 2.59 2.68 0.086 
Carjack 1.88 2.00 0.116 
Physical Assault 2.55 2.67 0.116 
Extortion 2.52 2.65 0.125 
Kidnapping 2.40 2.53 0.127 
Homicide 2.40 2.56 0.159 
 
Risk of being victimized compared to other families depends among other 
factors in how one’s family is perceived by others. Questions were asked about how 
much they think their families are perceived by other families in the community 
among different aspects. These aspects are: asset rich, vulnerable, socially active, cash 
rich, powerful. No further explanations on those aspects were given to the participants. 
These indirect questions about themselves provide answers on how they perceive their 
own family without being direct. Therefore, whatever they respond on other’s 
perception on their own family should correspond with their actual situation.  
The likelihood of being victimized within the next 12 months is low for all 
crimes. Even though for all crimes the likelihood ranged from 1 to 5, the highest 
average among the crimes is 2.56 and the lowest 1.87.  Probability of carjacked has 
the lowest average, followed by homicide, kidnapping, physical assault, extortion, and 
personal theft. In the survey, a value of 2 is very low probability, and 3 is probable. 
For most crimes, the likelihood of victimization increases with age but at a decreasing 
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rate. Except for kidnapping, all other crimes have a positive and significant coefficient 
for age and negative and significant age squared. Except for carjack, being considered 
land rich has a negative and significant value in the likelihood of victimization. This 
could be derived from a sense of security from owning land. Being considered 
vulnerable has a positive and significant effect. An interesting finding is that for most 
crimes, being considered socially active has a negative and significant effect. Again, a 
feeling of security may be caused by having many friends and being able to rely on 
them. Gender has no effect on the likelihood of crime, but education has a positive 
effect.  
Living in an unsafe region has consequences in the way people live. It is 
natural that when people feel at risk they change their behavior to adapt to the new 
environment. In this research, I find that many people have altered their daily activities 
or have planned of doing something to cope with the violence. In my sample, 18% of 
the people know somebody who has moved out of the community for fear of being 
victimized. Even though 84% of the respondents have never considered moving out of 
town because of the violence, 7.8% have considered it a few times, 5.9% some times, 
and 2% many and all the time. That is, 16% have considered moving out of town at 
least some time. 8% of the farmers surveyed have changed production decisions 
because of the violence, and 14% have changed their daily activities. If the current 
violence level continues, 35% would change production decisions in their farms. 
These results show that the effect of narco violence in rural life is non-trivial, and that 
urban population is not the only one suffering the consequences of the drug war. 
Narco violence affects not only daily rural life but also production decisions.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter presents the results of a survey on Mexican grain farmers 
conducted in 2011. The importance of this survey is that it provides a summary on the 
conditions of these farmers as well as other information related to the current violence 
level caused by the war on drugs. This survey, to my knowledge, is the first one to be 
done in a real time conflict zone in Mexico. It provides information on demographics, 
production, risk taking behavior, and risk perception on violence that was previously 
not known.  
Besides summarizing information on farmers, this survey provides information 
on risk attitudes and demand for risk contingent credit products. Risk attitudes are 
measured as the willingness to adopt new technology. Their analysis provides insights 
into how to better address technology adoption programs. Risk contingent credit is a 
collateral-free credit. It is especially suited for low income farmers, and those that do 
not borrow formally for fear of losing collateral, also referred as risk rationed farmers. 
Currently this financial product is unavailable to them; however, most farmers stated a 
desire to have this type of credit.  
Violence and how it affects farming decision and rural life is also investigated. 
The current war on drugs has spread into many parts of the country. Rural areas are no 
exception. This study provides evidence that narco violence affects production 
decision, daily activities and rural migration. How violence is perceived by farmers is 
also analyzed. These results shed light into the determinants of fear, which ultimately 
causes changes in behavior.  
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The results of this survey shows only one part of the rural life in Mexico. Some 
aspects of these farmers, like production as well as fear level, are specific to the 
region. This survey can provide a reference for future research, much needed in 
Mexico.  For instance, a follow up survey to determine changes in risk and violence 
perception could be done. There are a lot of research opportunities in rural Mexico at 
the moment; unfortunately narco violence makes it harder to conduct field research.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
CROSS MARKET PRICE SUPPORT AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
Abstract 
The need for creating mechanisms that reduce price risk for farmers in 
developing countries has been cited as a priority for economic development by the 
World Bank (2005). Accordingly, this paper develops a market driven mechanism for 
commodity price insurance in those target countries. Our model incorporates futures, 
exchange rate and local basis risk under the Black-Scholes framework to develop 
quanto (Quantity Adjusting Option). When the domestic price of a commodity in a 
developing country is strongly correlated to the price in a futures market, price support 
premiums can be estimated. We calculated the price insurance premium at various 
local markets in Mexico for corn and sorghum. Our results are consistent with those 
for the US, showing that relative price premiums are similar. 
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Introduction 
Commodity price insurance products are easily available to farmers in 
developed countries. For instance, institutional futures markets provide agricultural 
producers and buyers with financial derivatives to hedge against price uncertainty. 
Corn farmers in the US have access to futures and options contracts through the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME). The exchange provides price disclosure and 
standardized contracts, which facilitates commercial operations. However, in most 
developing countries, with no organized futures exchange, producers and buyers do 
not have direct access to these types of products. In its World Development Report of 
2005, The World Bank acknowledged the importance of reducing price risk as a 
priority for economic development. Among the policy options described in the report 
to manage risk, the main ones are the piloting and adoption of market-based risk 
management instruments; and the creation of countercyclical safety nets for poor 
farmers (World Bank, 2005). However, in most instances the market instruments 
required is a derivative of a security (e.g. futures contract) denominated in a currency 
that differs from the target client. For instance, the Mexican government through a 
marketing program buys options at a futures market in the US in order to hedge 
farmers and buyers positions. Using US wheat futures and options contracts are 
analyzed as a hedging strategy in Pakistan (Faruqee, Coleman and Scott, 1977). Thus, 
not only is basis and price risk critical elements but also important is foreign exchange 
rate. The burden of mispricing publicly provided risk management ultimately rests 
with either the farmers whom are to be the beneficiaries (if the price is too high) or tax 
payers (if the price is too low), and without computational guidance this can become 
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costly. In order to fulfill programs such as discussed in the World Bank report, 
techniques are required to properly price risk on a probabilistic basis. Policy makers 
must take into account not only the price risk of the foreign security, but swings in 
exchange rates and local basis. This requires a unique approach and the purpose of this 
paper is to describe and illustrate the pricing mechanism on an actuarial basis using 
options theory. This paper address the two policy priorities outlined by the World 
Bank by illustrating how futures price, basis and foreign exchange affect local cash 
prices and its derivatives. These two policy priorities can be met by means of the 
market-based quanto (Quantity Adjusting Option) pricing mechanism described in this 
paper. 
The subject matter of this paper deals with the price protection of grains in 
Mexico. Problems faced by Mexican farmers are typical of the problems faced by 
producers of the World Bank target countries. In general, they lack the financial 
infrastructure needed to insure their crops, like institutional futures markets or over-
the-counter (OTC) markets. How we deal with the Mexican case lays out some 
fundamental strategies that can be scaled up or down to address similar issues in other 
developing agricultural economies where price risk is largely determined offshore, that 
is, from futures markets that affect local prices, and the foreign exchange rate. 
In Mexico, the most common way for grain producers to hedge price risk is by 
participating into a government sponsored option contract program called Programa 
de Administración de Riesgos a través de Intermediarios Financieros (PARMIF). This 
program began in July 31
st
, 2012, substituting the program Agricultuta por Contrato. 
Under PARMIF, registered producers sign forward contracts with buyers and then 
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register those contracts with financial institutions certified by the government, which 
guarantees each party the contract price through put or call options. Producers select 
the degree of coverage at the certified financial institutions. Option premiums are 
subsidized by the government for both parties but at different rates, up to 85% for 
producers and 50% for buyers. Adverse basis are also covered by the government. 
Local prices for basis estimation are calculated by adding to the closest futures price 
contract quoted at the CME transportation, storage and financial costs to commodities 
at relevant port of entry. Depending on the distance to these ports, the basis for each 
local market is calculated. The price at each port of entry is also calculated on the 
futures price at the CME plus local basis, which are published and thus publicly 
available in the US.  
Although the benefits of price guaranteed programs, like PARMIF are evident, 
there are also problems in its reach. The program subsidizes any contract cost to both 
parties and provides a guarantee against counterparty default. Farmers are not subject 
to basis risk under this scheme; any price movement against the farmer is covered by 
the government. Nevertheless, the requirements for producers to be part of the 
program can be overwhelming and consequently some producers may not meet the 
criteria. Because this program is not market driven but politically motivated, the 
success of it depends on its assigned budget. There are times when farmers are left out 
due to lack of funding (Echánove, 2009). Excluded farmers may engage into forward 
contracts directly with large grain buyers and processors, but without government 
sponsorship these contracts are subject to default risk. Also, not all grain contracts in 
México are supported through this program.  
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Background 
Quanto, or cross currency, options are used when the underlying asset of an 
option is quoted in a different currency than its payments. For instance, an option on 
the Nikkei index in US dollars is a quanto option since the underlying asset, the 
Nikkei Index, is quoted in Japanese yen, but its payoffs are quoted in US dollars. 
Multinational companies with cash flows in many currencies benefit from this type of 
options, which are mostly sold in OTC markets. Despite its relevance in globalized 
economies, the amount of research done on quanto has not been large. For instance, an 
unrestricted search in Google Scholar in October 2012 of the words “cross currency 
options” returns 156 articles. Most of the analysis of quanto options has been made on 
foreign exchange indexes. Earlier papers on cross currency options include Biger and 
Hull (1983), Giddy (1983), Grabbe (1983) and Rumsey (1991). Wei (1996) develops a 
closed form pricing formula for cross currency bond option with deterministic 
volatilities. Duan and Wei (1999) develop it under stochastic volatility of exchange 
rate and foreign asset price. Branger and Muck (2012) study the price of quanto 
options when covariances are random. Quanto options research and its application in 
agricultural commodities are very limited. For instance, in Canada some OTC 
products offered to farmers were priced in Canadian dollars with the underlying priced 
in USD; however, those options did not consider basis risk (Braga, 1996). Accounting 
for basis risk, Turvey and Yin (2002) analyze the application of quanto options to 
agricultural commodities in Canada at several locations. 
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Producers in developing countries generally lack access to financial markets 
that provide insurance against covariate price risk. Their financial systems are usually 
not sophisticated enough to provide these type of products. Government programs, in 
most cases, become the main provider of price insurance for farmers. The motivation 
of these programs is to create social stability in the event of sharp decline in prices, 
which causes a welfare loss to producers. In Mexico for instance, under the federal 
government program PARMIF, farmers are guaranteed a minimum price for their 
harvest through option contracts. Farmers and buyers are not required to hold margin 
accounts, but are protected against basis and default risk by the government. Buyers 
and producers reach an agreement on the volume and price of the product with 
delivery places and dates stated in the contract. These prices are based on the price of 
grains at an entry port plus transportation, storage costs, expected demand and profit 
margins. The federal government becomes a liaison between the two parties and buys 
at the CME their respective option positions. The government subsidizes partially the 
option premium of both parties. Since margin accounts are not required, the contracts 
are guaranteed by the government in case of default; and in case of adverse market 
prices at maturity, the government compensates each party. Farmers are fully 
protected against unfavorable price movements, making it a risk free contract; grain 
processors and buyers are also covered but not completely. In order to participate, 
each producer must meet certain requirements to be eligible, including minimum land 
and production quotas. Farmers have to either meet the contract quota by themselves 
or belong to a producers’ association and share the production quota. Currently only 
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corn, sorghum and wheat are eligible for this program. Moreover, the existence of 
those programs depends on an assigned budget and is subject to political debate 
 
Model 
The purpose of this paper is to develop a market driven mechanism for 
commodity price insurance in Mexico. Turvey and Yin (2002) develop a quanto model 
that includes CME traded futures, exchange rate and basis risk for an over-the-counter 
Canadian hog options program based on the Black-Scholes (1973) framework and 
equilibrium conditions; we use this framework for guidance. Given that local prices in 
Mexico for yellow corn, white corn and sorghum are highly correlated to local prices 
of yellow corn in the US, and hence to its futures price at the commodities exchange in 
Chicago, the option pricing method for local commodities in Mexico is one where two 
currencies are involved. One of these is in which the underlying asset is quoted, in this 
case is yellow corn at the commodities exchange quoted in usd, and the other currency 
is in which payments are made, i.e. Mexican peso (mxp). This class of derivatives, 
involving more than one currency, a quanto In the case of commodity prices in 
Mexico, local prices are determined by the price of the commodity in a US market 
plus transportation costs to a Mexican port, the conversion to Mexican peso plus an 
adjustment of local basis for each market. Local prices are defined by 
 
     [1] 
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where  is the local price of a given commodity at time  and for location , 
 is the nearby futures settlement price for yellow corn quoted in usd at the CME at 
time ,  is the exchange rate mxp/usd at time ,  is the local basis in mxp for 
market .  Each component of the local price is assumed to follow a geometric 
Brownian motion with a drift: , , 
 where  is the annual growth rate, the standard deviation 
of the growth rate, and  follows a Weiner process  , where  . The 
local price, by looking at its components, can be assumed to follow a Brownian 
motion of the same form . We obtain the local price growth 
rate, , and variance, , after applying Ito’s lemma to the local price equation [1]. 
 
    [2] 
 
          [3] 
Under no arbitrage opportunities, there exists a risk neutral rate used to price 
options. This rate is used to discount future cash flows of the derivative. The 
currencies involved and the commodities are tradable that can create a hedge portfolio. 
No arbitrage opportunities are assumed by the law of one price.  We test the no-
arbitrage condition by testing whether price processes follow a stationary geometric 
Brownian motion (GBM) in another section of this paper.  
The risk free growth rate for futures and exchange rate is defined by usual 
arbitrage conditions. The arbitrage free price for the future price of the commodity 
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becomes the risk free rate minus carrying costs, δ, of the commodity at base currency: 
.  Where  is the risk free rate in the US. For the exchange rate, its 
arbitrage free growth rate is a function of the difference in the risk free rates of the two 
countries, .   is the Mexican risk free rate measured as the return on 
28-day government bonds. From the above, we obtain the basis risk free growth rate 
as, . 
The risk neutral growth rate is defined by  . We assume that the 
risk premium for each local market is estimated using the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model:  with  being the market price or risk of a state variable and 
 its volatility
2
. , beta, is the covariance between the Mexican stock market index, 
IPC, and basis at location ;   is the annualized return of the Mexican market. 
Under risk neutrality the risk premium of all assets involved in the option is zero. 
CAPM is convenient since it does not depend on risk preferences, and doesn’t require 
the state variable to be traded (Roll, 1977). From [2] and [3] and using the 
corresponding risk neutral rates, we obtain the following local cash price change rate 
to value the quanto at each location : 
 
          [4] 
 
                                                 
2
 Generally speaking the market price of risk is an economic metric required to compensate investors 
when the underlying cannot be hedged with market instruments to create a risk-free portfolio. It 
captures market risk aversion. 
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Where ω is the percentage of the local price that depends on the future price 
quoted at base currency, EF/P; and 1- ω is the percentage of local price that depends 
on the basis, B/P.  
Since this analysis considers protection for producers, we are only estimating 
quanto put prices. However, we can easily estimate the quanto call prices, which are 
used by buyers to hedge against price increases. The quanto put price is then 
calculated using the Black-Scholes formula. 
 
,   [5] 
 
with the boundary condition , where  is the strike 
price,  is time to maturity, and  is the cash price at time 0, i.e. at time of valuation.  
 and  are given by: 
 , and   
From the differential equation [4] we estimated 
 
 
Once the quanto put price is estimated by the model, we can calculate the 
quanto call price by using the put-call parity. However, for the purpose if this paper, 
we only estimated put prices. 
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Comparative Statics 
 
The quanto option as presented above has many moving parts and how these 
change or relate to each other is important from the pricing and policy standpoint. The 
effect of the option price caused by changes in variance of the three sources of risk, 
i.e. basis, futures price and foreign exchange rate, are analyzed in this section.  
 
Effect of on and  
The derivative of d1 with respect to  is  , which 
is positive if , and negative otherwise. If the option’s strike price is 
larger than the local price, , the value of ; if this happens, when 
, the derivative . Otherwise, if , then the value of  
has to be much larger than  for the derivative to be positive. Our estimated values 
for  are about 0.07, while  is about 0.05; thus, in our model the effect of a change 
in the local price volatility to the value of  is negative,  for  . Only 
when the value of , the derivative becomes positive. 
 
The derivative of  is quite similar: . This value is 
positive when  . In other words, if the strike price is much higher 
than the cash price at low values of , the derivative eventually turns positive. It is 
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negative if the opposite holds. Given the value of our estimated  and , we have 
 when  and  is about 90% or larger than . The effect changes once  
is less than 90% of .  
Next we analyze the effect of local price variance on the quanto price. This is 
the vega of the quanto. For the complete derivation refer to the appendix. This 
derivative becomes . Where the 
terms  and . The function  is the standard normal cdf, and so, it 
is increasing in its argument. , but because of the negative sign 
in the put option formula, its derivatives are negative. The signs of  and  can be 
positive or negative according to the conditions previously mentioned. The result of 
the derivative  , which is the option’s vega, can be simplified as  
 , where . The effect on both put and 
call options is positive and consistent with the literature,  (Merton, 1973).  
 
Effect of   
Since we are interested in knowing the effect of the changes in our three 
sources of risk, we proceed to estimate the quanto price derivative with respect to 
futures price, exchange rate and basis. The variances of all risk factors affect the 
quanto through changes in . Only  and  affect  as well. Since basis risk only 
has an effect on the put price through , the derivative  is simplified to: 
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The derivative  determines the sign of , and its result is: 
 
  [6] 
For the denominator to be positive, the next condition needs to hold: 
 
  [7] 
This condition holds for our data, where all correlation values are negative for 
sorghum and yellow corn, and only the correlation between basis and exchange rate is 
positive for white corn at each location. As an illustration, for Guadalajara the left and 
right hand side of equation [7] for sorghum, white corn, and yellow corn are 
respectively:0.344, 0.027; 0.383, 0.015; and 0.283, 0.022. This is by no means a 
general rule; it is an empirical problem. The results and the effects of the risk variables 
are data driven and may be different depending on the characteristics and conditions of 
the area in study. In our data the denominator of [6] is always positive; thus, its 
numerator defines the sign of the derivative. Its effect can be either positive or 
negative depending on the correlations between futures and basis, and exchange rate 
and basis. If both correlations are zero or positive, then the effect of basis risk on local 
price risk is positive. If both correlations are negative, as it is the case in our data, the 
effect of a change in basis risk depends on the sum of the products of the correlation of 
futures and basis times the volatility of futures and correlation of exchange rate and 
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basis times the volatility of exchange rate. If this value is larger than twice the basis 
volatility times the ratio of basis and futures price in local currency, then the effect on 
price volatility is positive, otherwise it’s negative. These conditions are: 
, when ; and , when  
 
 
Our data supports the first condition, change in basis risk increases local price 
volatility. The effect on put price is also positive, but opposite for call prices. For 
instance, the value of the numerator of [6] for Guadalajara for sorghum, white corn 
and yellow corn are: 0.032, 0.091, and 0.021. In the scenario that the two correlations 
have opposite signs, the effect of a change in basis risk corresponds to the sign 
of .  
The derivative of the put price with respect to the other two variances, futures 
price and exchange rate, are analyzed next. Since their changes alter the risk neutral 
rate as well, their effect on the option prices depends not only on  but also on , 
where  stands for futures price and exchange rate. The derivative   is simplified in 
the following formula. The complete derivation can be found in the appendix. 
 
 [8] 
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The effect on the put option price now depends on both the derivative of the 
local price and of the risk neutral rate with respect to the volatility of the futures price 
and exchange rate. The sign of [8] is positive if , 
otherwise, it is negative. 
The sign of the derivative of  depends on the correlation between futures and 
exchange rate since  , where 
 In our data, the values of  for each 
location and crop are negative. Since all other variables inside the square brackets in 
[8] are positive, a negative  implies that the sign of [8] depends on  .  A 
positive derivative , given  has a positive effect on put prices. If , 
the effect is positive if , and negative otherwise. 
Using the same definition for subscripts, 
. The sign of  is the same 
as . It depends on the signs and magnitudes of  
and . It is positive if both correlations, and , are positive. This implies 
that by having positive correlations, the risk of the components cannot be mitigated 
and so this increases local price risk. If both  and , as with most of 
our data, the derivative is negative if , or if 
; and likewise, a positive derivative occurs if  
. In the case where one correlation is positive and the 
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other negative, or one being zero and the other non-zero, the effect on the sign of  
is given by the interaction with the rest of the variables of the equation. In general, the 
effect is positive if  and , when . 
Our data shows positive derivative of local price risk with respect to futures 
price and exchange rate volatility. This effect on the put option price is also positive. 
The negative correlation  certainly contributes to this result. Also, from our data 
 is more than 60 times , and more than 6 times , which again, contributes to the 
positive effect of . 
 
Data 
Local prices in Mexico are determined by the nearby futures price at the CME 
plus basis accounting for transportation costs and local demand and supply conditions. 
The price data used in this research are cash prices paid to producers in Mexico of 
three commodities: yellow corn, white corn, and sorghum. These grain prices at 
various locations were obtained through Grupo Consultor de Mecados Agricolas, S.A. 
de C.V., a consulting company specialized in agricultural markets in Mexico. 
Although local prices in Mexico are not recorded systematically by official sources, it 
is estimated by the law of one price by adding transportation and handling costs from a 
US port to a desired local market. This method of estimation is done by the 
government in order to establish a price for its programs and subsidies; in this same 
way large grain buyers calculate their offer prices to producers. The exchange rate and 
the risk free rate were obtained from the Mexican Central Bank (Banco de Mexico). 
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The closing price of the IPC and the futures price of yellow corn were obtained from 
Thomson Reuters’ DataStream service. The data available for this research represents 
13 local markets distributed in nine states. These markets are located in major 
production regions. The main corn producing states for both varieties of corn are 
Sinaloa (Sin), Jalisco (Jal), and Mexico State (Mex). This relationship has been steady 
for the past years. In 2010, the state of Sinaloa produced 22.4% of total national corn 
production, Jalisco 14.5% and the State of Mexico 6.6%. 
 
Table 3.1 States with their Local Markets and Commodity 
State Local Market Commodity 
Campeche (Camp) Campeche Corn 
Chiapas (Chis) Tuxtla Gutierrez Corn 
 
Arriaga Corn 
Tapachula Corn 
Chihuahua (Chih) Chihuahua Corn 
Mexico (Mex) Toluca Corn 
Guanajuato (Gto) Irapuato Corn, Sorghum 
Jalisco (Jal) Guadalajara Corn, Sorghum 
Michoacán (Mich) Morelia Corn, Sorghum 
Sinaloa (Sin) Culiacan Corn, Sorghum 
 Mochis Corn, Sorghum 
Tamaulipas (Tamps) Victoria Corn, Sorghum 
 Matamoros Corn, Sorghum 
 
Sorghum production is more concentrated than corn production. In 2007 the 
main producer was the state of Tamaulipas (Tamps) with over 40% of total national 
production. The main five producing states account for over 83% of total sorghum 
production, while in the case of corn they account for 57%.  
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Local Cash Prices 
For the analysis of the Mexican market, daily prices of corn (white and yellow) 
and sorghum consisting of 1,370 observations were used from July/18/2003 to 
Dec/31/2007 
3
. Cash prices were estimated by the consulting company for 13 locations 
nationwide for both varieties of corn, and a subset of 7 locations for sorghum. These 
prices are paid to the farmer at the elevator, which are greatly affected by the US corn 
price, exchange rate and transportation cost.  
Among the three commodities, yellow corn is the most commonly traded in a 
futures exchange. In the case of white corn, the South African Futures Exchange is the 
only exchange that trades its futures contracts. Sorghum futures are traded at the 
Australian Securities Exchange. White corn is generally priced higher than yellow 
corn and sorghum priced lower, but in general the price of white corn and sorghum are 
strongly correlated with that of yellow corn in the futures market. In Mexico the 
nearby future contract price of yellow corn at the CME (CBOT before) is used as a 
reference for both white corn and sorghum subject to local demand and supply 
conditions.  
 
 
                                                 
3
 After revising the data we found some inconsistencies that are attributable to typographical errors in 
the record of cash prices. Only one location, Morelia, was found to have typos, for white and yellow 
corn during the interval of Aug/1/2006 through Aug/17/2006. There was a very large discrepancy in 
the price difference with respect to a major market, Guadalajara. The price difference of white corn in 
those markets had been consistent at $21.7 mxp/ton higher in Guadalajara, but during ten days of 
that time interval the price ranged from $341 to $724 mxp/ton higher in Morelia. This difference could 
be offset by transporting the commodity from nearby markets according to the Law of One Price. We 
find no justification for that price difference when it had been constant throughout the time series. 
Those prices were corrected using the usual price difference between markets of $21.7 mxp/ton. 
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Brownian Motion and Stationarity 
One of the conditions for pricing derivatives using the Black-Scholes 
framework is that asset prices follow a geometric Brownian motion (GBM). Failure to 
meet this criterion gives biased results. A closely related condition for analyzing 
financial time series is that they be stationary. Spurious correlation results when two 
non-stationary time series are analyzed together. In finance we are interested in the 
return of assets, thus the stationary condition is applied to time series of returns. A 
GBM is a type of random walk with independent increments; although a GBM is not 
stationary, its increments are.(Tsay, 2005).   
We tested for GBM in each time series by estimating its Hurst coefficient 
through a scaled variance ratio test (See Turvey 2007; Weron 2002; Schepers, 
VanBeek, Bassinsthwaite 1992; Lo and Mackinlay 1988). A Hurst coefficient (H) not 
different from 0.5 is a sufficient proof of Brownian motion, which also implies that the 
time series return has a unit root with an AR(1) process. A fractional process (H not 
equal to 0.5) is one with a unit root over an AR(q) process. We obtained the Hurst 
coefficients for each of our time series, and then compared them to the 90% 
confidence level estimated by Turvey (2007) for N= 1370, significantly more than the 
N= suggested by Cannon et al. (1997) for unbiased results. 
In general, most time series at each location has a Hurst value within the 90% 
interval. Only two locations, Culiacan and Mochis, both from the state of Sinaloa and 
both for yellow corn have the only values that lay outside the 90% level; however, 
they lay within the 95% level. For most locations, yellow corn has the lowest Hurst 
value, followed by white corn and sorghum with the highest value. Given the sample 
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size and number of lags, the Hurst coefficient values at the 90% confidence level lies 
between 0.5529 and 0.4470; at 95% is between 0.5631 and 0.4368; and at 99% 
between 0.5832 and 0.4167.   
The Hurst values for the change in local basis were estimated at three 
locations, Guadalajara, Culiacan and Matamoros, because they represent major grain 
producing regions. The local basis for yellow corn at all locations has Hurst values 
below the 99% level. This is the only crop which basis has insignificant Hurst values. 
White corn and sorghum are within the 90% confidence interval, except for the local 
basis of sorghum at Matamoros, which is in the 95% level. We are not sure why the 
local basis for yellow corn indicates mean reversion, but speculate that because basis 
is comprised mostly of transportation costs, which are almost constant through time 
due to the rigidity of gas prices in Mexico, local supply and demand conditions may 
have a stronger effect on local basis for white corn and sorghum, on top of 
transportation costs. 
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Table 3.2 Estimated Hurst coefficients of local prices 
Market Yellow Corn White Corn Sorghum 
Campeche, Camp. 0.4622 0.4558   
Tuxtla Gutierrez, Chis. 0.4586 0.4491   
Arriaga, Chis. 0.4573 0.4522   
Tapachula, Chis. 0.4557 0.4506   
Cihuahua, Chih. 0.4598 0.4617   
Toluca, Mex. 0.4567 0.4610   
Irapuato, Gto. 0.4637 0.4708 0.4862 
Guadalajara, Jal. 0.4698 0.4731 0.4926 
Morelia, Mich. 0.4625 0.4659 0.4942 
Culiacan, Sin. *0.4423 0.4612 0.4705 
Mochis, Sin. *0.4419 0.4639 0.4718 
Victoria, Tamps. 0.4702 0.4691 0.5151 
Matamoros, Tamps. 0.4685 0.4678 0.5116 
 
Table 3.3 Estimated Hurst coefficients of local basis 
Market Yellow Corn Basis White Corn Basis Sorghum Basis 
Guadalajara, Jal. 0.3820 0.4815 0.4878 
Culiacan, Sin. 0.3887 0.4574 0.4605 
Matamoros, Tamps. 0.4088 0.4922 0.4181 
 
We also analyzed the behavior of the time series data from international 
markets. The prices from institutional markets have Hurst values within the 90% 
confidence level, and quickly converges to 0.5 as would be expected for complete and 
perfect markets. Futures price of yellow corn has a value of 0.5031, and it stays about 
0.5 throughout the whole time interval. Foreign exchange has an estimated Hurst 
coefficient of 0.4598 at lag 37, but may be mean reverting at longer scales because of 
government policies regarding foreign exchange parity. In any case, our results show 
that the exchange rate is not a significant source of risk for pricing options in our 
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model and appears to satisfy the properties of GBM at local scale of 37 lags. In 
addition, local cash prices already incorporate exchange rate, basis and futures  risk, 
and almost all of them follow a Brownian motion within the 90% confidence level.  
Figure 3.1 shows the time series of corn futures, and the local price at 
Guadalajara of sorghum (S), white corn (WC), and yellow corn (YC). All prices are in 
Mexican peso per ton. The similitude in price movement across all series is evident 
and reflects the substitutability across crops and the market integration with the US. 
Jaramillo, Yunez-Naude and Serrano-Cote (2012) show that this integration has 
increased since NAFTA took place in 1994, specifically for corn and sorghum. They 
also conclude that the speed of price adjustment has increased as well since 1994.  
The strength of this integration is illustrated by a simple OLS regression. 
Results show that on average a $1 usd increase in corn futures translates to a 5.04 peso 
increase in yellow corn (R
2
= 0.93), 6.92 peso increase in white corn (R
2
= 0.87), and 
4.99 peso increase in sorghum (R
2
= 0.91) in Guadalajara. Similar strengths of price 
transmission were found at all localities. With an average exchange rate of 10.92 mxp 
/ usd, local price changes do not correspond to an equivalent contemporary change in 
futures prices.  
It can be appreciated that throughout the time period the future price of corn 
has the lowest price per ton, and white corn the highest. The price difference between 
yellow corn and sorghum is not very clear, however, yellow corn seems to be priced a 
little higher than sorghum.  It is important to note that agricultural commodities 
imports to Mexico have been gradually decreasing since January 1994 when NAFTA 
took effect. The tariff rate quotas to corn and other agricultural commodities imposed 
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by the Mexican government were finally eliminated in January 2008. However, as 
Yunez-Naude (2011) argue, there was no import tariffs charged for corn imports even 
when the amount imported was higher than the established quotas. Following this, he 
concludes that it can be said that starting in 1994 corn has been imported duty free into 
Mexico.  
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Figure 3.1 Time series of sorghum, white and yellow corn in Guadalajara and yellow corn futures in 
Mexican pesos per ton. 
 
Data Summary Statistics 
We use the annualized returns of the Mexican stock exchange index, IPC, for 
the Mexican market return. The time period of the data was from October 1st 2002 to 
December 31st 2007. Local prices were only available throughout this period; all other 
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time series were obtained for the same time period to be consistent. They summed up 
1,370 daily observations. The average return on the Mexican market is 24.55% with a 
standard deviation of 18.72%. This was an unusual high growth period prior to the 
subprime housing market in the US. At the time of the option valuations, the risk free 
rate in Mexico was 7.64%. For this we used the return on Cetes28, which is the 28-day 
government bond. From the sample of cash prices white corn has the largest average 
price and standard deviation: 488.97 compared to 345.63 of yellow corn, and 342.5 of 
sorghum. The lowest domestic prices for grains are in those locations that are large 
producers or that are close to the US border or to a seaport 
For the sample period all three crops, yellow corn, white corn and sorghum 
showed an average annual price growth of 13.68%, 11.23% and 10.80%, and their 
average volatilities were 24.17%, 29.13 and 24.43% for yellow corn, white corn and 
sorghum respectively.  Among all markets, Matamoros has the largest volatility for 
yellow and white corn with 28.74% and 33.41% respectively, while the market with 
the lowest volatility for yellow corn is Guadalajara at 22.25% and for white corn 
Tapachula at 27.53%. In the case of yellow corn, the market with the lowest annual 
growth rate is Culiacan at 11.86%, and the highest is Tuxtla Gutierrez at 15.60%. The 
lowest average price for yellow corn is Matamoros, bordering with Brownsville, TX, 
at $1,333 mxp/ton; while Guadalajara showed the highest at $1,641 mxp/ton.    
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Table 3.4.Sample statistics of local commodities' prices (mxp / ton). 
Commodity 
Market 
(city, state) 
Average 
Price 
Std. 
Deviation Max Min 
Annual 
Growth 
Rate 
Annual 
Volatility 
Yellow Corn Campeche, Camp. 1530.54 343.67 2561.30 1066.42 0.14154 0.23865 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Tuxtla Gutierrez, 
Chis. 1524.21 381.55 2623.25 1009.99 0.15602 0.23601 
Arriaga, Chis. 1455.22 358.05 2466.04 969.32 0.15146 0.24579 
Tapachula, Chis. 1516.34 353.37 2522.24 1049.25 0.14257 0.23645 
Cihuahua, Chih. 1507.69 336.01 2510.62 1068.71 0.13139 0.25400 
Toluca, Mex. 1632.57 360.14 2685.93 1178.84 0.13365 0.22602 
Irapuato, Gto. 1596.35 333.71 2633.68 1202.59 0.12304 0.23096 
Guadalajara, Jal. 1641.76 341.30 2684.48 1233.59 0.12237 0.22245 
Morelia, Mich. 1622.55 338.91 2669.62 1211.89 0.12426 0.22660 
Culiacan, Sin. 1556.35 341.17 2641.62 1207.40 0.11875 0.23889 
Mochis, Sin. 1516.05 345.00 2606.02 1165.34 0.13073 0.24827 
Victoria, Tamps. 1520.90 330.35 2537.62 1155.62 0.12263 0.25080 
Matamoros, 
Tamps. 1333.25 329.99 2347.62 967.94 0.13686 0.28738 
Yellow Corn All Locations 1534.91 345.63 2576.16 1114.38 0.13348 0.24171 
White Corn Campeche, Camp. 1790.18 475.84 3009.65 1207.30 0.11722 0.28347 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Tuxtla Gutierrez, 
Chis. 1798.07 509.32 3091.67 1254.21 0.11518 0.27678 
Arriaga, Chis. 1731.87 495.97 2999.89 1187.56 0.11688 0.28510 
Tapachula, Chis. 1793.91 493.86 3056.07 1243.70 0.10842 0.27527 
Cihuahua, Chih. 1759.48 485.19 3084.68 1191.56 0.11676 0.29768 
Toluca, Mex. 1889.98 485.58 3155.15 1322.14 0.14482 0.27677 
Irapuato, Gto. 1831.63 485.31 3144.75 1283.85 0.10803 0.31662 
Guadalajara, Jal. 1875.70 491.54 3187.74 1333.53 0.10770 0.30745 
Morelia, Mich. 1872.77 482.52 3180.25 1319.10 0.10925 0.26647 
Culiacan, Sin. 1815.20 494.79 3130.42 1234.09 0.09551 0.28547 
Mochis, Sin. 1774.87 493.88 3096.11 1199.92 0.10499 0.28589 
Victoria, Tamps. 1783.05 481.51 3079.56 1186.07 0.10256 0.29625 
Matamoros, 
Tamps. 1595.44 481.27 2892.20 998.68 0.11266 0.33414 
White Corn All Locations 1793.24 488.97 3085.24 1227.82 0.112306 0.306081 
Sorghum Irapuato, Gto. 1585.93 336.18 2559.27 1164.11 0.10423 0.23871 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Guadalajara, Jal. 1620.02 340.87 2595.40 1186.40 0.11006 0.22853 
Morelia, Mich. 1604.76 341.95 2580.70 1164.19 0.11107 0.23128 
Culiacan, Sin. 1557.93 370.25 2588.70 1085.90 0.12299 0.24836 
Mochis, Sin. 1535.93 362.90 2553.70 1074.50 0.12209 0.25175 
Matamoros, 
Tamps. 1353.28 322.67 2255.70 953.97 0.09774 0.27233 
Victoria, Tamps. 1540.29 322.66 2442.70 1140.97 0.08810 0.23914 
Sorghum All Locations  1542.59 342.50 2510.88 1110.00 0.10804 0.24394 
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Table 3.5.Sample statistics of future prices and exchange rate. 
 Average 
Std. 
Deviation Max Min 
Annual 
Geometric 
Mean 
Annual 
Volatility 
Corn Futures 266.28 65.32 455.50 186.25 0.10540 0.26778 
Exchange Rate 
(mxp / usd) 10.92 0.33 11.68 9.94 0.01382 0.07310 
Futures MXP 1145.50 284.38 1958.07 773.95 0.11922 0.27140 
 
 
Results 
For each local market we estimated for every commodity (yellow and white 
corn and sorghum) the basis, standard deviation, growth rate, correlation (beta) with 
respect to the Mexican stock market index, and risk premium. These results are 
presented in tables 3.6 and 3.7.  Both types of corn have negative beta and risk 
premium for all locations. Sorghum show positive and negative beta and risk 
premium, depending on the location. The largest sorghum producing state, 
Tamaulipas, is among those locations with positive beta and risk premium. They are 
also the only ones, among all, that have negative basis growth. This may be because 
Matamoros is also a major port of entry for sorghum and other grains from the US, 
and transportation costs depend on the US basis and not so much on Mexican energy 
prices. We estimated quanto put prices for all locations at different levels of coverage 
with respect to the cash price. These results take into account basis risk, and thus each 
location has its own quanto price. Strike prices for the options were assigned at 80, 
100 and 120% of the local price of each commodity measured in December, 31, 2007. 
Prices are in MXP per ton and time to maturity is one year. For simplicity we set the 
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carrying costs, δ, to zero. These prices are shown from tables 3.8 to 3.10, for yellow 
corn, white corn and sorghum, respectively.  
For all locations, quantos for white corn are valued the highest for every 
coverage level. Sorghum quantos are higher than those for yellow corn at every 
location and coverage, even for the sorghum producing regions. Indeed, markets in 
Tamaulipas have the highest quanto prices for sorghum and yellow corn.  For white 
corn, they are second and fourth, just below Irapuato, and Guadalajara.  
If we compare quanto prices relative to the cash price at each location, those 
with the highest absolute priced options are also the ones with the highest relative 
quanto price. For yellow corn, quantos at 100% coverage of local price are valued 
between 3.8 and 6.9% of local prices. At 120% coverage, the relative prices range 
from 12.3 to 19.6%, and for 80% coverage the range is between 0.5 and 1.5%. White 
corn quantos at 100% coverage range from 5.1 to 9.2% of local price; at 120% 
coverage those values are 15.3 and 20%; and 0.7 and 2.8% for an 80% coverage level. 
For sorghum, at 100% coverage the range of relative prices is between 5.5 to 7.5%; at 
120% coverage, 16 to 18.4%; and at 80% coverage, relative prices range from 0.8 to 
1.7% of local prices. 
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Table 3.6.Basis estimation for yellow corn at each market. 
Commodity 
Market 
(city, state) 
Average 
Basis 
Std. 
Deviation 
Basis 
Growth 
Rate  
Std. 
Deviation Beta 
Risk 
Premium 
Yellow 
Corn 
Campeche, 
Camp. 385.04 116.80 0.2416 0.5726 -0.0197 -0.0043 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Tuxtla 
Gutierrez, 
Chis. 378.71 146.91 0.3514 0.5807 -0.0082 -0.0018 
Arriaga, Chis. 309.72 122.65 0.4005 0.7166 -0.0099 -0.0021 
Tapachula, 
Chis. 370.84 115.76 0.2596 0.5734 -0.0059 -0.0013 
Cihuahua, 
Chih. 362.19 95.41 0.1825 0.6545 -0.0253 -0.0055 
Toluca, Mex. 487.07 121.54 0.1793 0.4463 -0.0137 -0.0030 
Irapuato, Gto. 450.85 85.15 0.1346 0.4895 -0.0262 -0.0057 
Guadalajara, 
Jal. 496.26 94.73 0.1311 0.4513 -0.0317 -0.0069 
Morelia, Mich. 477.05 92.01 0.1389 0.4591 -0.0255 -0.0055 
Culiacan, Sin. 410.85 93.78 0.1174 0.6030 -0.0376 -0.0082 
Mochis, Sin. 370.55 97.65 0.1707 0.6953 -0.0305 -0.0066 
Victoria, 
Tamps. 375.40 77.87 0.1346 0.6346 -0.0243 -0.0053 
Matamoros, 
Tamps. 187.75 77.45 0.2669 1.5480 -0.0232 -0.0050 
All Yellow Corn 389.41 102.91 0.2084 0.6481 -0.0217 -0.0047 
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Table 3.7.Basis estimation for white corn and sorghum for each local market. 
Commodity 
Market 
(city, state) 
Average 
Basis 
Std. 
Deviation 
Basis 
Growth 
Rate  
Std. 
Deviation Beta 
Risk 
Premium 
White Corn 
Campeche, 
Camp. 644.68 230.79 0.1131 0.6565 -0.0490 -0.0106 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Tuxtla 
Gutierrez, 
Chis. 652.57 263.49 0.1075 0.6245 -0.0359 -0.0078 
Arriaga, Chis. 586.37 250.38 0.1119 0.6977 -0.0423 -0.0092 
Tapachula, 
Chis. 648.41 250.22 0.0883 0.6216 -0.0352 -0.0076 
Cihuahua, 
Chih. 613.98 244.88 0.1106 0.7132 -0.0501 -0.0109 
Toluca, Mex. 744.48 245.10 0.2114 0.6101 -0.0486 -0.0105 
Irapuato, Gto. 686.13 244.73 0.0849 0.7321 -0.0517 -0.0112 
Guadalajara, 
Jal. 730.20 251.45 0.0852 0.6844 -0.0519 -0.0112 
Morelia, Mich. 733.17 256.16 0.0892 0.8747 -0.0337 -0.0072 
Culiacan, Sin. 669.70 269.19 0.0514 0.6744 -0.0583 -0.0126 
Mochis, Sin. 629.37 263.96 0.0755 0.7137 -0.0581 -0.0126 
Victoria, 
Tamps. 637.55 251.09 0.0676 0.7208 -0.0495 -0.0107 
Matamoros, 
Tamps. 449.94 250.9553 0.0933 1.3257 -0.0447 -0.0097 
All White Corn  648.20 251.7265 0.0992 0.7422 -0.0468 -0.0101 
Sorghum Irapuato, Gto. 440.43 105.4572 0.0625 0.6607 0.0138 0.0030 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Guadalajara, 
Jal. 474.52 106.8381 0.0845 0.5747 0.0016 0.0003 
Morelia, Mich. 459.26 106.7082 0.0876 0.5930 0.0016 0.0003 
Culiacan, Sin. 412.43 134.2574 0.1352 0.8061 -0.0196 -0.0042 
Mochis, Sin. 390.43 125.4693 0.1318 0.8549 -0.0192 -0.0042 
Matamoros, 
Tamps. 207.78 107.8181 -1.5226 3.4042 0.0050 0.0011 
Victoria, 
Tamps. 394.79 107.8075 -0.0015 0.7527 0.0204 0.0044 
All Sorghum  397.09 113.47 -0.1461 1.0923 0.0005 0.0001 
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Table 3.8.Quanto put prices in mxp for yellow corn. 
Yellow Corn Local Price (Dec 31, 2007) 
 
Put Price 
Market 
(city, state) 80% 100% 120% 80% 100% 120% 
Campeche, Camp. 2049 2561 3073 19 121 362 
Tuxtla Gutierrez, Chis. 2098 2623 3147 14 100 323 
Arriaga, Chis. 1972 2466 2959 16 104 318 
Tapachula, Chis. 2017 2522 3026 17 116 353 
Cihuahua, Chih. 2008 2510 3012 26 143 394 
Toluca, Mex. 2148 2685 3223 17 123 385 
Irapuato, Gto. 2106 2633 3160 21 135 402 
Guadalajara, Jal. 2147 2684 3221 18 130 400 
Morelia, Mich. 2135 2669 3203 19 131 400 
Culiacan, Sin. 2113 2641 3169 24 146 417 
Mochis, Sin. 2084 2606 3127 25 143 402 
Matamoros, Tamps. 1878 2347 2817 36 156 390 
Victoria, Tamps. 2030 2537 3045 28 150 410 
 
 
Table 3.9.Quanto  put prices in mxp for white corn. 
White Corn Local Price (Dec 31, 2007) 
 
Put Price 
Market 
(city, state) 80% 100% 120% 80% 100% 120% 
Campeche, Camp. 2327 2909 3490 48 205 506 
Tuxtla Gutierrez, Chis. 2370 2962 3555 46 204 512 
Arriaga, Chis. 2296 2871 3445 48 205 503 
Tapachula, Chis. 2341 2927 3512 46 206 515 
Cihuahua, Chih. 2185 2732 3278 53 209 495 
Toluca, Mex. 2337 2922 3506 35 170 446 
Irapuato, Gto. 2256 2821 3385 68 242 543 
Guadalajara, Jal. 2297 2872 3446 64 236 542 
Morelia, Mich. 2285 2857 3428 21 148 445 
Culiacan, Sin. 2264 2830 3396 54 220 527 
Mochis, Sin. 2235 2794 3353 51 211 508 
Matamoros, Tamps. 2061 2576 3092 72 237 514 
Victoria, Tamps. 2213 2766 3320 57 222 520 
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Table 3.10.Quanto put prices in mxp for sorghum. 
Sorghum Local Price (Dec 31, 2007) 
 
Put Price 
Market 
(city, state) 80% 100% 120% 80% 100% 120% 
Irapuato, Gto. 2047 2559 3071 27 155 431 
Guadalajara, Jal. 2076 2595 3114 22 143 417 
Morelia, Mich. 2064 2580 3096 23 144 416 
Culiacan, Sin. 2070 2588 3106 27 150 415 
Mochis, Sin. 2042 2553 3064 28 152 415 
Matamoros, Tamps. 1804 2255 2706 38 168 415 
Victoria, Tamps. 1954 2442 2931 29 159 431 
 
 
Validation 
How different are our option prices with respect to the option prices quoted at 
a commodities exchange? To validate the relative price of our estimated options, we 
divided the option price at each level of coverage by the current local price for each 
location. Table 3.11 shows the relative option prices at each location and at the CME 
commodities exchange. The relative price for the CME options was obtained by 
dividing the option price for yellow corn by the nearby futures contract price. Quanto 
prices for yellow corn are cheaper in Mexico than those quoted using futures prices at 
the CME; the only exception is Matamoros at 80% coverage level. The quanto price is 
1.5 % of the local price in Matamoros and 1% at the CME. Relative price of put 
options for White corn at 120% are higher in the CME than in most locations in 
Mexico; however, prices in Mexico can be higher for some locations at 100% 
coverage, but they are higher at all locations at 80% coverage. Sorghum relative prices 
have mixed values with respect to CME prices. For 120% coverage, the CME price is 
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higher than any location in Mexico. At 100% coverage, the relative price in 
Matamoros is more expensive, while at 80% coverage, Mochis, Matamoros and 
Victoria are higher, and Culiacan the same than the CME relative prices. This 
comparison does not take into account local basis in the US. It was shown just as an 
illustration and also to verify that the estimated prices in Mexico are in accordance to 
the prices at the futures market.  
 
Table 3.11.Relative prices of options as percentage of local prices for different coverage levels. 
 
 
 
Put Price / Cash Price 
Yellow Corn 
 
Put Price / Cash Price 
White Corn 
 
Put Price / Cash Price 
Sorghum 
Market 
(city, state) 80% 100% 120% 80% 100% 120% 80% 100% 120% 
 
CME  
(Futures 
Exchange) 0.010 0.069 0.196 
      
Campeche, Camp. 0.007 0.047 0.141 0.017 0.070 0.174 
   
Tuxtla Gutierrez, 
Chis. 0.005 0.038 0.123 0.016 0.069 0.173 
   
Arriaga, Chis. 0.006 0.042 0.129 0.017 0.071 0.175    
Tapachula, Chis. 0.007 0.046 0.140 0.016 0.070 0.176    
Cihuahua, Chih. 0.010 0.057 0.157 0.019 0.077 0.181    
Toluca, Mex. 0.006 0.046 0.143 0.012 0.058 0.153    
Irapuato, Gto. 0.008 0.051 0.153 0.024 0.086 0.192 0.011 0.061 0.168 
Guadalajara, Jal. 0.007 0.048 0.149 0.022 0.082 0.189 0.008 0.055 0.161 
Morelia, Mich. 0.007 0.049 0.150 0.007 0.051 0.156 0.009 0.056 0.161 
Culiacan, Sin. 0.009 0.055 0.158 0.019 0.078 0.186 0.010 0.058 0.160 
Mochis, Sin. 0.010 0.055 0.154 0.018 0.076 0.182 0.011 0.060 0.163 
Matamoros, 
Tamps. 0.015 0.066 0.166 0.028 0.092 0.200 0.017 0.075 0.184 
Victoria, Tamps. 0.011 0.059 0.162 0.021 0.080 0.188 0.012 0.065 0.176 
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Conclusion 
In response to calls for more market oriented approaches to price risk 
management in developing economies, this paper develops a dual currency financial 
derivative model, called quanto, to investigate a market-based price insurance product 
for grain farmers at various locations in Mexico. A quanto option is used when the 
underlying asset is priced in a currency different from its payoffs, but where the local 
price is dependent on the price in another country. In our paper, the underlying 
commodity is yellow corn futures quoted at the CME in USD, with payoffs in 
Mexican pesos. We were able to price the quanto options since local grain prices in 
Mexico are correlated to the price of futures corn contracts in the US. By knowing the 
price of the futures corn contracts, exchange rate and local basis for each crop we were 
able to price put options for yellow corn, white corn and sorghum at 13 locations 
throughout Mexico. The relative prices of our quanto options are consistent with the 
option prices traded at the CME. Differences in prices are due to the extra sources of 
risk that developing countries face but captured in our model.  
As indicated, the advantage that this model presents to current approaches to 
price stabilization in Mexico is that its pricing mechanism is market based. The 
current Mexican price guarantee program, Programa de Administración de Riesgos de 
Mercados a Través de los Intermediarios Financieros (PARMIF) does not cover all 
products (currently only options for corn, sorghum and wheat are available), and being 
a government program the inclusion of new crops depends on the lobbying capacity of 
producers. Through this model, we are able to price put options for different crops if 
their local price is correlated to a futures price in a foreign market. The futures price 
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need not be the same crop in the domestic market, as in the case of sorghum in 
Mexico, we were able to price the options because its local prices are correlated to that 
of yellow corn in the CME. This characteristic allows us to price options for any 
commodity anywhere as long as the correlation condition is met. Another advantage 
that this model presents is that by incorporating local basis risk, it provides a better 
hedging model than by just buying two options on the market, one for the crop and 
another one for the exchange rate risk.  
This quanto model is not limited to European options, but can be used to price 
path dependent options like Asians or Barrier options. Call prices can also be 
estimated.  Furthermore, due to the simplicity of this model it can be pilot tested for 
selected crops and regions given any level of coverage if the risk factors are 
measurable, that is, if the correlation between local and futures price is sufficiently 
large. This conforms to the World Bank sets of policy priorities for agricultural and 
rural development.  
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Appendix 
 
1.The quanto’s vega, , is: 
 
We know that, 
, for ;    , and   
   from which we obtain: 
 
Simplyfies to, 
 
 
 
2. The result of [8],   , where  is: 
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After expanding , 
 
 
 Simplifies to, 
 
 
 
Where  ;  
and ; ;  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
RISK RATIONING AND THE DEMAND FOR AGRICULTURAL CREDIT 
 
Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to determine the extent of risk rationing amongst potential 
rural borrowers. Using data from 372 farmers in northeastern Mexico and 730 farm households 
in the Shaanxi province of China, we investigate factors associated with risk rationed, price 
rationed and quantity rationed farmers. This study compares the results of both surveys. The 
analysis applies both a linear probability and logit model. We find in China the incidence of risk 
rationing in farmers to be 6.5%, 14% for quantity rationed and 80% for price rationed. In 
Mexico, 35% of our sample is risk rationed, 10% quantity rationed and 55% price rationed. Our 
results from China support the hypothesis that financial poor are more likely to be quantity 
rationed; in Mexico however, the level of education is found to be important in determining 
quantity rationed. In both countries, asset wealthy farmers are less likely to be risk rationed; 
however, income doesn’t appear to have an impact. We provide evidence that the elasticity of 
demand for credit is different among the three credit rationed groups: risk rationed, price 
rationed and quantity rationed. Risk aversion and prudence are significantly correlated with risk 
rationing in China, while only risk aversion is significant in Mexico. Our results suggest that 
efforts to enhance credit access must also deal with risk and risk perceptions.  
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Introduction 
Credit rationing can be broadly categorized into three groups: risk rationing, 
price rationing and quantity rationing. The first two groups are determined by the 
producer, while quantity rationed is externally determined by the financial institution. 
Although in this study we analyzed all three types of credit rationing, our main interest 
is on those household characteristics that can help in understanding the determinants 
of risk rationing. 
The decision to become risk rationed can depend on many factors. According 
to a definition of risk rationing proffered by Boucher, Carter and Guirkinger (2008) 
(BCG) “Risk rationing occurs when insurance markets are absent, and lenders, 
constrained by asymmetric information, shift so much contractual risk to the 
borrower that the borrower voluntarily withdraws from the credit market even when 
he has the collateral wealth needed to qualify for a loan contract”. This definition 
suggest that a risk rationed individual can only be classified as such if insurance 
markets are absent, adverse selection is present, and there is a real demand for credit; 
but in the absence of risk contingent markets of any sort, there is a withdrawal from 
the credit market in order to preserve collateral. From an economic point of view, the 
concept of risk rationing rounds out the various sources of credit constraints including 
quantity and price rationing. When considered in full, supply side quantity and price 
rationing, combined with demand side price and risk rationing round out all possible 
factors that might give rise to a positive shadow price on a farm household’s credit 
constraint
2
.At the heart of risk rationing is the partitioning of non-borrowers into those 
that do not borrow because of collateral risk and those that do not borrow because of 
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they have no need
3
. Price rationed individuals’ demand for credit depends on the 
current interest rate. Quantity rationing occurs when the lender does not lend because 
he deems the borrower to be unqualified for repayment. 
  Risk rationing, as a topic of inquiry, is critically important to understanding 
borrower behavior and credit decisions in agricultural development. The state of the 
art in the present study are theoretical postulates in which the entirety of risk rationing 
behavior is determined by the relationship between wealth, risk aversion and 
prudence. However, risk aversion and prudence are nebulous measures that arise in 
theory but are much more difficult to measure in reality. Nonetheless they are critical 
to the baseline understanding. However, there may be many other household 
characteristics that do not arise in theory that can also aid in distinguishes why one 
farmer might risk ration while another price rations. Arising from this are the 
problems of instrumentation and endogeneity.  For example simply observing that a 
farm household has no formal debt does not imply either risk rationing or quantity 
rationing; It may simply be that debt is not needed or that debt is not used at the 
current rate of interest (i.e. price rationing). Consequently, designing appropriate, 
properly identified, instruments that are not endogenously determined by 
indeterminable factors requires great care.  
In this study, we investigate risk rationing in rural Mexico and China. To 
accomplish this we designed the survey specifically to identify risk rationing, price 
rationing and quantity rationing so that the partitioning between the three is 
unambiguous. In doing so we avoid problems of identification, instrumentation and 
endogeneity and can then focus on determining relationships between 
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independent/explanatory variables and risk, price and quantity rationing. Our use of a 
two-country panel is part of this approach. There are many country-specific 
characteristics that could explain risk rationing behavior including agricultural 
populations and culture, technology adoption, different political and credit systems 
and so on that may help in understanding differences in credit rationing in different 
countries. We thus employed identical surveys, the first being delivered in Chinese in 
Shaanxi China in November of 2010 and the second, prepared in Spanish, in San Luis 
Potosí, Mexico in September of 2011 . In the two surveys reported in this paper, we 
find that 6.5% of Chinese farmers and 35% of Mexican farmers are risk rationed. The 
China survey interviewed 730 farm households, while the Mexico study interviewed 
372 small land owner 
4
. 
This chapter synthesizes these two studies on risk rationing: China and 
Mexico. The results from the Chinese study were part of Sivalai Vararuth's 
(Khantachavana) Ph.D. dissertation (2012). The result of the two studies are also 
analyzed in Verteramo et al. (2013), coauthored by Vararuth. For the sake of 
consistency, and to facilitate the understanding of the organization of these two 
studies, some definitions of the conditions of risk rationing by BCG and the way they 
are presented and organized are transcribed from Vararuth (2012), with the permission 
of the author. 
Our surveys were instrumented to specifically test the conjectures and 
hypotheses of risk rationing and to examine further endogenous relationships that 
might prove important to a deeper understanding of risk rationing. Our approach uses 
the direct elicitation methodology (DEM), where a set of questions directly elicits the 
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household’s status as either credit constrained versus unconstrained, and is similar to 
an approach recommended in Boucher, Guirkinger and Trivellini (2009).  Endogenous 
characteristics that we estimate econometrically include credit demand and credit 
demand elasticities, informal lending, property rights, entrepreneurship, risk aversion, 
prudence, wealth, insurance markets and asymmetric information. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we review related literature 
on credit demand and constraints. We then stipulate the hypotheses of interest from 
the definition of risk rationing by BCG, explain how these are instrumented with our 
approach, describe data and survey techniques, and end with results and discussion. 
 
Background and Related Research 
The central importance of BCG, and their related papers, is in the 
understanding of credit constraints in agricultural development. The idea that farmers 
will avoid credit risk is not new, but a formal treatment has been elusive. One of the 
earliest considerations from Roy (1952; see also Masson 1974) dealt with safety-first 
constraints. A farmer facing bankruptcy (i.e. loss of collateral) would minimize the 
probability of falling below a critical income level that would trigger the loss. The 
constraints on (linear) utility would be such that debt coverage is satisfied in all states 
of nature. On the relationship between credit constraints and agricultural productivity 
and rural livelihoods much has been written (Binswanger 1980; Binswanger and 
Sillers 1983; Carter 1988; Carter and Olinto 1993; Eswaran and Kotwal 1990; Kochar 
1997a, 1997b) and with some discourse over the range of interventionist policies 
(Adams and Graham 1981; Adams and Von Pischke 1991; Carter 1988). An early 
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sentiment of risk rationing is by Binswanger and Siller (1983) who state “If the 
disutility of the loan is sufficiently high, small farmers may stop borrowing altogether, 
i.e. the credit market for small farmers may disappear because of lack of demand, 
despite the fact that small farmers may still have available collateral in the form of 
unencumbered land” (page 17), and in concluding “It is important to realize that it is 
not an innate deficiency in the willingness of small farmers to take risks that hold them 
back” (page 19). Binswanger and Siller see an inverse incidence of risk rationing to 
asset size. This is because, collateral is assumed to be divisible so that interest and 
collateral are viewed as substitutes (as in Bester 1985). In reality, loss of collateral is 
an all or one proposition as developed in Roy (1952) and Masson (1974). If the fixity 
of collateral is considered then the larger farm would have proportionately more to 
lose with the same level of risk and would view asset risk with greater prudence.  
Eswaran and Kotwal (1990) examine credit constraints using a two-period 
consumption model to explain why the risk premium declines with wealth. Then they 
state that “this theory thus may dispense with the need for an assumption involving the 
third order derivative of the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function” (page 478), 
that is, prudence
5
. This seems to say that the ability to use credit markets to smooth 
consumption between individuals of different income classes but identical utility 
functions can be differentiated by scale of operations in terms of credit demand. 
However, Eswaren and Kotwal (1990) conclude that under their original assumptions 
“the poor are reluctant to become residual claimants (i.e. equity owners); they would 
rather work for fixed wages that are lower than the expected values they could earn as 
residual claimants. What seems like an inordinate degree of risk aversion may be a 
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merely a reflection of their inability to sustain downswings in income” (Page 480). 
Under the current definition of risk rationing, however, an increased prudence of the 
wealthy can lead them to behave as risk rationed. With different points of view, 
whether risk aversion, prudence and wealth matter independently or jointly is an 
empirical matter that we test in this paper. 
Bell, Srintvasan and Udry (1997) examining credit demand with linked (e.g. a 
contractual relation with a marketer offering a loan to be repaid with commodity 
delivery) and unlinked (regulated cooperatives) credit estimate a credit demand 
relationship in which demand increases with liquid assets but decreases with fixed 
assets, a result they state is “both puzzling and unsatisfactory” (page 575). That the 
sign on liquid assets is positive is at least suggestive of risk rationing behavior, since 
liquid assets would buffer (in a precautionary and prudent way) the collateralized 
value of fixed assets in case of default. However, Bell, Srintvasan and Udry (1997) 
find that credit demand for the unregulated market has a positive sign, suggesting that 
higher land assets held more informal debt than formal debt perhaps because the latter 
would have a claim on the land itself, whereas the informal, unregulated market, 
would not. While it is naturally difficult to reinterpret such results, it appears on the 
surface that Bell, Srintvasan and Udry (1997) also show evidence of risk rationing in 
the Punjab. However, Swain (2002), investigating credit rationing in Puri, India, finds 
evidence of credit rationing in the conventional sense, but also notes that “the lower 
number of households demanding loans from the formal sector might be a choice 
decision of the household… Such households restrict their demand for production 
loans even if they have access to them” (Pages 4-5). Bhattacharyya (2005) reveals data 
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from West Bengal showing that even in the presence of formal lending, 62.3% of 
farmers used informal credit with 86% of these willing to pay a substantial premium 
for not having to give up collateral
6
.   
Placing the above research in context it becomes clear that an important (and 
missing) aspect of risk rationing is how it affects or explains credit demand. The true 
demand will be different from the notional demand, but only the latter is actually 
observable. Kochar (1997) and Bell (1990) make the broad conclusion that notional 
demand is low given access to informal credit and that the benefits derived from credit 
policies may be limited. It is worth noting that of Kochar’s (1997) sample only 34.7% 
borrowed either formally (20%) or informally (17.2%), leaving 45.3% non-borrowers 
unidentified as to the reasons. If the results reported here for China and Mexico are 
any indication of the degree of risk rationing in a rural population; then, conclusions 
that credit policies are ineffective can be misleading. In a statistical framework, the 
risk rationed can easily be mistaken for borrowers with a perfectly inelastic demand 
for credit at zero, which when aggregated across all borrowers will arithmetically 
result in an inelastic aggregate demand. But this is not the case at the micro level. In 
China, for example, Turvey et al. (2011) show that about 20% of households have 
highly inelastic demands for credit (less than -0.25). Many of these households had no 
demand for debt and thus had perfectly inelastic demands. However, nearly 50% of 
households had demand elasticities in excess of -0.50 and nearly 20% with elasticities 
greater than -0.75. About 15% of households had demand elasticities greater than -1.0. 
Salazar, Bogan and Turvey (2010) find a similar distribution of microcredit borrowers 
in the Dominican Republic with an average elasticity across borrowers of -1.0. In both 
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papers there is evidence that the demand becomes more elastic as interest rates fall. 
The point is that the broader view of credit policies needs to be investigated in the 
context of borrower characteristics (Braverman and Guasch 1986). This is a difficult 
task as illustrated in Binswanger and Khandker (1993) who, upon investigating a 
supply leading approach to rural credit in India, could not conclude whether India’s 
programs were successful or not.  The identification of risk rationing suggests that 
farmers are not passive or irrational, but prudent actors. Nonetheless, only recently 
have approaches to new credit instruments that deal directly with collateral preserving 
credit instruments that would be attractive to risk rationed farm households been 
considered (Galarza and Carter 2010; Carter 2011, Miranda and Gonzalez-Vega 2011, 
Collier 2011; Karlan et al. 2011; Shee and Turvey 2012).  
 
Hypotheses on Risk Rationing 
The hypotheses about risk rationing emerging from BCG are derived from a 
very specific utility model. Since we do not alter their model (BCG, Pages 411-418) in 
any form we see no need to replicate it here, but instead provide its qualitative 
implications as conjecture and hypothesis. Addressing their model in this way also 
avoids the problem of having to jointly test the specifics of their model structure and 
the implications derived therefrom.  
In the following paragraphs, and in the same spirit as Vararuth and Verteramo 
et al., we generalized on a more qualitative basis the BCG model implications for 
empirical assessment. Again, certain contents are transcribed from Vararuth (2012) 
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and Verteramo et al. (2013) with the permission of the authors for the reasons 
previously mentioned. 
 
Wealth-Biased Quantity Rationing 
Quantity rationing is decreasing in financial wealth and productive wealth. 
Financial wealth is liquid and can be committed as collateral to secure production 
loans. Productive wealth is land which can also be used as collateral. BCG shows that 
quantity rationing is unambiguously biased against the poor. An increase in financial 
wealth tends to relax quantity rationing, while an increase in an agent’s land 
endowment, whether it is titled or untitled, will also relax quantity rationing. 
 
Risk Rationing and Financial Wealth 
Following Thiele and Wambach (1999), BCG demonstrate that risk rationing 
may depend on the type of wealth considered. They obtain the results that the financial 
wealthy will be risk rationed. BCG argue that whether the financially poor or 
financially rich are risk rationed depend on the relative strength of two opposing 
effects from risk-aversion and incentive-dilution. The risk-aversion effect states that 
those agents who are more sensitive to risk would be more likely to be risk rationed 
(assuming decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA)). The incentive-dilution effect 
states that financially wealthier agents are less sensitive to a given contractual risk and 
must then face riskier contracts than poorer agents in order to maintain incentive 
compatibility. Therefore, relatively rich agents might also display risk rationing 
behavior. 
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Prudence and Risk Aversion 
Under proposition 2 in BCG (Page 416), risk rationing can be biased either for 
or against the financially wealthy but this is linked to the relationships between 
prudence (P), , and risk aversion (A), . The idea that the financially 
wealthy can be risk rationed is therefore not so clear cut. BCG  propose that if the 
coefficient of prudence is greater than three times the coefficient of risk aversion, then 
an agent with financial wealth will prefer commercial activity while the poor will 
prefer subsistence activity and be risk rationed. However, if prudence is less than three 
times risk aversion ( P < 3A), then the poor will prefer commercial activity while the 
rich will prefer subsistence activity and be risk rationed. The theoretical conclusions 
suggest that measures of prudence or risk aversion are less than perfectly correlated 
and in fact may be inversely related in order to identify degrees of risk rationing across 
wealth classes. Whether prudence and/or risk aversion influence risk rationing are 
complements, substitutes or neither is a testable hypothesis. 
 
The Relatively Land-Poor are Risk Rationed 
Here BCG argue that there is a relationship between risk rationing and 
productive wealth. The authors argue that exploiting the land with risky activity yields 
a higher return. As farm size increases, returning to safe activity becomes increasingly 
costly. The land-wealthy will choose to participate in the credit market and fully 
exploit their productive asset (land). Thus, against the null of no difference in risk 
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rationing between farm households of different sizes, the effect of land size on risk 
rationing behavior is a testable hypothesis. 
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Risk Rationing and Insurance Markets, Asymmetric Information and the 
Elasticity of Demand for Credit 
BCG argue that risk rationing occurs when insurance markets are absent; the 
agent would be offered and demand a credit contract in the symmetric information 
world; the agent is offered a financially feasible contract in the asymmetric 
information world, but the agent chooses not to accept the offered contract, preferring 
the reservation subsistence activity. In a literal interpretation of these propositions, the 
existence of insurance markets would vitiate risk rationing as a form of credit 
constraints. This is a strong condition and needs to be investigated as a specific 
hypothesis; that is, if participation in insurance reduce the incidence of risk rationing, 
and if asymmetric information defines quantity or price rationing. Quantity rationing 
would more likely be tied to asymmetric information, but whether farmers classified 
as risk rationing have also been rationed or refused debt at some time may be 
indicative (as a testable hypothesis) of the effects of asymmetric information. The 
demand for credit is important. The demand elasticity may appear to be perfectly 
inelastic whether the farmer is risk rationed, quantity rationed or price rationed.  More 
generally, we would expect that the demand elasticity for credit is more inelastic for 
risk rationed farmers than quantity or price rationed farmers. These relationships 
between credit demand elasticities and rationing are testable hypotheses. 
In the next section, we briefly review the literature on risk rationing. We then 
describe our approach to segregating credit rationed, price rationed and risk rationed 
farm households, and the survey and data that used in the analysis. Empirical results 
are then presented and policy implications discussed. 
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Credit Rationing Status and Credit Constraints 
The survey asked questions that made it possible to infer respondents’ credit 
rationing status based partly on Boucher, Guirkinger and Trivelli (2009) strategy to 
directly elicit credit constraint. Constraint categories can be defined as follows.  
1) Price rationed or unconstrained farmer are those who may either 
borrow or not, and are satisfied with the loan amount at the price offered. External 
price rationing can occur if the lender raises interest rates and/or transaction costs, 
so that free choice along the credit demand curve results in a utility maximizing 
position. Internal price rationing occurs when a borrower chooses or not to borrow 
at fair market prices and transactions costs. Price rationing in this context is 
determined by cost-quantity tradeoffs along the demand curve and the degree by 
which these tradeoffs take place is determined by individual credit demand 
elasticities which, as we show later, differ amongst borrowers.  
2) Quantity rationed, or supply-side-constrained, farmer may be either 
an applicant who was rejected a loan or a non-applicant who knew that he would 
be rejected. A quantity rationed farmer faces a binding credit limit; therefore, the 
limiting constraint comes from the supply side. A quantity rationed farmer is 
expected to have excess demand.   
3) Risk rationed farmers do not face a binding limit and therefore does 
not have excess demand for credit. The limiting constraint comes from the 
demand side. Their demand is lower because of the risk-sharing rules associated 
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with the loan contract. Asset wealth, financial wealth, risk aversion, prudence and 
property rights are all aspects of the risk rationing problem identified in BCG. 
 
Survey and Data 
We use direct elicitation methods to gather information on the credit market 
perceptions of both borrowers and non-borrowers. Figure 1 shows the structure of the 
survey questions required to segregate and identify credit constraint status for the 
China survey. An equivalent instrument was modified for Mexico. We divide farmers 
into two groups. Farmers in the first group do not have to apply for a loan but instead 
have the lender (bank, buyer or for China, the Rural Credit Cooperative (RCC)) 
evaluate their creditworthiness and offer them a loan. Farmers in the second group 
must formally request a loan. In the first group, since a loan offer is made farmers are 
not quantity rationed. We asked the first group “How much of loan did RCC or Bank 
offer to lend you?” and “How much of loan did you actually use?” Risk rationed 
farmers are defined by those who responded that the amount of loan they use is less 
than the amount offered by the RCC or bank, specifically, because they are afraid of 
losing collateral. This is distinguished from farmers who use less than the offered loan 
but not because they fear losing collateral. In keeping with BCG, these respondents are 
labeled as being price rationed.  
In the second group, farmers must request a loan. We asked farmers whether 
they applied for a loan within the past 2 years. It is a challenge to accurately classify 
the constraint status of individuals who do not participate in the credit market. They 
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might not have applied for a loan because of three reasons; first, they had enough 
money and therefore no need to borrow (price rationed); second, they knew that they 
would be rejected (quantity rationed); or third, they were afraid to lose collateral (risk 
rationed). On the other hand, among the loan applicants, farmers who applied for a 
loan but were either rejected or offered an amount less than requested are quantity 
rationed. Price rationed farmers either accepted the approved loan or applied but did 
not accept the approved loan because of reasons other than risk associated with a loan 
contract. Risk rationed farmers did not accept the approved loan because they were 
afraid of losing collateral. Once identified according to the schematic in figure 4.1, the 
three rationing typologies are used as dependent variables in the regressions that 
follow.  
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Local RCC or Bank 
evaluates my 
creditworthiness and offers 
me a loan without me 
requesting a loan. 
I must formally request a 
loan from my local RCC or 
Bank. 
1. On the most recent loan 
OFFER, approximately how 
much (RMB) in loan did RCC or 
Bank OFFER to lend you? 
2. How much of loan (RMB) did 
you ACTUALLY use? 
 
 
4. Have you applied for a 
loan from RCC or bank 
within the past 2 years? 
5.On the most recent 
loan request, 
approximately how 
much (RMB) in loan 
did you request? 
6. How much (RMB) 
did RCC or banks offer 
to you? 
 
7.(If answer to Q6 is 
greater than zero) Did
you accept the offered 
loan? 
8. Why? Because 
you are afraid of 
losing collateral? 
 
3. Why? Because 
you are afraid of 
losing collateral? 
9. Why? Because 
you are afraid of 
losing collateral? 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Sample survey questions to identify credit constraint status in China. an ad hoc version was used to 
identify the status of Mexican farmers. 
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As mentioned before, the farm household survey in China was conducted in the 
Shaanxi province, Yangling district in November 2010. 730 households were surveyed. Each 
household was interviewed by graduate students from Northwest Agriculture and Forestry 
University
7
. The survey in Mexico was conducted in September 2011, through the assistance 
of a local integrator company. Local college students were hired to interview farmers with 
principal investigators always present. The characteristics of these communities are as follows. 
On average there are about 5 people living in each household for both China and Mexico. The 
average education level of respondents is between attending middle school and completing 
middle school for Chinese farmers, while for Mexican farmers the average education is 
attending some elementary school and finishing elementary school. The average number of 
farming years for China is 28, while for Mexico is 22. From our Chinese data, the average 
farm size is 5mu (about 5/6th of an acre), however, the average farm size for the Mexican 
farmers is 10 Hectares (about 24 acres). In the Chinese survey, household average yearly 
income is 23,796 RMB with approximately 39% of household income coming from farm 
activities. Similarly for Mexico, our results show an average household income of 64,115 
pesos, 61% of them derived from farming activities. The average profit per year earned from 
cropped land is 953 RMB/mu for China, and 3,702 peso/Ha for Mexico. The average asset per 
household is 318,904 RMB for China and 532,838 pesos for Mexico. There are 203 Chinese 
farmers that indicated any amount of debt; the average debt per household is 29,330 RMB. 
Similarly, 125 Mexican farmers indicated to have any debt. The average debt in Mexico is 
25,231 pesos. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 report some descriptive statistics on Chinese and Mexican 
farmers. 
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Table 4.1.Descriptive statistics of Chinese farmers. 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Sex (Female =1) 730 0.54 0.49 0 1 
Age 730 48.72 11.36 18 78 
Education 730 4.37 1.83 0 8 
Household member 730 4.88 1.51 2 18 
Years of Farming 726 27.66 13.54 0 65 
Farm Size (mu) 728 4.93 2.81 0 40 
Household Income (RMB) 721 23,796 23,048 0 248,000 
Percentage farm Income 720 39.29 29.32 0 1 
Asset Value (RMB) 703 318,904 1,897,610 0 50,000,000 
Farm Profit (RMB/mu) 710 952 1,915.054 0 25,000 
Amount of Debt (RMB) 203 29,329 58,190 0.01 600,000 
 
Table 4.2.Descriptive statistics of Mexican farmers. 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Sex (Female =1) 372 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Age 372 52.79 13.75 18 87 
Education 369 1.84 1.59 0 8 
Household member 372 5.15 2.55 1 17 
Years of Farming 364 21.97 12.38 1 68 
Farm Size (Ha) 372 10.84 5.04 0 40 
Household Income (MXP) 372 64,115 56,006 6,000 450,000 
Percentage farm Income (MXP) 372 61.49 24.17 0 1 
Asset Value (MXP) 372 532,838 566,206 12,000 7,500,000 
Farm Profit (MXP/Ha) 372 3,702 3,705 0 30,000 
Amount of Debt (MXP) 125 25,231 36,663 0 300,000 
1 Ha = 15 Mu 
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Risk Rationing, Quantity Rationing and Price Rationing 
Using the above approach, we obtained the following groupings. The first was 
a group of 52 farmers in China, and 18 in Mexico, who did not request a loan but a 
local RCC, bank or buyer evaluated their creditworthiness and offered them a loan. 
Among farmers who borrowed less than the amount that the lender was willing to 
provide, 27.3% of Chinese farmers indicated that they did not use the total amount of 
credit made available to them because they were afraid of losing collateral, but none of 
the Mexican farmers indicated as a reason for not taking the full loan the fear of losing 
collateral. In the second group, 672 Chinese and 354 Mexican farmers indicated that 
they must formally request a loan. Of these, only 121 Chinese and 45 Mexican farmers 
had applied for a loan within the past two years and no risk rationed farmers were 
found in this group. Among those who had not applied for a loan, approximately 7.5% 
of Chinese and 39% of Mexican farmers were determined to be risk rationed because 
they indicated that the risk of losing collateral was important to their loan choices. 
Among all 730 Chinese and 372 Mexican respondents, the total proportion of risk 
rationed farmers is approximately 6.2% for China and 34.67% for Mexico. We 
determined that approximately 14% of all Chinese respondents and 9.94% of Mexican 
farmers were quantity rationed. These farmers indicated that they had formally 
requested a loan from RCC, bank or buyer within the past two years, but the lender 
either did not offer them any loan or offered less than the amount requested. Also 
included in the quantity rationed group are farmers who had not applied for a loan 
because they believed they would be rejected, were deemed not to be credit worthy or 
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were unable to obtain a group or individual guarantee. 79.9% of Chinese and 55.37% 
of Mexican farmers were deemed to be price rationed. Price rationed farmers indicated 
either that they actually used a loan offered to them without requesting it; applied for a 
loan and accepted the offered loan; or are non-borrowers with no need to borrow. 
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 provide a summary of household characteristics and 
frequencies by credit constraint status. The tables compare the means and medians of 
several key variables for 3 types of credit rationed farmers. Risk rationed farmers tend 
to be a bit younger and substantially more educated than quantity and price rationed 
farmers. The household income, asset value and farm profit of quantity rationed 
farmers are less than that of risk rationed and price rationed farmers. As expected, 
poor farmers are more likely to be quantity rationed as it is difficult to get a loan 
approval by RCC, bank or buyer. Among Chinese farmers, the risk rationed group has 
the highest median household income, asset value and farm profit but the lowest 
amount of debt. However, for Mexican farmers, the group with the highest median 
household income, asset value and farm profit is the price rationed, followed by 
quantity and then risk rationed. The average amount of debt is highest for price 
rationed, then risk rationed and finally quantity rationed. They all have the same 
median of zero debt. The Chinese results are in general consistent with the theoretical 
findings of BCG that risk rationing is not linked to farm households with low asset 
and financial wealth. For China, the mean and median incomes of risk rationed 
households are higher than both the quantity and price rationed groups. However, the 
results for Mexico show that the risk rationed farmers have the lowest household 
income, asset value and farm profit measured as average and median. In any case, as 
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predicted by BCG, one cannot take for granted the notion that only the poor, collateral 
constrained households are risk rationed as a matter of course. Behavioral aspects 
dealing with prudence and risk aversion may come into play. 
 
Table 4.3.Summary of household characteristics and frequencies by credit constraint status for Chinese 
farmers. 
 
Non-price Rationed 
  
  Risk Rationed Quantity Rationed Price Rationed Total 
  mean median mean median mean median mean median 
Sex (Female =1) 0.67 1.00 0.54 1.00 0.54 1.00 0.55 1.00 
Age 44.87 47.00 48.70 50.00 49.02 50.00 48.72 50.00 
Education 4.67 5.00 4.17 5.00 4.38 5.00 4.37 5.00 
Years of Farming 25.87 27.00 29.54 30.00 27.48 30.00 27.67 30.00 
Farm Size (mu) 5.00 5.00 5.18 5.00 4.88 5.00 4.93 5.00 
Household Income (RMB) 26,337 22,000 21,301 16,000 24,040 20,000 23,796 20,000 
Percentage farm Income 41 30 42 36 39 31 39 32 
Asset Value (RMB) 210,166 200,000 208,234 145,000 346,280 150,000 318,904 150,000 
Farm Profit (RMB/mu) 1,296 700.00 564 500 994 500 952 500 
Amount of Debt (RMB) 21,500 7,500 29,009 10,000 29,837 20,000 29,329 18,000 
Observations 45 102 583 730 
Percentage of sample 6.2 14 79.9 100 
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Table 4.4.Summary of household characteristics and frequencies by credit constraint status for Mexican 
farmers. 
 
Non-price Rationed 
  
  Risk Rationed Quantity Rationed Price Rationed Total 
  mean median mean median mean median mean median 
Sex (Female =1) 0.124 0 0.135 0 0.145 0 0.137 0 
Age 53.83 53 53.59 55 52 54 52.79 54 
Education 1.84 1 1.40 1 1.92 1 1.84 1 
Years of Farming 21.75 22 25.37 25 21.52 22 21.97 23 
Farm Size (Ha) 10.49 10 10.91 10 11.05 10 10.85 10 
Household Income (MXP) 54,574 40,000 55,059 47,000 71,716 49,200 64,115 45,750 
Percentage farm Income 58 62 62 63 63 66 61 64 
Asset Value (MXP) 430,620 350,000 524,594 400,000 598,330 450,000 532,838 400,000 
Farm Profit (MXP/Ha) 3,144 2,200 3,403 2,500 4,163 2,763 3,702 2,500 
Amount of Debt (MXP) 7,052 0 5,621 0 9,902 0 8,488 0 
Observations 129 37 206 372 
Percentage of sample 34.67 9.94 55.37 100 
 
 
The Model and Determinants of Credit Constraint Status 
To investigate the various hypotheses jointly, we run a series of regressions to 
segregate cause and effect. Because our interest is in risk rationing relative to quantity 
and price rationing our regressions include four categorizations as Boolean (1,0) 
dependent variables; that is the risk rationed group relative to all others, the quantity 
rationed group relative to all others and the price rationed group relative to all others. 
The analysis applies both the linear probability model and the logit model using a 
robust estimator to test the hypotheses.  
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Credit Demand 
An interesting feature of our study is our use of credit demand elasticities. In 
Turvey et al. (2011) it was shown that elasticities were highly heterogeneous across 
borrowers with some having high elasticities and others perfectly inelastic demands 
for (formal) credit; that elasticities were endogenously determined by many 
demographic and economic factors and thus were far more complex than what has 
previously been discussed; and that credit demand is more inelastic at higher interest 
rates and less inelastic or elastic at lower interest rates. The importance to the current 
study is that assuming homogenous preferences for farm credit is a weak and perhaps 
erroneous assumption. To counter this we imbedded within our China and Mexico 
survey a polychotomous choice build to derive the ‘relative’ credit demand elasticities 
of respondents. The build included two mutually exclusive choice frameworks. For 
Chinese farmers, we used a 7% interest rate as a benchmark. We first asked farmers to 
rank on a five-point Likert-type scale their demand response (from Definitely Borrow 
a lot more to Definitely not borrow anymore) when interest rate decreased from 7% to 
6%, 5%, 4%, and 3% (called lower interest rate) and then using a reverse scale their 
response when interest rates increased from 7% to 8%, 9%, 10%, and 11% (called 
higher interest rate), assuming that respondents can borrow as much as they need. 
Similarly, for the Mexico survey the interest rates were benchmarked to the market 
rate of 35%. The low interest rates were 5%, 15%, 25% and 35%; while the higher 
interest rates were 35%, 45%, 55% 70% and 90%. Using the responses from this credit 
demand scale, we created 10 binary variables to indicate characteristics of each 
respondent as to whether his credit demand was perfectly inelastic; highly inelastic, 
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medium elastic, moderate elastic and highly elastic for lower and higher interest rates. 
As will be discussed, the results from the credit demand elasticity build shows that 
demand preferences do indeed differ by rationing group with a surprising and 
interesting find that the risk rationed group has a nearly perfectly inelastic demand for 
credit at high interest rates but a positive demand for credit at lower interest rates. This 
results suggests that risk rationing is not entirely independent of interest rates, and that 
even otherwise risk rationed farmers might consider borrowing if interest rates are low 
enough. 
 
Informal Lending 
In addition to formal credit, our previous research (Turvey, Kong and Huo 
2010; Turvey and Kong 2010) has shown that informal credit between friends and 
relatives (familial lending) is an important economic consideration in China. While 
many farmers in our surveys use familial lending, some borrow exclusively from 
informal sources while others may combine informal borrowing with formal 
borrowing. We include binary variables for whether the respondent held informal 
credit (friends and family); and/or formal credit to capture effects between formal and 
informal credit.  
 
Land use Rights  
As discussed previously, part of the motivation for the present study resulted 
from a query in 2009 relating to the use of land use rights as collateral. We repeated 
the question in the current study to see whether there was greater incidence of a 
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negative response for risk rationed farmers. Willingness to borrow if they could use 
land use rights as collateral was measured on a five-point scale (from definitely 
borrow more to not borrow any more).  The higher the value, the less likely farmers 
will borrow. All Mexican farmers in our survey hold property rights, so there was no 
need to include this query in the Mexico survey.  
 
Entrepreneurship 
We include a dummy variable to account for farmers’ entrepreneurial activity. 
The variable “Ever started business” takes a value 1 if respondents have ever started a 
new business and 0 otherwise. Whereas, the variable “Plan to start business” takes 
value 1 if respondents are planning to start a new business and 0 otherwise. Questions 
on entrepreneurship were not asked of Mexican farmers. 
 
Measures of Wealth 
In the literature, both financial wealth and productive wealth are significantly 
associated with credit rationing. Specific variables include farm size, household 
income, percentage of farm income, asset value and saving. Farm size is a proxy of 
productive wealth and the rest are proxies of financial wealth. 
 
Measuring Risk Aversion and Prudence 
We asked a series of questions about risk taking, risk mitigating and 
precautionary saving behavior that would reflect such attributes and used these to 
compute a risk aversion score and prudence score. The risk aversion score is based on 
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farmers’ willingness to take risk, risk management options use and perceptions. In the 
survey, farmers were asked to identify their willingness to accept greater production 
risks in order to increase the chance of higher profits, to take risks with new 
technologies, and to take risks with new management practices before seeing good 
results in other farms. In addition, farmers indicated the importance of risk 
management on their farm. Risk management options included farm diversification, 
geographic diversification, irrigation, marketing diversification, forward contracts, 
participation in government programs, maintaining financial reserves and investing 
off-farm for other sources of income.  
The prudence score was calculated based on the purposes of their 
precautionary savings. Farmers specified their level of agreement or disagreement on a 
five-level Likert scale for a series of statements; ‘I save in case my automobile break 
down’; ‘I save for unexpected medical emergency’; ‘I save to protect job loss’; and ‘I 
save for unanticipated crop loss’. The higher the score would indicate that the 
respondent is more prudent.
8
 
 
Insurance Markets   
Measure of insurance market participation is represented by insurance variable. 
Farmers indicated whether they regularly purchase insurance for any of the following 
items: life insurance, fire insurance for home and, automobile insurance, health/medical 
insurance, farmer’s minimum living standard security, rural old-age insurance, crop 
insurance, and livestock insurance. The higher value of insurance variable would 
imply the more participation in insurance markets. 
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Asymmetric Information   
Rural Credit Cooperatives and other agricultural lenders will often evaluate 
individual borrowers, and sometimes entire villages, offering certificates of credit 
worth. Creditworthiness is based on individual interviews as well as the word of 
village leaders. In China for instance, a village will form a village credit committee 
which will include the village leader, members of the community and RCC personnel. 
In addition lenders may require a group guarantee with 3 or 4 friends or relatives 
agreeing to secure a loan. The borrowers and the guarantors are then vetted by front-
line lenders and managers. Collectively the purpose of the activities and declarations is 
to eliminate asymmetric information. A farmer deemed credit worthy or with a 
guarantee removes informational asymmetries and in principle would be more likely 
to receive a loan. To capture asymmetric information, we include two binary 
variables; credit worthy and group guarantee variables. In the presence of asymmetric 
information, creditworthy borrowers may be denied credit because they are unable to 
meet such collateral requirements or pay such high interest rates. Loan may be refused 
or diminished if borrowers are not members of group guarantee in which every 
member of a group ensure the repayment of all members. The credit worthy variable 
takes a 1 if a respondent indicated he is currently considered a ‘Credit Worthy’ 
borrower by a local RCC or buyer, or 0 otherwise.  The group guarantee variable takes 
value 1 if a respondent indicated he is a member of a Group Guarantee, or 0 otherwise.  
Predetermination of credit worthiness and group guarantees is an institutional structure 
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that is unique to China and therefore related questions are not included in the Mexican 
survey. 
 
Empirical Results 
In this section we report results of the hypotheses testing. Tables 4.5, 4.6 and 
4.7 present the results from linear probability model. The theory suggests that there 
will be a negative relationship between quantity rationing and wealth. We find that 
this holds true for China, but the result is not significant for Mexico. In China, both 
models show a negative and significant relationship between quantity rationed farmers 
and asset value. In addition, both China and Mexico show asset value to be significant 
and positively associated with price rationing. As expected, relatively financial poor 
are more likely to be quantity rationed because from a lenders’ perspective, the 
likelihood of repayment of the poor may be small. However, this does not appear to be 
the case for productive wealth, which has an insignificant coefficient for the farm size 
variable on both quantity and risk rationing. We also tested the hypothesis that the 
financial wealthy are risk rationed and this does not hold true in both models in the 
two countries. Our results are not consistent with what Thiele and Wambach (1999); 
and BCG found, that it is the financially wealthy who will be risk rationed.  
We find risk aversion and prudence to be positively correlated with risk 
rationing and quantity rationing in China. In the case of Mexico, risk aversion is 
positively significant for risk rationed but negative for prudence. Risk aversion is 
negatively significant for price rationed in Mexico but not significant for China. In 
China, relatively high risk averse and prudent farmers tend to be risk rationed. The 
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coefficient on interaction term between risk aversion and prudence is negative and 
significant indicating that risk aversion and prudence work in an opposite direction for 
risk rationed farmers. This is consistent with a key result in BCG that prudence and 
risk aversion can have opposing effects, and Boucher, Guirkinger and Trivelli (2009) 
that risk rationing should be more likely among households that are more risk averse. 
For quantity rationed Chinese farmers, the effect of risk aversion and prudence are 
negative while the coefficient on the interaction term between risk aversion and 
prudence is positive and significant, showing that the relationship between risk 
aversion and prudence for quantity rationed farmers are complementary.  This is not 
the case for Mexico, where only the prudence score is marginally significant but 
positive. In China, neither risk aversion nor prudence, or their interactions  are 
significant for price rationed farmers; although Mexican price rationed farmers show a 
negative significant value in risk aversion. Implicit in BCG’s model is that prudence 
and risk aversion directly affect, or interact to affect, loan choices and loan rationing 
typologies. This important observation is upheld by our results. 
Our results for China shows that the likelihood of being risk rationed increases 
significantly with participation in insurance markets as presented in both the linear 
probability and logit models. The results for Mexico are not significant. Risk adverse 
households who tend to have a higher willingness to pay for insurance and to 
participate in insurance markets are more likely to be risk rationed. This is not 
consistent with the risk rationing characterization given by BCG’s definition of risk 
rationing as stated at the beginning of this paper. Rather, these results suggest that 
while absence of insurance may be a sufficient condition (which is not easily tested), 
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but may not be a necessary condition. In other words, risk rationing can exist in the 
presence of insurance markets. In contrast, the likelihood of being quantity rationed in 
China significantly decreases with the increase in insurance markets participation, 
perhaps because lenders view insurance favorably as they would any other guarantee. 
Again, this result is not significant for Mexico. 
We examine the effects of asymmetric information on the three rationed types. 
This was only tested for China, since group guarantee are nonexistent in our Mexico 
sample. Being considered as a credit worthy borrower and being a member of group 
guarantee appear to have no impact on risk rationing. This a sensible result because 
risk rationing is not tied to credit worthiness but a more intrinsic, cognitive, attitude 
towards credit risk by the borrower. However, credit worthiness is significantly 
decreasing with quantity rationing as anticipated. Creditworthiness has to do with the 
ability of a borrower to pay current debt in a timely manner. Lenders would be more 
willing to provide loans to credit worthy individuals. The coefficients of credit 
worthiness and group guarantee are significant and positive on price rationed farmers. 
This could simply be that farmers who are credit worthy or are member of group 
guarantee are more likely to be price rationed, which simply means that they can 
borrow along their credit demand curves without restriction. Returning to BCG’s 
definition of risk rationing, it is implied that asymmetric information is an important 
consideration and this in fact holds for the exact group to which asymmetric 
information could lead to credit constraints. Our empirical results suggest that 
asymmetric information is neither necessary nor sufficient to define the risk rationed 
group because by definition the risk rationed do not participate in the credit market.  
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Table 4.5.Linear probability model for risk rationed producers. 
  Risk Rationed 
   China p-value Mexico p-value 
Sex (Female =1) 0.0390119* 0.061 -.1064668 0.176 
Education 0.0074557 0.212 .0164944 0.352 
Years of Farming 0.0002039 0.804 -.0002508 0.917 
Farm Size -0.0010763 0.743 .0033023 0.569 
Household Income  -8.31E-08 0.781 -1.95E-06 0.218 
Percent Farm Income 0.0374555 0.354 -.0909334 0.428 
Asset Value  -1.16E-09 0.274 -9.64E-08 *** 0.067 
Saving 0.0015636 0.884 1.90E-06 0.570 
Informal Borrowing -0.0129207 0.54 0.1687906 0.202 
Formal Borrowing -0.0638383*** 0.003 -0.1315146 ** 0.032 
Insurance 0.0269298* 0.062 0.0283218 0.631 
Highly Inelastic_lower_i -0.0243217 0.356 0.0282084 0.722 
Medium Elastic_lower_i 0.0182933 0.632 -.0383204 0.671 
Moderate Elastic_lower_i -0.0173542 0.722 0.0615445 0.657 
Highly Elastic_lower_i 0.1625621 0.164 0.0965279 0.676 
Highly Inelastic_higher_i -0.0303448 0.366 -0.057318 0.673 
Medium Elastic_higher_i -0.0124085 0.778 -0.077946 0.790 
Moderate Elastic_higher_i -0.047337 0.271 -0.496064 0.120 
Highly Elastic_higher_i -0.0604622 0.512 
  Land Use Rights as Collateral 0.0014965 0.854   
Credit Worthy -0.0035254 0.875   
Group Guarantee -0.030602 0.297   
Ever started business -0.023436 0.244   
Plan to start business 0.0113026 0.612 
  Risk Aversion Score 0.0039919*** 0.01 0.130845 0.156 
Prudence Score 0.004964** 0.029 -.046799 0.751 
Risk Aversion* Prudence  -0.0000621* 0.086 0.01119 0.788 
Constant -0.322263** 0.012 .071170 0.827 
Observations 575 
 
349 
 Note: The dependent variable for each column is listed in the column heading. 
Farm Size in China is in mu, in Mexico is in Hectares. 
Household Income and Asset Value are in RMB for China, and in MXP for Mexico. 
***Significant at the 1 percent level, ** 5 percent level, *10 percent level 
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Table 4.6.Linear probability model for quantity rationed producers. 
  Quantity Rationed 
   China p-value  Mexico p-value 
Sex (Female =1) 0.0177828 0.528 0.036534 0.452 
Education -0.0040498 0.637 -0.01527 0.163 
Years of Farming 0.0014853 0.191 0.002051 0.170 
Farm Size 0.0029848 0.594 -0.00196 0.583 
Household Income  4.98E-07 0.573 -1.73E-07 0.859 
Percent Farm Income -0.0249433 0.652 -0.00338 0.962 
Asset Value  -3.92E-09* 0.093 -3.17E-09 0.922 
Saving -0.0235085 0.152 -3.39E-07 0.869 
Informal Borrowing 0.1373711*** 0.0 0.117697 0.150 
Formal Borrowing -0.0220723 0.635 0.024573 0.514 
Insurance -0.0292646* 0.057 0.001911 0.958 
Highly Inelastic_lower_i -0.0164642 0.627 -0.00455 0.926 
Medium Elastic_lower_i 0.0300997 0.47 0.003874 0.944 
Moderate Elastic_lower_i 0.0582786 0.426 -0.02486 0.771 
Highly Elastic_lower_i 0.2178793 0.123 -0.07823 0.583 
Highly Inelastic_higher_i 0.0115993 0.814 0.015256 0.856 
Medium Elastic_higher_i 0.1249938 0.112 -0.04597 0.800 
Moderate Elastic_higher_i -0.0814908 0.477 -0.01447 0.941 
Highly Elastic_higher_i -0.3241685** 0.013 
  Land Use Rights as Collateral -0.0180144 0.117   
Credit Worthy -0.1011384** 0.014   
Group Guarantee -0.0658012 0.167   
Ever started business 0.0007093 0.982   
Plan to start business 0.0528498 0.125 
  Risk Aversion Score -0.0048225* 0.094 -0.05488 0.335 
Prudence Score -0.0080622*** 0.008 -0.0148 0.871 
Risk Aversion* Prudence  0.0001273** 0.017 0.011447 0.657 
Constant 0.5936249*** 0.002 0.230025 0.253 
Observations 575   349 
 Note: The dependent variable for each column is listed in the column heading. 
Farm Size in China is in mu, in Mexico is in Hectares.  
Household Income and Asset Value are in RMB for China, and in MXP for Mexico. 
***Significant at the 1 percent level, ** 5 percent level, *10 percent level 
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Table 4.7.Linear probability model for price rationed producers. 
  Price Rationed 
   China p-value     Mexico p-value 
Sex (Female =1) -0.0567947* 0.097 0.012191 0.882 
Education -0.0034059 0.739 -0.0157 0.397 
Years of Farming -0.0016892 0.224 -0.00268 0.289 
Farm Size -0.0019085 0.764 -0.00088 0.885 
Household Income  -4.15E-07 0.649 1.56E-06 0.344 
Percent Farm Income -0.0125123 0.848 0.105083 0.381 
Asset Value 0.00000000508* 0.079 1.14E-07 0.390 
Saving 0.0219448 0.253 -2.69E-06 0.442 
Informal Borrowing -0.1244504*** 0.003 -0.23679 0.087 
Formal Borrowing 0.0859106* 0.088 0.11516 0.072 
Insurance 0.0023348 0.908 0.003893 0.950 
Highly Inelastic_lower_i 0.0407859 0.329 0.037414 0.652 
Medium Elastic_lower_i -0.048393 0.365 0.123562 0.190 
Moderate Elastic_lower_i -0.0409244 0.634 0.026673 0.854 
Highly Elastic_lower_i -0.3804414*** 0.01 -0.03036 0.900 
Highly Inelastic_higher_i 0.0187455 0.74 0.093325 0.512 
Medium Elastic_higher_i -0.1125852 0.189 0.151329 0.622 
Moderate Elastic_higher_i 0.1288278 0.325 0.602629 0.071 
Highly Elastic_higher_i 0.3846307** 0.017 
  Land Use Rights as Collateral 0.0165179 0.224   
Credit Worthy 0.1046638** 0.021   
Group Guarantee 0.0964032* 0.075   
Ever started business 0.0227267 0.527   
Plan to start business -0.0641524 0.105 
  Risk Aversion Score 0.0008307 0.793 0.018279 0.850 
Prudence Score 0.0030982 0.406 0.07743 0.615 
Risk Aversion* Prudence  -0.0000652 0.303 -0.02928 0.502 
Constant 0.7286381*** 0.002 0.2805 0.411 
Observations 575   349 
 Note: The dependent variable for each column is listed in the column heading. 
Farm Size in China is in mu, in Mexico is in Hectares.  
Household Income and Asset Value are in RMB for China, and in MXP for Mexico. 
***Significant at the 1 percent level, ** 5 percent level, *10 percent level 
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From our credit demand build in the survey we are able to identify among 
borrowers who have between highly inelastic and highly elastic demands for credit. 
These categories are introduced using dummy variables. In the model, none of the 
elasticity measures are statistically significantly different from 0 for the risk rationed 
group. In other words, we cannot distinguish risk rationed farmers by their sensitivity 
to changes in the interest rate. This seems to be consistent with the hypothesis since 
interest rate variation should not affect the credit demand of risk rationed individuals. 
This does not mean that risk rationed individuals have perfectly inelastic demands for 
credit. Quite the opposite is true, that indeed they may have a positive demand for 
credit but do not act upon this demand. This is critically important to the BCG 
argument because one of the requirements is that the risk rationed actually have a 
demand for credit but do not act upon it. Our results empirically validate this 
important conjecture. 
In comparison, the model shows at least some of the elasticity measures being 
statistically different from zero for the quantity and price rationed typologies.  Our 
results show that quantity rationed individuals are less sensitive to high interest rate 
than others. But price rationed individuals are more sensitive to high interest rate and 
less sensitive to low interest rate. This illustrates the excess demand for credit of 
quantity rationed farmers as interest rate increases or decreases relative to price 
rationed farmers. To add clarity to these results, tables 4.8 through 4.11 provide cross-
tabulations between the inelasticity of credit demand and borrower type. They confirm 
that risk rationed farmers are more sensitive to lower interest rates. Higher inelasticity 
indicates a lower willingness to borrow when interest rates vary. At any given interest 
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rate, a large proportion of risk rationed farmers actually have highly inelastic demands 
as expected. However, when interest rates are low enough, some risk rationed farmers 
have more elastic demand and despite being non borrowers, could actually enter the 
credit market. BCG make no claim that risk rationing is a permanent state and these 
results suggest that as financial risks fall with lower interest rates, risk rationed 
farmers may in fact enter (or reenter) the credit market. 
There appears to be a strongly negative relationship between formal borrowing 
and risk rationing which is simply a definitional result that having formal debt is 
inversely related to any likelihood that a respondent would be risk rationed. However, 
the model does not show that informal borrowing is more prevalent in the risk rationed 
typology than those in other borrowings. For the quantity rationed typology, we find a 
positive and significant relationship for informal borrowing in China (p=0.00) and 
Mexico (p= 0.102). These results show that quantity rationed compensate for 
unsatiated demand in the formal sector. This does not appear to be the case for the 
price rationed typology, which has a negative and significant coefficient for the 
informal borrowing variable indicating a lower demand for informal credit with 
satiated demand in the formal sector (China p=0.003, Mexico p=0.084). Although 
BCG do not consider informal borrowing the results reported here are consistent with 
their principle conjectures. 
To capture the willingness to borrow when farmers can use their land as 
collateral, we find the coefficients on the land use rights as collateral variable for the 
risk rationing and price rationing typologies are not different from zero. However, the 
variable is significant and negatively associated with the quantity rationed typology. 
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We would have expected a stronger negative relationship between using land use 
rights for collateral for the risk rationed typology. This interesting result is open to 
interpretation but it suggests that the quantity rationed group may be so rationed 
because they have a general reluctance to use collateral. The insignificance of the risk 
rationed group could simply be a statement that reluctance to use land use rights is not 
a differentiating factor across typologies. 
 
Table 4.8.Measure of inelasticity at lower interest rates for Chinese farmers by borrower type. 
 Borrower Type 
Total 
Risk 
Rationed 
Quantity 
Rationed 
Price 
Rationed 
Highly Elastic 4.40% 4.90% 2.10% 2.70% 
Moderate Elastic 4.40% 18.60% 8.30% 9.50% 
Medium Elastic 33.30% 29.40% 23.60% 25.00% 
Highly Inelastic 17.80% 19.60% 28.60% 26.70% 
Perfectly Inelastic 40.00% 27.50% 37.40% 36.20% 
     Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
 
Table 4.9.Measure of inelasticity at lower interest rates for Mexican farmers by borrower type. 
 Borrower Type 
Total 
Risk 
Rationed 
Quantity 
Rationed 
Price 
Rationed 
Highly Elastic 3.91% 2.70% 5.94% 4.90% 
Moderate Elastic 7.81% 16.22% 14.36% 12.26% 
Medium Elastic 67.19% 48.65% 52.97% 57.49% 
Highly Inelastic 21.09% 32.43% 26.73% 25.34% 
Perfectly Inelastic 0% 0% 0% 0% 
     Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
 
 132 
 
 
Table 4.10.Measure of inelasticity at higher interest rates for Chinese farmers by borrower type. 
 Borrower Type 
Total 
Risk 
Rationed 
Quantity 
Rationed 
Price 
Rationed 
Highly Elastic   1.00% 0.50% 0.60% 
Moderate Elastic   1.00% 1.60% 1.40% 
Medium Elastic 6.70% 16.70% 5.90% 7.50% 
Highly Inelastic 8.90% 20.60% 15.80% 16.10% 
Perfectly Inelastic 84.40% 60.80% 76.20% 74.50% 
     Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
 
Table 4.11.Measure of inelasticity at higher interest rates for Mexican farmers by borrower type. 
 Borrower Type 
Total 
Risk 
Rationed 
Quantity 
Rationed 
Price 
Rationed 
Highly Elastic 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Moderate Elastic 0% 0% 1.98% 1.09% 
Medium Elastic 0.78% 0% 2.48% 1.63% 
Highly Inelastic 7.03% 8.11% 7.43% 7.36% 
Perfectly Inelastic 92.19% 91.89% 88.12% 89.92% 
     Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
 
In addition, in China females are more likely to be risk rationed but males are 
more likely to be price rationed. In Mexico, gender has no effect. This is consistent 
with most studies indicating that women are found to be more risk averse than men. 
But we should be very careful here because the instrument was indexed to the 
respondent and not the sex of the decision maker. So this variable might best be 
interpreted as a control or fixed effect variable. Finally, there is no strong relationship 
between entrepreneurship variables and all 3 credit rationed types in the linear 
probability model; however, in the logit model, the coefficient on plan to start business 
 133 
 
variable is negative and significant on price rationed farmers. Farmers who plan to 
start business are not likely to be price rationed.  
 
Conclusion  
The purpose of this paper was to analyze the characteristics for risk rationing 
and to provide a specific test of the risk rationing theory proposed by BCG. Among all 
respondents, 730 in China and 372 in Mexico, the total proportion of risk rationed, 
quantity rationed and price rationed farmers are approximately 6.2%, 14% and 79.9% 
respectively for China and 34.67%, 9.94% and 55.37% respectively for Mexico. The 
results verify the existence of risk rationing in both China and Mexico rural credit 
markets. There is a strong support to the theory that the financial poor are more likely 
to be quantity rationed but the financial wealthy are more likely to be risk rationed. 
However, the productive wealth appears to have to no impact on all types of credit 
constraint typologies. We find that risk averse and prudent individuals are more likely 
to be risk rationed. This is likely due to innate risk judgments made by individuals. 
Our study is among the first that we are aware that has been able to provide evidence 
that in fact risk rationing behavior can take place in the presence of insurance markets. 
This evidence is not consistent with BCG, which stated that risk rationing occurs when 
insurance markets are absent. Combining the results, risk adverse households tend to 
have a higher willingness to pay for insurance and participate in insurance markets and 
are more likely to be risk rationed. 
The elasticity of demand for credit has a strong implication for credit markets 
and we find that credit demand elasticities differ amongst rationing typologies.  We 
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find that a large proportion of risk rationed farmers have perfectly inelastic demand for 
credit but at lower interest rates even risk rationed farmers might enter the credit 
market. 
What we have learned from studying risk rationing is that efforts to enhance 
the working of rural credit markets and credit access in order to increase agricultural 
investment and alleviate poverty must also deal with risk. BCG argue that failure to 
account for risk rationed agents, who have profitable projects but are discouraged from 
implementing them because of the riskiness of the available loan contracts, may lead 
to a distortion of the rural financial system. We agree. One policy remedy is to 
maintain lower interest rates since we find that risk rationed groups may enter the 
credit market. Such a policy is not without its critics however.  In addition, BCG 
considers at length the role of ambiguous property rights. This is the current state of 
land use in China. The current debate in China regarding transferability and 
mortgagability of land use rights might be successful if collateral played a key role in 
borrowing agreements
9
. However, land use right reform in China will be only partially 
effective to encourage risk rationed borrowers to enter the credit market since our 
results do not indicate that using land use rights for collateral can differentiate risk 
rationed farmers from other typologies. As a result, policies that decrease the risk 
associated with loan contract to rural households would be more appropriate in the 
presence of risk rationing. 
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Endnotes 
1 
Both papers report survey results from Peru with the first reporting surveys in 1997 and a second sample 
in 2003/2004. It is not clear if this is the same data in both papers but the range of risk rationing is nonetheless in 
the same range of 21% to 25% as indicated. 
2 BCG also includes transactions cost rationing. We set this aside from an empirical point of view by 
assuming that transactions costs imposed by a lender to increase the cost of borrowing or endogenous to the 
borrower through travel costs or inconvenience and so on are incorporated into the price rationing component. 
3 Using survey data from Peru to measure the incidence and impact of credit constraints in the formal 
credit sector Boucher, Guirkinger, and Trivelli (2009), provide examples of responses associated with risk 
rationing. Of these, the most common response in each of the surveys they conducted was “I don’t want to risk my 
land”.  
  
4We collaborated with Interagro de las Huastecas, S.A. de C.V., a local producer integrator, which 
provided logistic support and sampling design. 
5The idea of the third derivative of the utility function as a way to represent preferences for precautionary 
savings was first mentioned by Leland (1968). If the third derivative is positive, the consumer has a preference for 
precautionary savings. Analogous to the Arrow-Pratt index of risk aversion, Kimball (1990) coined the index of 
absolute prudence, which represents the strength of precautionary savings as  . 
6 The majority of these loans were for non-agricultural uses. 
7 The survey investigated areas other than risk rationing including farm credit, risk perception and 
management, transaction of land use rights, and entrepreneurship. Only the risk rationing component is discussed 
here. 
8 We also conducted a simple field experiment to estimate the partial risk aversion coefficient of the 
farmers based on Binswanger (1981) which is used as a proxy of risk aversion. 
9 Stiglitz and Weiss (1992) argued that collateral and other non-price rationing devices would not 
eliminate the possibility of credit rationing. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
RISK RATIONING AND JUMP UTILITY 
 
Abstract 
This chapter investigates the concept of risk rationing in a jump utility 
framework. The current definition of risk rationing, that individuals refrain from 
borrowing for fear of losing collateral, is based on a principal-agent model that 
excludes exogenous risk factors. Production is based on different effort levels. The 
model proposed in this chapter depends on the first three moments of the expected 
return distribution. The theoretical model is developed and tested empirically on 
Mexican farmers using data from a survey conducted in 2011. Our results suggest that 
risk rationing can be modeled as having a jump disutility. Preference for risk rationing 
depends on the difference in the expected return distribution moments of the two states 
(debt and no debt). My results suggest that risk rationed have a stronger preference for 
skewness than borrowers (price rationed), but not necessarily for the first two 
moments. Also, the utility at their initial level of wealth is higher for risk rationed, 
suggesting that their discount rate is larger than price rationed. These results provide 
elements for policies to integrate risk rationed into the formal credit market. 
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Introduction 
In recent years a renewed policy interest in rural credit for generally poor and 
underrepresented farmers has given rise to a more concentrated interest in factors 
affecting credit demand. An offshoot to this effort has culminated in the refinement of 
credit rationing to include not only the notion of price and quantity rationing but also 
risk rationing (Boucher, Carter and Guirkinger, 2008). Risk rationing describes an 
individual that having the asset wealth to qualify for a credit, voluntarily refrains from 
it for fear of losing his collateral. Unlike borrowers, risk rationing individuals believe 
that by taking a loan, a positive and sufficiently large probability of default may occur.  
Under imperfect markets, which are mostly the case in the agricultural sector 
in developing economies, production risk cannot easily be diversified away and thus it 
is not independent of consumption. Under imperfect markets, or where “capital 
markets are inefficient” Masson (1974) argues that jump disutility and its 
corresponding avoidance behavior is more likely to occur. The existence of a jump 
disutility can affect risk taking behavior in a way that appears to mimic risk rationing 
behavior. This is what is explored in this paper. According to Masson, under disaster 
avoidance a risk-averse investor may choose an investment as its variance increases, 
as long as its lower bound is above a threshold level. Even though this behavior can be 
found in the absence of disutility jumps, the presence of these can induce this 
paradoxical behavior. This action relates to Roy’s (1952) safety first criterion. 
Robinson and Lev (1986), referring to Masson’s model, provide an example of a firm 
facing liquidation costs as the source of a disutility jump: An investor may refrain 
from borrowing, even if he wants to borrow at the market interest rate, if the disutility 
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caused by liquidating assets in case of default is sufficiently large. This approach 
relaxes some of the more restrictive assumptions in Boucher et al. (2008) (e.g. effort 
differentiation and insurance markets) but also confirms some of the more critical 
aspects dealing with asset wealth, risk aversion and prudence.  
In our view, it is the exogenously determined probability of default, along with 
asset values (principally land), that creates a state of disutility to be avoided as first 
analyzed by Roy in his Safety First model. Moreover, in the economic development 
context, some implications of a jump disutility, without using this term, have also been 
described albeit briefly. An important implication is that jump disutilities may be 
indicative of poverty traps (Lybbert and Barrett, 2011) which may provide a deeper 
understanding of the ubiquitous nature of poverty traps as investigated  in Barrett et al. 
(2006), Hoddinott (2006), McPeak (2004), and Zimmerman and Carter (2003) among 
others. Another characteristic of risk rationing is the inter-temporal rate of substitution 
and a consequentially higher discount factor on future consumption as discussed in 
Pender (1996). Pender (1996) uses the ratio of marginal indirect utilities of initial 
wealth and future wealth to measure the discount factor. Alternatively, we can look at 
the utility of initial wealth for two identical individuals that have the same expected 
returns; those with higher utility at initial wealth would prefer current consumption 
more. This too is a characteristic of risk rationed individuals with jump utility who are 
expected to have a higher initial marginal utility, reflecting in part their time 
preference for consumption. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate risk rationing in a jump utility 
framework. We develop the relationship in a theoretical context and then investigate 
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the extent of risk rationing amongst Mexican farmers. The elementary claim is that if a 
farmer’s loss due to asset liquidation is sufficiently large, he may exhibit a jump 
discontinuity at a critical income level. Falling below this level could force liquidation 
of critical assets in order to meet financial obligations. Masson (1974) provides 
evidence of a utility function with a discontinuity in the form of a vertical jump, 
representing a large loss in utility due to income falling below a critical level. He 
makes analogies that the threshold is some situation that will lead to an undesirable 
state of nature and thus cause a large disutility, like a divorce or being declared 
bankrupt. In this model, farmers get utility from both income (or any variable of 
interest), and the state of nature. The different states are defined by being above or 
below a threshold level. Our results suggest that risk rationing can be modeled as 
having a jump disutility. Preference for risk rationing depends on the difference in the 
expected return distribution moments of the two states (debt and no debt). Our results 
suggest that risk rationed have a stronger preference for skewness than borrowers 
(price rationed), but not necessarily for the first two moments. Also, the utility at their 
initial level of wealth is higher for risk rationed, suggesting that their discount rate is 
larger than price rationed. Our results provide elements for policies to integrate risk 
rationed into the formal credit market.   
 
Risk Rationing 
The concept of risk rationing has been observed by many but not formally 
analyzed. An early sentiment of risk rationing is by Binswanger and Siller (1983) who 
state that “If the disutility of the loan is sufficiently high, small farmers may stop 
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borrowing altogether, i.e. the credit market for small farmers may disappear because 
of lack of demand, despite the fact that small farmers may still have available 
collateral in the form of unencumbered land” (page 17), concluding that “It is 
important to realize that it is not an innate deficiency in the willingness of small 
farmers to take risks that hold them back” (page 19). Eswaran and Kotwal (1990), 
examining the use of credit markets argue that the smoothing of consumption between 
individuals of different income classes but identical utility functions can be 
differentiated by scale of operations in terms of credit demand but also observe that 
“What seems like an inordinate degree of risk aversion may be a merely a reflection of 
their inability to sustain downswings in income” (Page 480). Bell, Srintvasan and 
Udry (1997) examining linked credit estimate a credit demand relationship in which 
demand increases with liquid assets but decreases with fixed assets, a result they state 
is “both puzzling and unsatisfactory” (page 575). That the sign on liquid assets is 
positive is at least suggestive of risk rationing behavior, since liquid assets would 
buffer the collateralized value of fixed assets in case of default. Swain (2002), 
investigating credit rationing in Puri, India, finds evidence of credit rationing in the 
conventional sense, but also notes that “the lower number of households demanding 
loans from the formal sector might be a choice decision of the household… Such 
households restrict their demand for production loans even if they have access to 
them” (Pages 4-5). Bhattacharyya (2005) reveals data from West Bengal showing that 
even in the presence of formal lending, 62.3% of farmers used informal credit with 
86% of these willing to pay a substantial premium for not having to give up collateral. 
Risk rationing can also affect the choices of risk coping mechanisms such as income 
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and consumption smoothing. Morduch (1995) mentions that “Income smoothing is 
more likely to occur when households anticipate being unable to borrow or insure.”  
The only study to attempt to place risk rationing in a theoretical context is 
Boucher, Carter and Guirkinger (2008). Their model is based on asymmetric 
information that leads to loan contracts with high collateral contracts, whereupon 
default the farmers lose productive assets. Consequently, the farmer will self-ration 
out of the market in order to preserve capital. If the farmer is to accept the risk of 
borrowing it is assumed that external risks can be controlled by some level of effort, 
but such effort also lowers utility in the good state. The lender offers a suite of 
contracts with the existence of an insurance contract available to reduce collateral 
requirements. Incentive compatibility is determined by a mix of high or low interest 
rates, insurance purchases and collateral. They then go on to show that there is some 
level of financial wealth (e.g. liquidity) that bifurcates the two economic outcomes. 
The first is the decisions to not borrow and expend high effort on subsistence activity 
and the second is to borrow for commercial activities with the potential loss of 
collateral or costly mitigation through some combination of insurance and high 
interest rates. Whether a farmer operates risk rationed or under a credit contract 
depends upon utility in high and low effort states, risk aversion and prudence. 
4
  
Of those studies that have instrumented field research to identifying risk 
rationing there is substantial evidence that it is not a trivial matter. In the current paper 
                                                 
4
 On this latter point Boucher et al. (2008) argue that any agent with prudence being three times 
absolute risk aversion, and wealth greater its critical value will choose risky commercial activities with 
credit, while those with the same level of wealth but prudence less than three times absolute risk 
aversion will choose risk-rationed subsistence activities. Those with financial wealth below the 
threshold will do the opposite. In other words a farmer with low financial wealth but with prudence 
less than 3 times risk aversion will choose to borrow and undertake risky commercial activity. 
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we find that 35% of Mexican farmers surveyed are risk rationed. In related research 
we find 6.5% of Chinese farmers are risk rationed. Barham, Boucher and Carter 
(1996) report that 32% of Guatemalan farmers surveyed did not apply for credit and 
were fully constrained in their credit choice due to either transactions costs 
(transaction cost rationing) or fear of risk leading to self-insure (but without using the 
term ‘risk rationing’). Boucher, Guirkinger and Trivelli (2009) find 8.6% of surveyed 
Peruvian farmers in 1997 were risk rationed and (with) Fletschner, Guirkinger and 
Boucher (2012) find 21% to 25% of a resample of Peruvian farmers in 2003 to be risk 
rationed. Boucher, Carter and Guirkinger (2008) report results from a number of 
surveys that 19% of Peruvian farmers, 16% of Honduran farmers and 12% of 
Nicaraguan farmers were identified as risk rationed. 
Risk rationing can affect the choices of risk coping mechanisms such as 
income and consumption smoothing. Morduch (1995) mentions that “Income 
smoothing is more likely to occur when households anticipate being unable to borrow 
or insure.” implying income smoothing practices are more likely to occur in risk 
rationed than price rationed. Conservative production decisions one way in which risk 
rationing smoothes income by limiting their exposure to risk. Other income and 
consumption smoothing methods include alternative income generating activities, 
diversification, borrowing, savings and informal insurance agreements.  
Under imperfect markets, which are mostly the case in the agricultural sector 
in developing economies, production risk cannot be diversified away and thus it is not 
independent of consumption level. Under imperfect markets, or where “capital 
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markets are inefficient” (Masson), jump disutility and its corresponding avoidance 
behavior is more likely to occur. 
The existence of a jump disutility can affect risk taking behavior. According to 
Masson, under disaster avoidance a risk-averse investor may choose an investment as 
its variance increases, as long as its lower bound is above the threshold level. Even 
though this behavior can be found in the absence of disutility jumps, the presence of 
these can induce this paradoxical behavior. This action relates to Roy’s (1952) safety 
first criterion. Robinson and Lev (1986), referring to Masson’s model, provide an 
example of a firm facing liquidation costs as the source of a disutility jump. They 
explain that the firm’s decisions are to avoid falling below the threshold that causes 
the disutility jump. An investor may refrain from borrowing, even if he wants to 
borrow at the market interest rate, if the disutility caused by liquidating assets in case 
of default is sufficiently large. This approach relaxes some of the more restrictive 
assumptions in Boucher et al. (e.g. effort differentiation and insurance markets) but 
also confirms some of the more critical aspects dealing with asset wealth, risk aversion 
and prudence. In our view it is the exogenously determined probability of default, 
along with asset values (principally land), that creates a state of disutility to be 
avoided. A sure way to avoid falling into this state is by not taking a loan. This 
consideration of preserving wealth by means of minimizing the probability of falling 
below a threshold income level was first analyzed by Roy in his Safety First model. 
Moreover, in the economic development context, some implications of a jump 
disutility, without using this term, have also been described albeit briefly. An 
important implication is that jump disutilities are indicative of poverty traps, which 
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can alter risk taking behavior of individuals faced by them. If an individual is below 
the utility jump, he may show excessive risk taking behavior if his safe production 
activity would not generate the necessary income to reach the jump. Under this case, a 
high-risk high-return activity provides a positive probability of asset accumulation. 
These dynamics of wealth on risk taking behavior and multiple equilibria derived from 
a disutility jump are analyzed by Lybbert and Barrett (2011) under the context of 
poverty traps. By the same token, this paper investigates risk taking behavior of 
farmers located to the right hand side of the disutility jump. Similar research in the 
development field where the risk taking behavior of farmers just above the poverty 
trap is analyzed includes Barrett et al. (2006), Hoddinott (2006), McPeak (2004), and 
Zimmerman and Carter (2003). Under multiple equilibria, and following Mason’s 
utility jump, these farmers would safeguard their productive assets by pursuing asset 
smoothing instead of consumption smoothing strategies. 
Another characteristic of risk rationing is the discount factor of future 
consumption. Risk rationing refrain from engaging into the risky activity by not 
borrowing; this forgone expected increase in revenues due to the commercial activity 
is compensated by current consumption, implying a larger discount factor than price 
rationed under homogeneous production and individual characteristics. Taking the 
risky commercial activity means sacrificing current consumption for future one. 
According to Pender (1996), the discount factor, or inter temporal rate of substitution, 
can be affected by marginal utilities of consumption or by time preference. He 
continues to say that under binding credit constraint borrowers’ discount rate is higher 
than the market interest rate. In his paper, he looks at the ratio of marginal indirect 
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utilities of initial wealth and future wealth as a measure of the discount factor. 
Alternatively, we can look at the utility of initial wealth for two identical individuals 
that have the same expected returns. That with the higher utility at initial wealth level 
prefers current consumption more. Risk rationed people are expected to have a higher 
initial utility, reflecting in part their time preference for consumption. 
One objective of this study is to investigate the extent of risk rationing amongst 
Mexican farmers. However, we present a model with a somewhat different structure 
from Boucher et al. (2008) preferring to develop risk rationing around the exogenous 
risk conditions that give rise to a jump in utility functions. If a firm’s loss due to asset 
liquidation is sufficiently large, it may exhibit a jump discontinuity at a critical income 
level. Falling below that level would force the firm to liquidate assets in order to meet 
its obligations. Masson (1974) provides evidence of a utility function with a 
discontinuity in the form of a vertical jump, representing a large loss in utility due to 
income falling below a critical level. He makes analogies that the threshold is some 
situation that will lead us into an undesirable state of nature and thus cause a large 
disutility, like a divorce or being declared bankrupt. In this model, people get utility 
from both: income (or any variable of interest), and the state of nature. The different 
states are defined by being above or below the threshold level.  
The second objective of this paper is to a model for risk rationing based on a 
jump disutility model. We show that a jump disutility requires the incorporation of 
third moments of the distribution of returns, or any variable of interest. The model is 
tested using data from Mexican grain farmers from a survey in 2011. With the 
responses on lowest and highest possible, and expected yield and price for their crops, 
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we simulated the revenue mean, variance and skewness using a Pert distribution. Our 
results suggest that risk rationing can be modeled as having a jump disutility. 
Preference for risk rationing depends on the difference in the expected return 
distribution moments of the two states (debt and no debt). Our results suggest that risk 
rationed have a stronger preference for skewness than borrowers (price rationed), but 
not necessarily for the first two moments. Also, the utility at their initial level of 
wealth is higher for risk rationed, suggesting that their discount rate is larger than price 
rationed. Our results provide elements for policies to integrate risk rationed into the 
formal credit market.   
 
Risk Rationing and Jump Discontinuity 
The concepts of a utility function with a jump discontinuity and risk rationing 
are, we argue, closely related. Risk rationing refers to an individual who, in spite of his 
willingness to borrow from financial institutions at the market interest rate, refrain 
from borrowing for fear of losing collateral. The probability of losing collateral creates 
a large disutility at the point where his revenues cannot cover the debt repayment. We 
can think of this disutility as a large vertical drop in utility caused by the collateral 
loss. The collateral loss, or jump disutility, depends on the size of the loan and on the 
divisibility of the collateral. 
Models that incorporate jump disutility relate the jump to a variable of interest 
reaching certain threshold value; however, the disutility is not caused directly by 
income falling low, but by the resulting state created by it. Low income triggers a 
disutility caused by another variable. In Robinson and Lev (1986), this variable is 
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liquidation costs; In Masson (1974), it is the state of being declared bankrupt (figure 
5.1). 
The connection between income and loss of wealth resulting in a disutility 
jump can be illustrated as a firm that cannot meet its debt obligations and is forced 
into asset liquidation. This can occur if a firm’s total revenue is less than its total costs. 
A firm will be indifferent between producing or not if their total revenue equals its 
total costs, but it will shut down if its total costs are not covered by its total revenue in 
the long run. From this condition we can have a relationship between revenue and 
liquidation loss. If , or consequently if the ratio , the firm will shut 
down and liquidate assets to pay its debt obligations. The amount of assets that the 
firm must liquidate, and all its associated costs, is the loss in total wealth of the firm 
and the source of jump disutility. The greater the firm’s financial obligations, the 
larger the wealth loss in case of default. The size of the utility discontinuity is directly 
related to the amount of fixed assets that a firm should liquidate in order to pay its 
obligations; if the liquidation of assets is large enough the firm may decide not to enter 
into the credit market, and thus become risk rationed. The firm will not borrow if the 
disutility associated to asset liquidation is deemed to be sufficiently large. Masson’s 
discontinuous function does not capture the interaction between income and wealth 
loss, it assumes that a given level of income the disutility occurs.  To better understand 
the relationship of income (or revenue) and asset liquidation, we need to include a 
function of wealth over the ratio  , and a utility function of wealth given that ratio.  
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Figure 5.1 Masson's jump utility function. 
 
Assume the profit function of an individual is the following: 
 π = α + R(l,r,d) + py - C(w,y) – D      
 [1] 
where is the initial wealth, or savings, R(l,r,d) is revenue from labor, 
,remittances, , and amount borrowed, ;  is revenue from farm operations, output 
price is  and output ;C(w,y) is the cost function of the farm and  is the debt 
repayment, if any. 
Total wealth at the end of period, t = 1, becomes:   
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  if    at period t = 0    
 [2] 
  if  at period t = 0 
Where  is the value of the land or total fixed assets that must be liquidated to 
repay the loan. When the firm’s total revenue is less than its total costs, it will 
liquidate its assets to pay for any debt obligations it may have incurred. 
  =    
We use to capture the ratio  and the different states of the world. As long 
as 1, equation [2], the firm will be able to repay its loan obligations and will not be 
forced to shut down operations. Liquidation of assets occurs if  . The amount of 
asset loss due to liquidation is proportional to the amount of loan, . Assume , 
 is indivisible and is used fully as collateral for . Let the liquidation cost in case of 
be  for simplicity. Assuming , borrowing decreases the value of ; thus, 
increasing the chance of liquidating assets.  
A liquidation of assets represents a loss in total wealth for the producer. At 
, a small decrease, , in  will trigger the wealth loss. This is shown in 
figure 5.2. Unlike this model, however, the jump disutility can also result from being 
in a different state of the world not necessarily dependent on wealth changes. 
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Figure 5.2 Wealth with respect to γ, good and bad state at right and left side of γ=1. 
 
Now that we have a relationship of wealth and  we can have a utility function 
of wealth dependent on .This utility function exhibits not only a vertical 
discontinuity at a given level of wealth, but also a change in wealth that separates the 
good and bad state of nature. Looking at figure 5.3, the point b is where , the 
limit of the “good state”. Once  drops below 1, the function takes the value at point a, 
the upper limit of the “bad state”. The separation of the two states occurs if a person 
borrows and has to liquidate his assets to repay a loan. The vertical jump from b to a is 
the change in utility from being at either state. This disutility is caused by the asset 
loss needed to meet obligations, represented by the horizontal gap between points a 
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and b. If this gap in wealth is related to the indivisibility of land, uncertainty of cash 
flows or current level of wealth; then, if a risk rationed individual can use other assets 
than his land as collateral, if he has a revenue insurance product, if he has other 
sources of income, or if there is a government policy that provides him with a steady 
cash transfer, then a risk rationed may engage into a higher expected yield enterprise, 
i.e. become price rationed.  
There may also be some disutility caused by the stigma of being at the bad 
state, like Masson suggested, but for the purpose of this paper we exclude it from the 
analysis; however, this stigma could cause a downward shift of the segment of the 
utility function left of point a, and thus, increase the jump, assuming marginal utilities 
are invariant in any state. Otherwise, the slope of the utility function may change as 
well.  
For a risk rationed, it is assumed that the starting value of is on the right of 1. 
When the starting value is located to the left side of 1, the individual could behave as 
risk seeker. His expected revenue distribution becomes positively skewed. At the “bad 
state” farmers may not have access to formal credit; nonetheless they may seek a 
production technology that offers them the highest variance to have a positive 
probability of reaching , and so be above the threshold level or in the “good 
state”.
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Figure 5.3 Utility function of wealth with a discontinuity given   
 
The relationship between the indirect variable, ; the direct variable, wealth; 
and the utility function, is shown in figure 5.4.Quadrant 1 shows utility as a function 
of . The loss in utility, J, occurs once  is at the threshold level.  This loss in utility is 
the result of the loss of assets, L, from liquidation when of , this is shown in 
figure 5.2 and quadrant 4 in figure 5.4. Quadrant 2 shows the relationship of utility 
and wealth when facing liquidation costs.  The discontinuity is derived from the loss 
of wealth, L, and utility, J. 
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Figure 5.4 Multi-Quadrant derivation of a utility function with jump disutility and wealth loss. 
 
The relationship of utility, wealth and the indirect variable, , can be expressed 
first as wealth as a function of , and then as the utility of wealth at each of the two 
states of nature. Looking at quadrant IV, the good state is at the left of , and the bad 
state at the right of . Summarizing [1] and [2], and following Lev and Robinson’s 
ad hoc decision rules, we have: 
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Where the ad hoc decision rule to maximize is: 
   
 [3] 
Solution of [3] is equivalent to Roy’s safety first model, since we are 
minimizing . 
Equation [3] refers to a price rationed individual; he is taking the loan and thus 
it incurs into a positive probability of losing L. This doesn’t mean that by not taking a 
loan the probability of liquidation, or  is not positive. This probability may in 
fact be positive, but the size of L may not be significant as to create a disutility jump. 
From this we can assume that for a small enough L, the utility function of a risk 
rationed, or non-borrower, is continuous over wealth. However, we should consider 
the cases where the individual’s utility function changes by taking the loan or not, and 
also his expectation on the distribution of revenues in the case of taking the loan or 
not. We could also expect that taking a loan increases the probability of higher returns. 
If this is so, then we have four different scenarios:  
1) Utilities don’t change between states (debt and no-debt), and neither does 
return   distributions. 
2) Utilities between states are the same, but return distributions differ by state. 
3) Utilities are different between states, and return distributions are same. 
4) Utilities are different between states, and return distributions are different 
too. 
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As an illustration of scenario (2), Figure 5.5 shows the same utility function of 
an individual in the two states, debt and no-debt, and only their revenue distribution 
changes between states. Since price rationed are those who borrow formally, we 
would expect that their upper bound on returns to be higher than under no debt. Also, 
we would expect that their benefits of increase revenue outweigh the cost of losing 
their collateral. That increase in expected revenue is reflected in Figure 5.5 as an 
increase in the upper bound of wealth from to , with a 
corresponding increase in utility at the upper bounds from  to . 
Borrowers would face the wealth loss of  with the corresponding 
jump disutility of . 
 
Figure 5.5 Utility function of a risk and price rationed individual under different revenue distributions. 
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The expected utility of a borrower is the integral from 0 to the higher upper 
bound of wealth  minus the expected disutility created by the jump. 
=       [4] 
     =  -  +  
 
The expected utility of a non- borrower is the integral from the origin to the 
maximum expected revenue under no debt.  
=       [5] 
An individual is risk rationed if EU > EU . 
>  -  +  
EU > EU = >  
 
Similar analyses follow for the other three scenarios. 
 
Effect of Higher Moments in the Expected Utility Function of a Risk Rationed 
Individual. 
The justification for including the third moment in the utility function is 
provided next. The drop in utility caused by the possibility of collateral loss has the 
effect of reducing the skewness of the expected revenue distribution. The reason for 
this is that there is a probability shift from the value of  that triggers the collateral 
loss to the values of  with the loss incurred. These values are to the left side of the 
trigger values, thus, shifting probability weights toward the left tail of the distribution. 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) mention that a density function created from another 
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one by taking probability weight from the center and adding it to the tails becomes 
more variable. In our case, however, the probability function created by shifting 
weights to the left tail not only becomes more variable, but also more negatively 
skewed.  
 
Figure 5.6.Probability shift from A' to A'' for borrowers under jump disutility. 
 
Figure 5.6 shows a probability transfer towards the left tail of the expected 
wealth distribution as described in equation [2]. The area =  is the 
probability of wealth being in the gap between and . This is the loss of wealth 
due to collateral liquidation. The borrower cannot attain the wealth values between 
and  anymore, the probability of being between them is transferred, from , to 
the left of  at . How spread is the new added probability at the left of  is 
unknown. However, we can denote the spread as being a positive number, . 
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Regardless of the value of  , the new distribution would have more weights towards 
its left tail, thereby decreasing skewness. 
Distribution of wealth might appear bimodal (or multimodal) amongst risk 
rationed, particularly if some of them used to be borrowers and lost collateral; while 
for borrowers it may appear unimodal.  
Following the justification, we can characterize the expected utility model of 
an individual through a third-order Taylor expansion over . The expected utility 
function of wealth depends on the current level of wealth and on the distribution of  . 
The incorporation of the third moment into the expected utility function is the result of 
the shape of the distribution of  : the starting value of  ,  , plus the random term 
.The distribution of , ,is characterized by its first three moments: 
 where  is the distribution mean,  its variance, and  its third 
moment or unstandardized skewness. The jump disutility of  creates negative 
skewness in its distribution. This jump process transfers risk from the right side to the 
left side of . For the same reason that limiting downside risk increases skewness, 
increasing downside risk decreases it. 
The inclusion of the third moment of a distribution in the utility function 
reflects the downside risk of a random variable. A positive skewness decreases 
downside risk, while a negative one increases it. Menezes et al. (1980) gives a general 
definition of increasing downside risk as the following: “one distribution has more 
downside risk than another if it can be obtained from the other by a sequence of 
probability transfers which unambiguously shift dispersion from right to the left 
without changing the mean and variance.” Cain and Peel (2004) studied the preference 
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for gambles and state that a risk-averse person has a preference for skewness; 
moreover, a tradeoff exists among mean, variance and skewness. People are willing to 
trade a negative expected mean of returns for a positive skewness. According to Golec 
and Tamarkin (1998), the preference for skewness can be sufficiently large that even 
though people are faced with negative expected return and high variance on a gamble, 
they would still take the gamble as long as the skewness is sufficiently large. Peel 
(2012), on the other hand, provides examples where given different characteristics of 
lotteries and utility functions, risk-averse individuals do not necessarily prefer a more 
skewed distribution with equal mean or variance. However, investor’s preferences for 
skewness in returns are so common that there exist many mechanisms in the market to 
increase positive skewness of returns. Tsiang (1972) cites limited liability, prearranged 
stop-loss sales on stocks, and put and call options as examples of market mechanism 
to increase positive skewness of returns. Diminishing the magnitude of a financial loss 
and increasing the magnitude of the gain are ways to increase the skewness of returns. 
Similarly, increasing the size of a loss and limiting gains decrease the skewness of the 
return distribution, which is avoided by investors. This can occur if the income level 
of a firm is sufficiently low that it may be forced into bankruptcy and into liquidation 
of assets. The size of the loss in assets due to liquidations is related to the amount 
owed to creditors. 
The expansion of the utility function of wealth over becomes: 
 =     [6] 
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Where , ,  , , 
, and          is the standardized skewness. Higher order 
terms are not considered in this analysis. After multiplying the second and third 
moments of [6] by  and  respectively, and standardizing the skewness, we 
transform [6] as a function of risk aversion and prudence. 
 =  
   
 =    [7] 
Where  is the Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion coefficient, and 
 is the absolute prudence coefficient (Kimball, 1990). The effect of the 
change in expected revenue, (or however  is defined) on expected utility is   
=  > 0, due to local non-satiation. The effect of revenue risk on expected utility 
is  = . When skewness is 0, the 
derivative is negative except under risk neutrality, that is, when . If and  
, the derivative can be positive when skewness is positive and sufficiently large, 
i.e. when .This is consistent with a case stated by Masson where an individual 
may prefer a production technology with a larger variance as long as the mean return 
of the two technologies is the same and the riskier technology does not fall below a 
minimum threshold. If a riskier production technology is left bounded, which 
increases its skewness, a person may in fact prefer it. Skewness has a positive effect 
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on expected utility,  =  , except again, under risk neutrality, 
or prudence neutrality (when ). The derivative increases with variance when 
both  and . This is equivalent to say that the larger the downside risk aversion 
coefficient is, (Modica and Salvatore, 2005), the larger the preference for 
skewness. As long as , skewness increases expected utility under larger 
variance. 
When prudence equals  , the expected utility function is characterized by 
the first moment only. If it is greater than that, a larger risk aversion values would 
increase expected utility. In a similar way, when prudence is lower than  , a larger 
risk aversion would decrease expected utility.  Prudence would increase expected 
utility as long as skewness is positive.  
The three-moment expected utility also affects risk premium through 
skewness. The risk premium is equivalent to , where 
is the distribution of the gamble’s outcome and  is the risk premium 
willing to pay in order to avoid the gamble . Under mean-variance analysis, the risk 
premium is approximated as , where  is the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of 
absolute risk aversion. Similarly, for a three-moment expected utility, the risk 
premium is . When skewness increases, risk premium 
decreases, as long as . 
The state of being risk rationed or price rationed is endogenous to each 
individual. We assume that they have complete information about their production 
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technologies and risks, from which they base their decision to be in either state. So far 
we have not specified the form of the utility function since for the purpose of 
explaining the decision to be risk rationed, it is sufficient to have the general form. 
The utility functions, however, can differ at each state. That is, the utility function of a 
risk rationed may be different from that of a price rationed. The resulting expected 
utility for each state is derived from the interaction of the utilities functions along with 
the distribution of expected returns 
A Farmer’s decision to beat each state can be summarized as follows. Suppose 
that each farmer starts with the decision to borrow or not at time 0. At this point he has 
the opportunity to borrow, and he indeed wants to borrow, in order to adopt a higher 
yield technology with higher expected returns; or he can choose not to borrow and 
produce with a lower yield technology if he deems that the probability of default is 
large enough as to force him to liquidate his assets in order to repay if default occurs. 
That doesn’t mean that farmers do not consider borrowing -they do want to borrow 
and have access to credit- but the disutility caused by the collateral loss risk is greater 
than the utility gained from the higher expected returns. The extra revenue from using 
the high yield technology does not compensate for the probability of losing collateral 
in case of a bad scenario. These people are risk rationed. If, on the other hand, the 
disutility from the probability of losing collateral due to default is lower than the 
utility gained from the higher expected returns generated by the adoption of the high 
yield technology, then this farmer would be price rationed. Therefore, the farmer has 
two options based on his utility function and on his risk assessment of returns.  
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An Empirical Investigation of Risk Rationing and Jump Processes amongst 
Mexican Farmers 
In this section we investigate the characteristics of risk and price rationing 
using a random utility model. Dichotomous variable indicating credit rationing status 
is used as dependent variable, and the first three moments of the expanded expected 
utility as independent variables. 
To accomplish this, a survey to unambiguously instrument credit status was 
specifically designed (see Figure 5.8 for a schematic of the survey). This survey 
divided individuals into three mutually exclusive groups: risk, price and quantity 
rationed. Quantity rationed are those people who requested a loan but the lender did 
not offer any amount or a lower amount than requested. They are externally rationed. 
As previously defined, risk rationed are those people who do not borrow, or borrow 
less than offered, for fear of losing collateral; while price rationed are those who 
borrow or refrained from borrowing for reasons other than fear of collateral loss. 
These two groups are internally determined by the borrower. The survey was designed 
specifically to identify respondents who are risk, price or quantity rationed and 
meticulously created to eliminate any ambiguity and to instrument against problems of 
unobserved endogeneity.  
We derive the econometric specification, identification strategy, and 
hypothesis generation from the above theory. Under the random utility framework, a 
farmer would decide not to borrow if his expected utility from not borrowing is larger 
than that from borrowing; that is, if  . The subscript  
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stands for risk rationed and  for price rationed. The probability that risk rationing is 
chosen, , is then: 
 
   [8] 
The probability of choosing not to borrow is given by the cumulative 
distribution function (CDF) of  to the point of the right hand side of [8]. That 
is, 
 [9] 
Equation [9] can be estimated using a linear probability, probit or logit model. 
The independent variables are the moments of the expected distributions of returns for 
each state. The dependent variable is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the 
individual is risk rationed, and 0 for price rationed as instrumented by the survey. The 
estimated coefficients are the utilities and its first three derivatives for each state, 
however, the constant term would be the difference in utilities at the initial wealth 
level. Going back to the four scenarios previously mentioned, we can test for different 
utilities functions or their derivatives by solving [9]and testing for differences in 
coefficients. On the other hand, if we believe that the moments are invariant between 
states, then the only source of differences in expected utility would be different utility 
functions. The probability of being risk rationed under the assumption of invariant 
moments becomes: 
 
  [10] 
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Model [10] can be justified if there are no significant differences between the 
moment distributions at each state. The coefficients in [10] now become the 
differences in coefficients between states. A coefficient that is not significantly 
different from zero means that it cannot explain the state preference between risk 
rationed and price rationed. As in [9], the constant term is the difference in utilities at 
the initial wealth level. The rest of the coefficients are also measured at the initial 
wealth, . If the coefficients of [10] are different from zero, each state would have a 
different utility function. Our data supports the use of model [10]. 
If the moment distribution is different across states but with equal utility 
function and initial wealth, the equation to solve becomes:  
   [11] 
Again, we can test for different utilities and its derivatives between states by 
testing the corresponding coefficients of [9].  
Once we have estimated the coefficients we can proceed to analyze some 
characteristics for each group. For instance, if model [9] is used we can estimate the 
values of the utility at initial wealth, and expected marginal utilities for each group. By 
dividing the utility at initial wealth by the expected marginal utility of each group we 
can get their discount factor (Pender, 1996). Also, by dividing the expected marginal 
utilities of each group we get the marginal rate of substitution between groups. This 
tells us the amount of expected income that can be given up in one state in exchange 
of one unit of expected income in the other while keeping utility constant. In other 
words, this is the value of expected income in one group measured in a unit of 
expected income in the other. Risk aversion, prudence and downside risk aversion 
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coefficients can also be estimated by using model [9]. If model [10] is used, the 
analysis is more limited since the coefficients are the difference of utilities and its 
expected moments between groups. The constant coefficient can tell us which group 
has a stronger preference for current consumption, implying a larger discount rate. If 
the value of the coefficient is positive, it means that risk rationed get more utility than 
price rationed at the initial wealth level, or at the present.  
Similar to the marginal rate of substitution between expected incomes of the 
two states, the difference of expected marginal utilities can tell us which state requires 
values expected income more, but not the actual price ratio like the marginal rate of 
substitution. This difference in marginal utilities indicates the expected income 
preference under risk. A small value means that an individual can easily substitute 
expected income between the two states, and then the state preference will depend on 
the higher moments.  
In figure 5.7, the horizontal axis is the expected income under risks rationed, 
while the vertical is under price rationed. The slope of the indifference curve is the 
units of expected income that should be given up under price rationed for one unit 
under risk rationed. 
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Figure 5.7.Marginal rate of substitution of expected income between each state. 
 
 
Comparative Statics of Demand for Credit under a Jump Utility Model with 
Intertemporal Consumption. 
Here we analyze the effects of key parameters on demand for credit for a 
farmer with a jump disutility using an intertemporal utility model. This section is to 
illustrate some comparative statics on demand for credit, and show how the discount 
rate is obtained. Similar to Pender (1996), we created a credit constraint where a 
farmer faces liquidation costs under a probability of default. We estimate the effect of 
assets, non-farm revenue, and expected farm revenue on credit demand. Assume the 
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farmer has initial assets , which includes land value. He complements his income by 
non-farming activities, . He decides how much to borrow, , before the planting 
decision. After harvest, he receives farm income  with distribution . He also 
repays his formal loan at the market interest rate, , but if his total income 
cannot meet the debt obligation, he is forced into liquidation of assets . The 
probability of default is . The farmer has savings rate of    for the assets at first 
period. His formal credit line is limited by . The farmer’s problem becomes: 
   
 [12] 
Applying the envelope theorem to [12] we obtain the effects of the different 
parameters on credit demand. The effect of non-farm income on credit demand is 
negative if the marginal expected utility of non-farm income is greater than the 
expected marginal utility of debt, as long as  , that is, if the 
marginal farm income from investing the loan plus savings rate is greater than 
marginal probability of default from an increase in debt times liquidation cost plus the 
market interest rate. In other words, if the farmer’s expected marginal utility of non-
farm income is greater than his expected marginal utility of debt, then his demand for 
formal credit would increase as his non-farm income increases if the liquidation costs 
are large, or the probability of default is high. This reflects the effect of a buffer cash 
to cope with bad outcome.  This interaction is complex, but one of the main factors is 
increase in expected farm income, liquidation cost and probability of default. The 
effect of  is the dominant force in determining credit demand for risk rationing; 
 173 
 
however, the interaction with the rest of the parameters will ultimately decide the 
credit demand. Demand for formal credit given non-farm income is: 
     [13] 
 
The Lagrange multiplier 
is , and  are consumption at 
each period. 
 is positive if the marginal farm income from investing the loan is greater 
than marginal probability of default times liquidation cost. Normally this is the case, 
unless the probability of default is large.  
How expected farm income affects credit demand depends also on the 
probability of default and liquidation cost, but also on the difference in expected 
marginal utilities of farm income and debt. If this difference is large enough, it would 
require a high savings rate for expected farm income to have a negative effect on 
credit demand. If both expected marginal utilities are close in value, credit demand 
would increase as  increases. 
Similar results hold for the effect of assets on credit demand. Asset wealth 
creates a safety net for borrowing that even with high probability of default credit 
demand is positive. 
One characteristic of risk rationed is that they forego the chance of higher 
future income, by not taking the risky activity. This may be also caused by time 
preference of consumption. Although risk rationing may exhibit larger discount rate 
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than price rationing, we believe this is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for 
risk rationing. Large discount rate can explain risk rationing behavior, but as 
mentioned before, many other factors affect that decision. Pender defined the discount 
rate (1+d) as the ratio of the marginal utilities between states 1 and 2, the smaller 
(1+d), the larger future consumption is discounted. His discount rate is obtained from 
the Taylor expansion of , the function that solves the UMP. The expansion 
becomes: . Pender defined  as the 
present reward and  as the future reward. For a small , the Taylor expansion 
provides an approximated solution. 
In our model, the discount rate is . 
The time preference depends on the expected utility from farm income, as well on the 
expected utility of certain wealth, w, and the savings rate. Unless  is very 
large, risk rationing would prefer current consumption. 
These models show that the demand for credit is the result of complex 
interactions. When demand for credit decreases for a given set of parameters, we can 
say that the individual is approaching risk rationing status, or is currently quasi-risk 
rationed. The advantage of our study is that we are not looking at those people who 
have diminishing demand for credit, but instead look at the determinants of risk 
rationing. This analysis is possible because we used a specific survey to 
unambiguously determine credit rationing status.  
 
Data and Empirical Results 
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The data used in this paper was collected from a survey of Mexican grain 
farmers that we conducted in September 2011. The survey took place in a grain 
producing region in eastern San Luis Potosi. We collaborated with a local grain 
marketing cooperative for logistics and survey sampling support. In total, we 
interviewed 372 grain farmers that produce among corn, sorghum and soybeans, or a 
combination of them. Survey participants were compensated with $100 pesos for 
participating, which is about a day’s wage.  
The survey included demographic as well as production questions. We asked 
them about their current production decisions, land size, total assets and expectations 
about the next season. Specifically, we asked farmers to give an estimate on the lowest 
possible, most likely and highest possible crop price they expect to sell. They provided 
the same estimation for their crop yields: lowest possible, most likely and highest 
possible yields per hectare of the crops intended to plant, and in some cases for the rest 
of the crops. Once we gathered the price and yield data, we estimated their expected 
revenue for next season. That is, we estimated their minimum, most likely and highest 
possible revenue based on their price and yield estimations. 
This same survey asked questions that define their credit rationing group. As 
mentioned before, this survey unambiguously categorizes each farmer, avoiding the 
use of instrumental variables to correct endogeneity. The flow chart of the survey is 
given in figure 5.8.  
With the estimated revenue data, we calculated the first three moments of the 
distribution through simulation. Using the software @Risk, we inputted the minimum, 
most likely and maximum revenue values into a PERT distribution simulator. We ran 
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5,000 iterations for each farmer and from the resulting PERT distribution, we obtained 
the first three moments for each farmer. Those values were used in this analysis. 
Parameterizing a PERT distribution when data is limited to expert opinion is a 
common practice. The parameters needed to fit a PERT distribution are minimum, 
most likely and maximum. Another advantage of this distribution is that it allows for 
skewness. 
A dichotomous variable was used as the dependent variable: 1 for risk rationed 
and 0 for price rationed. As regressors we used the estimated revenue variables for 
each of the three crops. If somebody planned to grow more than one crop, only the 
main crop in acreage was used for the analysis. For instance, if his main crop was 
corn, then the first three moments of corn would be used. We tested for differences in 
mean between groups for the estimated values of revenue and found them to be not 
significantly different. Because of this similarity, model [10] was used. 
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Figure 5.8.Schematic of the survey to classify producers according to their credit rationing. 
 
Most of the farmers in this analysis have the intention of planting sorghum as 
their main crop for the next season, 53%; followed by soybeans, 24%; and corn, 23%. 
The results of the regressions are shown in tables 1 and 2 for each crop.  
The coefficients in the regressions represent the difference between the utility 
at initial wealth level, marginal utility of expected revenues, change in the marginal 
utility of expected revenues, and the third derivative of the utility function of expected 
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revenues. Thus, a positive coefficient indicates that its value under risk rationing is 
larger than that under the price rationing state. 
 
Table 5.1. Probit regression of expected revenue moments on risk rationed. 
Risk Rationed = 1 Sorghum Corn Soybeans 
Mean -0.0000303     
(0.669)           
0.000217*    
(0.019)                                     
0.0000806   
(0.392)                 
Variance -7.38e-08        
(0.211)           
-0.000000143* 
(0.014)          
-0.000000166      
(0.071)                                 
Skewness 0.531  
(0.279)           
0.523            
(0.406)          
0.336       
  (0.563)                              
Constant 0.246    
(0.474)        
-1.011           
(0.128)          
-0.865    
(0.303)      
Observations  112 49 51 
p-values in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
 
 
Table 5.2.Linear probability regression of expected revenue moments on risk rationed. 
 Risk Rationed = 1 Sorghum Corn Soybeans 
Mean -0.0000173         
(0.451)           
0.0000743*     
(0.014)         
0.0000227                                        
(0.416) 
Variance -1.58e-08        
(0.163)           
-4.85e-08**     
(0.007)         
-3.68e-08*                                       
(0.037)                                      
Skewness 0.170           
(0.342)            
0.159       
(0.455)         
0.101                                    
(0.596)                                    
Constant  0.604***                 
(0.000)   
0.155 
(0.518)          
0.178    
(0.467)      
Observations  112 49 51 
p-values in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
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Equation [10] provides the interpretation of the coefficients. They measure the 
difference in utilities, and its derivatives, of the expected utility between risk rationed 
and price rationed. For each crop, the coefficient of the mean is ; 
for the variance, ; and for the skewness, 
.The constant term measures the difference in utility at 
initial wealth level between a risk rationed and a price rationed. This random utility 
model measures the likelihood that a person would be risk rationed given changes in 
the moments of the expected revenue distribution.  
Using the coefficients for sorghum under the linear probability model we have 
the following equation:  
 
 [14]  
We selected sorghum as an illustration since it is the crop that is most planted 
in our survey. Also, the coefficients of the linear probability model are used since they 
measure the marginal effects of the moments of the expected revenue distribution. 
Looking at the results from equation [14], we find that the utility of risk 
rationed is larger than that of price rationed at the initial wealth level. This is given by 
the positive value of the constant coefficient. However, the negative coefficient of 
shows that the expected marginal utility of revenue for price rationed is larger than 
the expected marginal utility of revenue for risk rationed. The larger the expected 
revenue for sorghum, the more likely someone would be price rationed. The sign of 
the coefficient for  is negative also, this means that the change in marginal utility of 
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expected revenue for price rationed is lower than that of risk rationed. The larger the 
variance in expected returns, the more likely someone is price rationed, that is, risk 
rationed are more adverse to expected variance in returns than price rationed. The 
positive value of the coefficient of skewness indicates that the third derivative of the 
expected utility of revenue for risk rationed is larger than that of price rationed. This 
means that risk rationed people prefer more skewness of the expected revenue 
distribution than price rationed. Recall that by staying risk rationed, the skewness of 
their distribution becomes less negatively skewed relative to price rationed, indicating 
that price rationed respond less to skewness.  
Similarly, corn and soybeans farmers have the same sign in the coefficients of 
variance, skewness and constant. They differ from sorghum growers in the sign of the 
expected revenue. Unlike sorghum, they have positive signs. This means that the 
larger the expected revenue for these two crops, the more likely a farmer would 
become risk rationed. Interestingly, not only do these results provide confirmative 
evidence of risk rationing but also evidence that the micro-structure of the farm itself 
and the dominance of one crop over another can influence risk rationing behavior.  
The constant term has different signs for corn and soybeans growers in the two 
regressions. In the probit model (Table 5.1) corn and sorghum have negative 
coefficients, while in the linear probability model (Table 5.2) all crops have positive 
coefficients. Since the coefficient of the constant term indicates the difference in 
utilities at the initial wealth level between risk rationed and price rationed, a positive 
coefficient indicates that at the initial wealth level the utility of being risk rationed is 
larger than that of a price rationed. The signs of the coefficients for sorghum (the most 
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common crop) in both models, and for the rest of the crops in the linear probability 
model, are all positive. This suggests that at the initial period, risk rationed have more 
utility than price rationed, and this may also indicate a preference for current 
consumption. When current utility is higher in risk rationed state, those farmers may 
not want to engage in the risky activity unless the utility derived from future revenues 
outweighs the utility at the present wealth level.  
The results in both Tables 1 and 2 show similar results regarding coefficient 
signs except in the constant terms for corn and soybeans. The positive signs of the 
mean coefficients for corn and soybeans show that the marginal utility of the expected 
revenue is larger for risk rationed. This also shows a stronger preference for expected 
revenue than price rationed. It is worth clarifying that the positive value does not mean 
that price rationed do not prefer expected revenues. It is assumed that both groups do, 
but that the preference for expected revenue is stronger for risk rationed who planted 
corn and soybeans. Risk rationed who planted sorghum have a lower preference to 
expected revenues than price rationed.  
On the results for variance, risk rationed people have a lower second derivative 
of expected utility of revenue than price rationed. This indicates that risk rationed are 
more adverse to higher values in variance than price rationed. They tolerate less 
variance than price rationed.  
The results for skewness measure the difference in the third derivative between 
groups. Being positive for all crops, risk rationed seems to have a stronger, or at least 
not weaker, preference for skewness of the expected revenue distribution. This is an 
important result that tests the theory of the jump disutility for risk rationed. The jump 
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disutility decreases skewness in the revenue distribution, which occurs when 
borrowing formally. Risks rationed are more sensitive to changes in skewness, which 
is why they refrain from borrowing when this change is sufficiently large. 
These results test the hypothesis that risk rationing is the result of a jump 
disutility of a borrower. This jump creates a probability shift towards the left of the 
distribution which in turn increases downside risk. When the jump disutility is large 
enough, farmers would restrain from borrowing in order to avoid falling below the 
threshold that triggers the jump.  
The positive coefficient for skewness indicates a preference for probability of 
large gains as well as the minimization of losses. In the data, we find evidence that the 
risk rationed are more downside risk averse than those who are price rationed since 
most farmers who do not use fertilizers are risk rationed. This occurs despite the 
higher increase in yields and revenue per hectare from utilizing fertilizers. These 
farmers are giving up the possibility of higher income by limiting the loss in case of 
disaster. Limiting downside risk becomes a dominant factor for input use. 
Finally, following our model, the coefficient captures the effect of the 
differences of utility at the initial wealth. The sign of the coefficients tell us the 
difference in utility of initial wealth for the two credit rationed groups. All of the three 
crops have positive coefficient. This means that the utility at the initial state of wealth 
is larger for the risk rationed group for all crops. This may also be a reflection of being 
risk rationed, since they are better off at the initial state than price rationed; 
consequently, it is more difficult for them to want to move from that initial state. By 
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preferring the status quo, they have more at stake when borrowing formally because 
that status quo is jeopardized.  
The difference in utility at the initial wealth level, given by the constant term, 
measures the preference for current consumption. In this case, risk rationed farmers 
have a stronger preference for current consumption, suggesting that their discount rate 
for future consumption is higher than that of price rationed. 
Since risk rationing farmers do not borrow formally, by definition, they rely on 
informal borrowing or own saving to smooth consumption. Following Morduch’s 
empirical tests for complete markets we regress household expenses on informal loan 
as a proxy for transitory income and savings. Informal loan is negative and marginally 
significant (p= 0.18), and saving positive and significant (p= 0.0). These results 
suggest that farmers use these mechanisms to smooth consumption, and thus implying 
that credit markets are not complete.  
Income smoothing mechanisms for risk rationed are also observed in our 
study. Our data shows that risk rationing farmers are much less likely to grow a high 
revenue- high risk crop in favor of low revenue-low risk ones. For instance, the 
percentage of risk rationed farmers who grow corn or sorghum, deemed as less risky 
crops, are about the same as price rationed farmers; however, the ration of price 
rationed farmers who grow soybeans, the high revenue crop, is more than double than 
that of risk rationed, 67 and 33%.  
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Conclusion 
This paper explores an alternative view to understand risk rationing among 
farmers in the context of a developing country. This new approach is formulated from 
Mason’s disutility jump. The  implications of the jump is a preference for skewness, 
which implies  significant downside risk aversion. In this paper we estimated each 
farmer’s expected revenue distribution by simulating a PERT distribution using three 
parameters obtained from a survey conducted in rural Mexico. Using the resulting 
simulated (PERT) distribution’s moments (mean, variance, skewness) we performed a 
random utility analysis between people classified as risk rationed and price rationed. 
we find that risk rationing preference depends on expected distribution, skewness 
preference and discount rate. 
Following the jump disutility theory proposed by Masson, we created a model 
where this jump disutility refers to the collateral loss that risks rationed avoid by not 
entering into the formal credit market. From there we have two possible distributions 
of future revenue, one under debt and one without debt. A formal debt would create, 
or increase, a disutility jump at a given revenue threshold, which if reached, triggers 
the jump disutility in the form of collateral loss. Reaching the threshold level of 
revenue is avoided at all costs under risk rationing. On the other hand, the distribution 
of future revenues without debt does not have this significant disutility jump, thereby, 
making that distribution less negatively skewed compared to being risk rationed. We 
find that risk rationed have a stronger preference for skewness and their expected 
revenue distribution is less positively skewed, or more negatively skewed, than that of 
price rationed.  
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Through a random utility model analysis, we estimate the preferences for 
expected revenue moments, and for present consumption. By looking at the 
differences in utilities and their derivatives between credit groups, given by the 
coefficients of the random utility model, we estimate that risk rationed have a higher 
discount factor than price rationed. This suggests that risk rationing can also be 
explained by the preference of current consumption. Price rationed, on the other hand, 
sacrifices current consumption in hopes to have a larger future consumption. This is 
measured by the difference between utility at initial wealth level. This difference is the 
constant term in the regressions. 
The results in this paper test the hypothesis that risk rationed farmers face a 
jump disutility in case they borrow formally. This jump is trigger by revenues falling 
below a threshold level. The consequence of the jump disutility model is that risk 
rationed farmers would not prefer less skewness in their expected revenue distribution 
than price rationed. This is tested empirically for all crops by looking at the skewness 
coefficients of the random utility model. A positive value indicates that risk rationed 
prefer more skewness in the distribution; however, although the significance level of 
these coefficients indicate that they are not statistically different from zero, they 
suggest that risk rationed do not have less skewness preference than price rationed, 
supporting utility jump theory. Another result consistent with the theory is that risk 
rationed farmers have larger aversion, or at least are not less risk averse, to expected 
variance of revenues. 
Although we believe that the analysis of risk rationing through the use of a random 
utility model shed lights on time preference of consumption, skewness preference, and 
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degree of risk aversion and downside risk aversion, other approaches to understanding 
risk rationing can be explored. One approach would be the application of behavioral 
and psychological models of risk, perhaps through experimental mechanisms. 
Farmers’ response to the risk of losing collateral by not borrowing needs to be 
examined through the interaction of emotions and calculative probabilities of default. 
This is a natural extension of this topic that can provide further insights on the 
relationship between risk preferences and emotions. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
PERCEPTION AND ACTION IN A CONFLICT ZONE: A STUDY OF RURAL 
ECONOMY AND RURAL LIFE AMIDST NARCOS IN EASTERN SAN LUIS 
POTOSI, MEXICO. 
 
Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between psychometric 
measures of risk perception and socioeconomic variables of small farmers living in a 
drug conflict zone in Mexico. The analysis follows two models of behavior and 
stimuli perception: The Ecological Psychology model, and the Dual Process Model. 
Using psychometric measures of risk we classified farmers into four groups, 
depending on their level of fear, familiarity with the risk of narco violence, and trust to 
authorities among other factors. For each of the four groups created we ran a 
multivariate regression on demographic, social and economic variables. In accordance 
to the literature, we find significant factors that determine group classification and 
others that provide new insights into violence perception and fear. Next, we used each 
of the groups as explanatory variables for determining stated changes in behavior due 
to violence. To our knowledge, this is the first study on small farmers’ risk perception 
and action in real time conflict areas, more specifically in the drug conflict areas in 
Mexico. Our results show that the current war on drugs in Mexico is not only affecting 
the urban population as it is widely perceived, but it is also affecting low income 
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farmers. The increase in risk perception due to criminal activity also has an effect on 
their risk taking behavior and adoption of new production technology. Our results can 
help determine a strategy to ameliorate those risks perceptions and improve rural life. 
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Introduction 
The level of violence in Mexico caused by the ongoing war on drugs has 
escalated dramatically in scale and scope affecting all members of Mexican society in 
many parts of the country. Based on official data from several government agencies, 
from December of 2006, when then newly elected president Felipe Calderon declared 
the war on drugs, to May of 2012, the newspaper Zeta estimates the number of 
homicides related to the drug war at over 50,000 (Proceso, May 28, 2012). Although 
most of these casualties are believed to be members of the drug cartels and 
government forces, many victims have been civilians unrelated to any side of the 
conflict. For instance, one of the most violent cases of attacks to innocent civilians is 
the arson of a casino in the city of Monterrey in August 2011, resulting in the dead of 
53 people.  This attack was perpetrated by a drug cartel when the casino refused to 
make extortion payments (Excelsior, August 26, 2011).   
The risks derived from the drug war that affects many civilians are kidnapping, 
extortion and carjacking. According to the Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Publica 
(2011) (National System of Public Safety), the official number of kidnaps in 2006 was 
80% higher than the previous year. This number rose by 27% in 2007. The same 
agency reported the official number of extortions in 2007 to be 3,123.  
Kidnapping and extortion, along with homicide, are also called high-impact 
crimes for the lacerating effect that they have on society. Being exposed to these kinds 
of traumatic events, including disasters and acts of terrorism, create cognitive, 
emotional and social effects on the victims (Alexander D., Klein S., 2009). Some of 
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these effects range from sleep disturbances, worry, and irritability to severe ones like 
psychic numbing, and recurring thoughts about the stressor (T. Markesteyn, 1992).  
As dramatic as these events are, we are unaware of any studies that have 
investigated how narco violence impact the human psyche, the changes in risk 
perception, or how it affects life in general. More specific to this paper is the effect of 
narco violence on agricultural productivity and rural life. By rural life we are 
interested not only in action but also in perception, with the latter occurring at the 
emotional level.  
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between psychometric 
measures of risk perception and socioeconomic variables of small farmers living in a 
drug conflict zone in Mexico. Using psychometric measures of risk developed by 
Slovic (1987), we classified farmers into four groups, depending on their level of fear, 
familiarity with the risk of narco violence, and trust to authorities among other factors. 
For each of the four groups created we ran a multivariate regression on demographic, 
social and economic variables. In accordance to the literature, we find significant 
factors that determine group classification. Next, we used each of the groups as 
explanatory variables for determining stated changes in behavior due to violence. To 
our knowledge, this is the first study on small farmers’ risk perception and action in 
real time conflict areas, more specifically in the drug conflict areas in Mexico. Our 
results show that the current war on drugs in Mexico is not only affecting the urban 
population as it is widely perceived, but it is also affecting low income farmers. The 
increase in risk perception due to criminal activity also has an effect on their risk 
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taking behavior and adoption of new production technology. Our results can help 
determine a strategy to ameliorate those risks perceptions and improve rural life. 
We measure degrees of affect (a feeling of good and bad), as defined by Slovic 
et al. (2007), of small farmers in a conflict zone. Specifically, we look in the emotions 
of farmers caused by the actions of drug cartel members (narcos). Our area of study is 
located in a tri-state region in northeast Mexico where for the past years the level of 
drug related violence has been overwhelming. In this area local police have been 
supported by convoyed federal forces. In some cases, local police have been 
investigated on corruption and complicity with the drug cartels. There have been cases 
where local police forces are dismantled completely if enough evidence of complicity 
is found. When this happens, military forces take over their duty of patrolling and 
enforcing security. The cities of Tampico and Veracruz are cases where the military 
are in charge of the local security (Proceso, April 19, 2012).  
To investigate narco violence on economics and rural life we need to step back 
from traditional economic paradigms to gain an understanding of behavior itself. Thus, 
our study is more tied to psychology than economics and in doing so we make some 
observations about behavior that are satisfying to both camps.  
In the psychological realm the problem posed is to know from which areas of 
psychology do we investigate. Two become clearly relevant, and we tie them together 
in a way which we have not previously seen done. The first is from the point of view 
of ecological psychology.  Ecological psychology evolved principally from Gibson 
(1986) about how organisms relate to their environment. The domain of his research in 
ecological psychology has not at all been in the social domain, as is our interest in this 
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paper, but the physical domain (P. Kugler, M.T. Turvey (1987); M.T. Turvey (2009); 
R. Shaw (2003)). The second strand views people’s decision making as the interaction 
of two systems: the emotional and the analytical.  This method of understanding 
decisions is called Dual Process. Under this paradigm, people’s decisions are affected 
by their fear level, or the emotions invoked from an event; and also by their objective 
assessment of the probability of an event, a rational mechanism. This part of social 
psychology follows Slovic (2002, 2004); Slovic, Lichtenstein, and Fischhoff (1984); 
Finucane and Holup (2006); Loewenstein, G., & O'Donoghue, T. (2005); Mukherjee 
K. (2010); Schulze W, & Wansink B. (2012). 
The two areas are different in several ways. Risk perceptions are for the most 
part non evolving, static events, where the ecological approach is dynamical. This 
does not mean that in terms of the researchers’ toolkit the two strands of psychology 
should not be viewed as being mutually exclusive, but simply needs to be looked at 
through a different lens to see the connection. We argue that the Dual Process theory 
can complement the ecological psychology model, and to an extent we can say that the 
Dual Process is contained in the ecological psychology framework.   
 
Background and Literature Review 
Slovic (1987) provides an axiomatic system to determine risk perception using 
a set of questions that measures characteristics of risk. Some of these characteristics 
are magnitude of risk, control over the event, familiarity and knowledge of the event, 
and lasting effects of the event. He synthesizes those results into a two-factor space: 
familiarity with the event, and dread level. Depending on where in that space an event 
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is located, its social consequences can be predicted. A large accident that occurs in a 
familiar setting has a much smaller social impact than a small accident in an 
unfamiliar setting. Car accidents for instance, which kills many people per year and is 
consider by experts to be one of the activities with highest risk, has a much smaller 
social impact than nuclear reactors even though the number of deaths from them are 
negligible compared to car accidents. This is due from the perceived potential of 
catastrophe and the unfamiliarity of the event. While we can assess risk objectively as 
a probability of an event, when we evaluate that probability based on feelings, it tends 
to be exaggerated if the event being analyzed is frightening (Rottenstreich and Hsee, 
2001).   
Although the tools developed by Slovic are very important in understanding 
how information and feeling of control about an event affect our risk perception of it, 
it does not suffice to explain the dynamics of risk perception, specifically for people 
living in a conflict zone as is the case in this study. Our belief is that viewing conflict 
through the prism of risk perceptions alone is inadequate since it excludes action. 
Action of some form, a response sort to speak, is critical. Two psychological 
approaches that incorporate actions in risk perceptions are the ecological psychology 
model, and the Dual Process model. 
 
Ecological Psychology and Dual Process Theory 
From the Ecological Psychology perspective, the way we perceive risk 
depends among other things in how we identify key variables that specifies the event, 
and in our environment. Our actions and intentions depend on our perception of the 
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world; this perception is determined by how we process information about various 
events, which in turn depends in our environment. However, our actions affect the 
way we process information therefore creating a circular relationship (Michaels C., 
Beek P. 1995). In other words, our actions are endogenous to our perception of risk.  
Borrowing figure 6.1 from Michaels and Beek (1995), we modify the labels of 
each box to represent the factors of the perception-action cycle for the farmers of our 
study.  
 
Figure 6.1.Relationship of stimulus, perception and action under the ecological framework. 
 
Here the stimuli are the violence from narcos in the community, which is the 
environment from the ecological perspective. The stimuli are perceived by the farmers 
differently, depending on several factors including demographic variables. How we 
perceive fear is analyzed using Slovic’s methodology. Given some stimuli and how we 
respond to them is time definite in the Slovic framework, our decisions have no impact 
on our perception.  From the ecological view, our perception of the stimuli (violence) 
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would make us act in a certain way or create new intentions regarding them.  These 
actions and intentions create a feedback and can alter our perception of the stimuli as 
well; therefore, making this interaction dynamic.  This is the circular relationship 
between our action/intentions and our perception (Michaels and Beek).  
 
Figure 6.2.Relationship of stimulus, perception and action under the dual process framework. 
 
The mechanism in which the dual process model works is explained in the 
following lines. An individual makes his decision based on a combination of two 
factors: emotional and rational. The emotional system of decision is also known as 
system 1, and the rational system as system 2 (Kahneman, 2011). This utility function 
is comprised of a linear combination of utilities of these two components. In the 
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rational component, probabilities are assessed for each state of the world and 
multiplied by the utility of each state based on some attributes. The sum of these 
probability-weighted utilities is the total utility from the rational component. In the 
emotional side, each state is assigned a utility based on the difference of attributes 
from a reference point, or status quo. That is, the utility derived from the emotional 
component is based on how different is each state in relation to a reference. There are 
no probabilities assigned at each state in the emotional component. Once the 
individual assess his utilities from the two components, his final utility is a linear 
combination of them. This allows for final utilities based only on emotional 
component, rational component or both
5
.  
The dynamical structure of the ecological approach is a much richer, with 
stimuli leading to risk perceptions, risk perceptions leading to action, and action 
feeding back in to stimuli to diminish or exacerbate, and so on. The structure of the 
dual process theory, on the other hand, relies on two decision making mechanisms in 
the brain: an automatic response mechanism based on emotions, and a conscious 
deliberation mechanism based on rational choice. The way in which stimuli is 
perceived is similar to the ecological model. Here stimuli lead to pattern recognition 
(risk perception); pattern recognition is analyzed under the two mechanisms, 
emotional and analytical; and then a decision is made. While the duel process model is 
by itself a very used model in behavioral economics, it is contained in the ecological 
model (see figure 6.2). Therefore, for the rest of this paper we will focus on the 
                                                 
5
  According to Shulze and Wansink (2012), an individual maximizes the following dual process utility 
function: , “where is the level 
of attribute  for choice   in state ; is the status quo or reference point for attribute ;  
is the relative weight on emotional utility…” 
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ecological psychology approach to behavior, under the premise that by analyzing 
behavior with this approach, the dual theory approach also holds for the analysis. This 
will be demonstrated later in the paper. We believe that two decision theories used in 
this study, fear perception based on Slovic’s methodology and the ecological 
approach, are congruent and our research design was developed around this 
congruency as artifact and hypothesis. We have found no research within the 
psychological and economic literature that has laid these two approaches together, 
along with the dual process model, as we do in this study. 
What then are the conditions for a system to be part of the Ecological 
Psychology framework? Petrusz and M. T. Turvey (2010) cite four features for this:  
1) They (animate beings must) reside at the ecological scale of organisms and 
environment; 2) the scale of perception-action, not at the scales of their components; 
they connect closely to the formalism of affordances; 3) they are more general than, 
not special cases of, the laws of physical (inanimate) systems; 4) they make reference 
to themselves, their form is impredicative.  
What do these conditions mean and how they relate to the language of 
economics is explained next. Condition 1 is an existence proposition, that is, animate 
beings must be in an environment. Since the environment refers to the surroundings, 
wherever there is an animate being, there is an environment. This condition holds as 
long as there exists an animate being, something that by definition exists in every 
economic system. In Mexico the infiltration of rural areas and the widespread 
exposure to terrorism and conflict satisfies the condition of a dynamical environmental 
system between, in our case, farmers and directly or indirectly, the narcos. Condition 2 
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states that perception and actions depend on affordances. The term affordances have 
evolved since its early usages in 1977, from the definition of an affordance of 
something as the “properties of its substance and its surfaces taken with reference to 
an animal” (Gibson, 1977), to the opportunity for actions in an environment (Schmidt, 
2007). An inanimate object, for instance a table, affords placing objects on top of it; in 
the same manner a stairway affords climbing it. Objects also have intangible 
affordances that may be specific to each individual. Schmidt (2007) provides an 
example of stairs as affording the feeling of “warm greeting on holidays.”, or the 
affordance of a “cup being a gift.” Under this context, an object, or environment, 
affordances are not only the opportunities for action that it provides for individuals 
(animals), which may be similar under the same social context (e.g. sharing the same 
culture or education); but also affordances describes the feelings caused to a person 
(animal), which again depends on individuals experience with an object/environment. 
People affordances refer to the opportunities of actions he provides, thus a person’s 
affordances are related to their personality, physical and mental capacity. A person’s 
affordances are his “dispositional properties that would affect a given action”. 
Examples of person’s affordances are given by Gunns, Johnson, and Hudson (2002) as 
the perception of vulnerability people give to others; and by Richardson, Marsh and 
Baron (in press) as the ability or disposition to help others. In the first example, people 
may increase their chance of being victimized; in the second, it can affect others’ 
feeling of safety, and thus alter their behavior (moral risk). People affordances can 
differ from the individual to the group level. Cooperation among people can enhance 
their individual affordances and affect the affordances of objects/environment, like the 
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change in “edibility affordances of larger animals” (Baron, 2007) when attacked by a 
pack of wolves than by one. Similarly for humans, vulnerable individuals can join 
forces in a group in order to protect themselves. Personal affordances, together with 
the affordances from the environment provide a “social context” for actions (Lockman 
and Hazen, 1989).  In the current paper, in which we study farmer responses to narco 
terrorism, it is the narcos that affords fear to our sample base. The existence of the 
narcos, is as unique to their environment, as a table is to writing. The idea is that the 
affordances including fear, risk perceptions, actions, responses and so on are as much 
a part of  rural life in Mexico in the presence of  Narcos,  as happiness, comfort,  
tranquility are affordances to rural life in their absence.   
For economists, the concept of affordance relates to those variables from the 
environment or from within the individual that affects his behavior. Affordances under 
the economic context can be exogenous, like age, marital status, income, and violence 
level; or endogenously determined by other variables like production, demand, fear. 
Within each group, we have personal (age, marital status, fear) and environmental 
(crop production, violence level) affordances. Instances of group affordances are 
belonging to a credit union or farming co-op. 
 Condition 3 refers to the physical properties of the entities in the ecological 
system. Although governed by physical laws, affordances are determined by the 
relevance to the animate beings. That is, even if an object has certain physical 
characteristics that provide various affordances, more non-physical affordances can 
exist. For instance, a mirror’s reflectivity, an affordance, can be explained by laws of 
physics; but the appeal and usefulness of a mirror is meaningful to an animate being 
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(Petrusz and M. T. Turvey, 2010) but not of much use to an inanimate object. In 
economic terms, this third condition makes allowances for ordinal transformations of 
the physical attributes of goods to measures of utility. Thus price affords utility, or 
product characteristics afford utility.  In the Mexican situation one can consider 
affordances in degrees. For example, observing a Narcos in a truck provides different 
affordances than a narcos with a gun, which provides different affordances when the 
narcos shoots the gun. In each case the physical system is altered in one way or 
another and the emotional affect on the recipient will (may) too be impacted. On the 
other hand, like the mirror with no user, opaque narcos activities that are meaningless 
to the farmer may provide no affordances at all. 
Condition 4 refers to the self-awareness of the animate beings in the 
environment, that is, they are impredicative. Affordances of the environment involve 
the individuals to be aware they are in the environment. Petrusz and M. T. Turvey 
(2010) exemplify impredicativeness in a situation when we want to say who is the 
tallest person in a room, we need to include ourselves in that comparison. For the 
affordance “X is the tallest person in the room” to be true, we need to be compared as 
well as everyone else. Each individual is “both a perceiver and object of perception.” 
In the economic system, each individual knows that he is an active part of the system. 
By being in an economic system, he interacts with others who perceive his affordances 
to them. In some situations (as in game theory) he has to predict what others will do 
based on others’ anticipation of his actions. To the economist, impredicativeness refers 
to endogenous relationships that may or may not be directly observed. For example, if 
we consider the relationship between stimuli and perception the linkage is well 
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defined by the affordances from the Narcos as the affect the perceptions or risk on the 
farmer. The farmer acts on these perceptions and to a large extent these might be 
observable. i.e. the farmer moves away; the farmer resists, the farmer changes crops to 
reduce exposure to criminals and so on. These actions, no matter how subtle, thus 
establish a new set of affordances, but now from the farmers to the Narcos. The truly 
endogenous relationship is that which relates action to stimuli and this is where the 
idea of impredicativeness becomes necessary rather than sufficient. If there is no 
relationship between action and stimulus- no feedback rule, or hysteresis or path 
dependency, there is no impredicative state and the system according to Turvey is not 
an ecological system. Instead, according to our figure 6.2 , the system reduces to a 
dual process system, which to our knowledge has never been characterized as an 
ecological system. An ecological system can involve a dual process system, but this 
does not mean that a dual process system is ecological. 
We believe that our study meets the aforementioned criteria. However, the 
fourth condition needs to be tested. It is explained later in this paper the methods used 
to test for impredicative in the system, which is the feedback between stimuli and 
actions. That is, that those variables are endogenously determined within the system. 
In the context of ecological psychology, impredicativeness corresponds to the 
feedback between outcome and perception (figure 6.1). In the context of this study, 
this is translated as the feedback between actions of farmers and their perceptions of 
fear. This feedback occurs if the covariance matrix of the error terms between actions 
and perceptions is non-diagonal, i.e. if there is correlation between these variables. 
This feedback can be tested by means of a Hausman test for endogeneity. Moreover, 
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the concept of affordances, the second criteria, in our study corresponds to variables 
that are exogenously determined, i.e. independent. Examples of these are demographic 
variables and other risk perception variables. Unlike impredicativeness, affordances 
need not be tested since they do not refer to relationships between variables, but as 
how they are specified (exogenous instead of endogenous).  
 
Fear Perception and Individual Characteristics 
Fear perception depends on individual characteristics as well. Studies show 
some demographic characteristics that affect the perception of risk, specifically, that 
women are more likely to show higher level of fear than men, even though men have a 
higher probability of victimization (Bennett and Flavin, 1994). This is attributable to 
the position of women in society and to physical differences in gender. The 
relationship between age and crime are mixed. Bennett and Flavin (1994) show a 
positive relationship; while Kanan and Pruitt (2002) shows that older people are less 
fearful than younger ones. Borooah and Carcach (1997) analyze the effect on 
education and fear level and find that more educated people are less fearful than less 
the less educated. In a study on fear of crime, Reese (2009) found that the proportion 
of fearful people in different countries when the crime rate is high turns out to be low, 
and vice versa, when the crime rate is low, the proportion of fearful people increases.  
Feeling of control over risks changes our perception of them.  People’s 
response to fear is associated to the level of control they have on the event, and are 
willing to take a higher risk in a controllable event than in another one where they 
have no control on the outcome (Slovic, 1987). For instance, driving a car and riding 
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an airplane. Jackson (2012) states that higher perceived control is associated with low 
perceived risk. 
Beliefs also play a role in people’s emotions, and through emotional influence 
beliefs can be distorted. Attacking or questioning one’s core beliefs creates an 
emotional response. Thus, people with same but false beliefs tend to support each 
other. At the same time, belief distortion can happen when the subject is under stress 
(Sjoberg, 1979). Distorted beliefs occur also when subjects are doing probabilistic 
inferences (Kahneman and Tversky, 1972). They accept the sample as representative 
of the population as long as it conforms to what subjects believe the population ought 
to be. That is, they trust a small sample size more compared to a larger one.  
The number of sources of information exposed also affects risk perception. In a 
study in Finland on how exposure to crime news affects risk perception, Smolej and 
Kivivouri (2006) find that the more exposed to crime news somebody is, their fear of 
violence increases.  Again, people’s perception on crime is exacerbated by the images, 
and not analyzed rationally. According to Eschholz et al. (2003), the substitution 
hypothesis states that the less is the personal experience with crime, the larger is the 
level of fear derived from crime media exposure. However, the resonance hypothesis, 
an opposing idea to the substitution hypothesis, states that those individuals who have 
experience crime are more prone to have higher fear levels when exposed to crime 
media (Rountree and Land, 1996). Another hypothesis on the effects of crime media 
on fear level states that the groups of people that feel more vulnerable are the most 
affected by crime news (Liska and Baccaglini, 1990). In other words, the more likely 
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someone feel to be victimized the higher level of fear they have by being exposed to 
crime news. 
Responses to risk perception take many forms, from physiological reactions 
such as irritability, anxiety and sleep problems (Kazantis N., 2009), to behavioral, like 
avoiding stressful situations, actions or objects deemed risky. Consumer reaction to an 
increase in risk perception of food products is analyzed by C. G. Turvey, et el. (2009) 
in a national survey about food safety regarding the first Mad Cow case in the U.S. 
They find that some of the factors that affect beef consumption in the U.S., although in 
a small degree, are voluntariness, control, dread and knowledge.   C. G. Turvey reports 
that in general consumers do not perceive the risk as high, and only 15% of them 
indicate a decrease in consumption.  However, this drop in consumption lasted about 
six months.  The high level of trust from consumers to farmers, government and food 
processors and retailers is attributable for this low effect on risk perception and 
decrease in consumption. In a latter paper, C. G. Turvey et al. (2010) examines the 
relationship between risk perception and the economic consequences of a biosecurity 
threat in the U.S. food system.  Using cluster analysis and dividing consumers into 
three groups: optimist, cautious and fearful, they find that fearful consumers reduce 
their food purchases more than the optimist. Time taken before consumption is 
resumed increases with the level of fear, showing hysteresis in fear perception.  
From the producer side, Rockmore (2011) studies farmers’ behavior in post-
conflict areas in northern Uganda. Using a national household data set, he shows that 
farmers switch production to lower expected return activities; thereby, lowering per 
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capita household expenditure by up to 6 percent.  In this study, risk accounts for more 
economic losses than direct exposure to violence. 
The study presented in this paper is conducted in a conflict area in Mexico 
where drug related violence is a recent phenomenon. High violence level due to the 
drug war started in 2006, and since then it has spread in many parts of the country. 
Although some areas are safe from the violence, the estimated percentage of families 
with more than one victim of crime in Mexico is 14% in 2009, while in Mexico City 
that number is as high as 28% (ICESI, 2009). The official number of kidnappings in 
Mexico rose from 595 in 2006 to 1,220 in 2010; however, it is estimated that about 
20% of victims report the crime to authorities.  
Fear of crime affect daily urban behavior even in those who are not victims of 
crime. In national surveys done by the ICESI, in 2009 22% reported that crime has 
affected their quality of life, up from 14% in 2008. Most of the changes in behavior 
reported by the survey are that people stopped using jewelry, didn’t allow their 
children to go out of home, didn’t go out at night and stop carrying cash (ICESI, 
2009). 
The level of violence in the area of study has increased substantially in recent 
years. Near our area of study, in the limits between Tamaulipas and Veracruz States, 
the violence between two rival cartels reached new levels as 10 decapitated bodies 
where left on a road; two days later 13 more bodies appeared again (Proceso, 
December 31, 2012). Large number of families from nearby Tampico and other 
medium sized cities has migrated to cities safe from drug related crime (kidnapping, 
extortion), and many more have migrated to the south part of Texas. This kind of 
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migration is done by higher income families benefiting greatly the host cities (Durin, 
2012) at the cost of reducing economic activity in the hometowns. 
 
Methodology 
The methodology used in this study is based in a survey previously mentioned 
in Chapter 2. I will discuss it again for clarity in the context of this study. Between 
September 13
th
  and 26
th
 of 2011 we interviewed 370 small farmers in the eastern part 
of the state of San Luis Potosi (SLP), in a region of about 600 Km
2 
near the border 
with the states of Veracruz and Tamaulipas. The population of the counties of Ebano 
and Tamuin, where our survey was conducted is about 41,000 and 38,000 respectively 
(INEGI).  We sampled from 5 different rural population centers near the city of 
Ebano, SLP. In each population center we interview people from different ejidos, or 
communes. The population centers differ in size, being the largest one about 6,000 
people and the smallest one about 3,000. A marketing cooperative in Ebano called 
Interagro de las Huastecas, S.A. de C.V. provided much of the logistic support for our 
research. They helped us in selecting a representative sample from all the communities 
in the region and establish a daily route. We hired eight local college students as 
enumerators for the survey, and train them by pilot testing the survey in our first day 
of fieldwork; however, we didn’t include those surveys in our results.  
Every day we would visit one community, and in the case of the larger 
communities we would repeat the visit at most four times. The way we recruited the 
participants for the survey was either talking to different ejidos’ leaders and let them 
spread the news, or through loudspeakers announcing the request of farmers to 
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participate in a survey for a university. Announcing daily events through loudspeakers 
is a common practice used in all the communities we visited and in many rural 
communities in Mexico. Also, much of the information is transmitted through word of 
mouth. Ejido’s leaders are in charge or passing the information to its members. In the 
communities there are no phone lines, although many have cellular phones, and the 
mail service is not used as a communication device.  The methods we employed to 
reach to people are the ones they are familiar with. For completing the survey we 
offered $100 pesos to participants, which is equivalent to more than an average day’s 
wage.  
We acknowledge the selection bias that both recruiting methods may have; 
however, we made every effort to correct for it. For instance, we sampled from 
different areas of the communities, and tried to include farmers from all ejidos.  We 
knew from the local marketing association the total number of farmers in the region 
belonging to ejidos, the number of ejidos and the size of each population center. Based 
on this information, we selected our communities and ejidos as to have a balanced 
sample. 
The survey was roughly divided into two parts: the first part asked about basic 
demographic and economic questions and the second part were question regarding 
their perception on insecurity and fear from the drug violence. The survey consisted of 
162 questions that took on average 45 minutes to complete. The questions were read 
and the answers written by the enumerators in order to eliminate any ambiguity. 
Although participants were told that they do not need to answer any question that they 
consider inappropriate, all of them answered every question.  
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Since most of the farmers interviewed belong to an ejido, they all have roughly 
the same amount of land, 10 Ha. The age ranged from 18 to 87, being 18 the legal age 
in Mexico.  75% are married, and only 8% single, but 92% have children. 86% of the 
respondents were male and 14% female. Most of their economic activity is planting 
sorghum, corn or soybeans. Almost every respondent is aware of the government’s 
war on drugs, 85% responded that they are aware of it, 7% said no and 8% were not 
sure about it. When asked to rate the change in crime in their community from the 
previous year, 62% said that the crime has increased.  
 
Cluster Variables Explained 
We want to evaluate the perception of fear given demographic characteristics 
as well as the resulting actions and intentions in response to risk. Given the 
multidimensionality of Slovic’s psychometric measure of risk, we opt to do a two-step 
cluster analysis to provide a natural grouping according to the multiple factors of risk 
using SPSS. For the creation of clusters, we used a set of 17 questions derived from 
Slovic but adapted to the local environment; they were answered using a five-point 
Linkert scale. These questions reveal the degree of dread people have given various 
situations, they also measure the degree of familiarity to the risk, control over the risk, 
magnitude and length of the disaster.   
 The clusters and their defining variables are shown in table 6.1. The main 
characteristics of each cluster are the following; Group 1 shows to have no control in 
case the risk is present, but feels is preventable, is unfamiliar to the risk, doesn’t trusts 
authorities, doesn’t feel personally at risk, but feels the risk is catastrophic but short 
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lived; Group 2 feels in control in case risk is present, can prevent the risk, doesn’t feel 
the risk is catastrophic, is unfamiliar to the risk, and doesn’t feel personally at risk; 
Group 3 has the highest level of fear, doesn’t trust authorities, is unfamiliar to the risk, 
feels the risk is increasing catastrophic and cannot be controlled; Group 4 feels 
personally at risk, doesn’t feel it is catastrophic but feels it can last a long time, lacks 
risk prevention, but feels it can be controlled once the risk is present, and trusts 
authorities.  
We label Group 1 as cautious, Group 2 as confident, Group 3 as fearful, and 
Group 4 as optimistic. The values in Table 1 are the OLS regression coefficients along 
with their p-value. The significance level at .15, .10 and .05 are denoted by one, two 
and three stars respectively. The cautious group for instance, has a significant positive 
value to the statement “Random shooting can kill many people” meaning that they 
strongly believe the statement; Confident, on the other hand, are unlikely to feel this 
way. Optimistic also feels that a catastrophic event is unlikely. Fearful are more likely 
to respond positive to the statement “If stopped by narcos, I’ll die”, and to “The risk of 
getting kidnap / robbed is increasing”. Similarly, confident and fearful respond 
negative to the statement that “risk of getting robbed can be reduced”. Confident are 
likely to feel that the risk of getting kidnapped or robbed is decreasing but they also 
feel that they cannot do anything to reduce that risk. 
Group 1 is the largest of the clusters with 111 members (30%), followed by 
group 4 with 100 (27%), group 3 with 83 (22%), and finally group 2 with 76 elements 
(21%) from a total of 370 observations. 
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In our survey, apart from the questions that designate each of the four clusters, 
we also have questions that elucidate people’s perception about crime in their 
community and roads, that estimate the likelihood of being victimized, and questions 
that elucidate their level of fear of being victimized by different crimes. Since these 
questions require answers for several related parts, and to simplify the information that 
these questions provide, we created three clusters for each of them. That is, we have 
three clusters that describe the following: violence level, probability of being 
victimized in the next 12 months, and fear of being victimized in the next 12 months. 
The values of these clusters represent the value of each variable: 1 being low value, 2 
middle, and 3 high value.  The resulting clusters are named: FearLevel, 
ViolenceLevel, and ProbCrime. Each of these names is followed by the suffixes G1, 
G2 and G3 that indicates the value being low, middle, and high. Therefore, the 
variable FearLevelG1 is the group that has the lowest fear of being victimized in the 
next 12 months, and FearLevelG3 has the highest fear. These questions are also on a 
five-level Linkert scale. An example of a ProbCrime question is the following: Do you 
feel that you or your family can be victim of the following crimes in the next twelve 
months? Respondents have to answer for each of six different crimes (carjack, theft, 
extortion, kidnap, homicide, assault) their likelihood ranging from 1 to 5: from not 
likely at all, to extremely likely. FearCrime questions are of the same nature. How 
much do you dread being a victim of the following crimes in the next twelve months? 
is an example of FearCrime questions. Again, respondents are asked to answer their 
fear of crime for the six crimes mentioned earlier in the same Likert scale. 
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Table 6.1. Regression of groups on their determining variables. 
 Group1 p Group2 p Group3 p Group4 p 
If stopped by narcos, 
I'll die 
-0.0114 
 
(0.460) -0.0296*** 
 
(0.021) 0.0303*** 
 
(0.003) 0.0106 
 
(0.358) 
I prevent being killed 
by narcos 
-0.00122 
 
(0.925) 0.0305*** 
 
(0.005) -0.00754 
 
(0.385) -0.0217*** 
 
(0.028) 
         
If extorted, can sell 
assets and leave 
-0.0301*** 
 
(0.017) 0.0163* 
 
(0.117) -0.0119 
 
(0.153) 0.0257*** 
 
(0.007) 
         
Random shooting 
can kill many people 
0.107*** 
 
(0.004) -0.0592** 
 
(0.055) 0.00978 
 
(0.691) -0.0571*** 
 
(0.041) 
         
Living under violence 
is new to me 
-0.0852*** 
 
(0.000) 0.0274* 
 
(0.138) 0.0432*** 
 
(0.004) 0.0146 
 
(0.381) 
         
The Army knows 
where narcos are 
-0.0344*** 
 
(0.026) 0.00401 
 
(0.753) 0.00791 
 
(0.438) 0.0225** 
 
(0.052) 
         
I know the modus 
operandi of narcos 
-0.0634** 
 
(0.077) 0.0659*** 
 
(0.027) 0.000112 
 
(0.996) -0.00268 
 
(0.920) 
         
Narcos' crimes can 
be controlled 
0.0190 
 
(0.232) 0.00474 
 
(0.720) -0.0504*** 
 
(0.000) 0.0266*** 
 
(0.026) 
         
Criminals in my 
region can put in 
danger fut. 
generations 
-0.100*** 
 
(0.001) 0.00746 
 
(0.764) 0.0533*** 
 
(0.008) 0.0397** 
 
(0.078) 
         
I'm at risk because I 
work in the field 
-0.0485*** 
 
(0.019) 0.00885 
 
(0.606) 0.0400*** 
 
(0.004) -0.000388 
 
(0.980) 
         
I'm at risk because I 
transit on the roads 
-0.0493*** 
 
(0.047) -0.0232 
 
(0.259) 0.0122 
 
(0.457) 0.0604*** 
 
(0.001) 
         
The presence of 
narcos can cause a 
Nat. catastrophe 
0.0297* 
 
(0.112) -0.0143 
 
(0.355) -0.0109 
 
(0.377) -0.00445 
 
(0.750) 
         
The Army can react 
quickly to narcos' 
crimes 
-0.0490*** 
 
(0.004) 0.0146 
 
(0.302) -0.00763 
 
(0.501) 0.0420*** 
 
(0.001) 
         
The risk of getting 
kidnap is increasing 
-0.0476** 
 
(0.095) -0.0422** 
 
(0.075) 0.0520*** 
 
(0.006) 0.0378** 
 
(0.078) 
         
The risk of getting 
kidnap can be 
reduced 
0.0346 
 
(0.180) -0.0296 
 
(0.167) -0.0787*** 
 
(0.000) 0.0737*** 
 
(0.000) 
         
The risk of getting 
robbed is increasing 
0.0767*** 
 
(0.008) -0.104*** 
 
(0.000) 0.0313** 
 
(0.100) -0.00349 
 
(0.871) 
         
The risk of getting 
robbed can be 
reduced 
0.0171 
 
(0.504) -0.0398** 
 
(0.062) -0.0713*** 
 
(0.000) 0.0939*** 
 
(0.000) 
         
I can minimize the 
risk of being a crime 
victim 
0.0313*** 
 
(0.014) -0.0168* 
 
(0.110) 0.00685 
 
(0.414) -0.0214*** 
 
(0.025) 
Constant 0.934*** 
 
(0.000) 1.146*** 
 
(0.000) -0.232** 
 
(0.094) -0.848*** 
 
(0.000) 
Log Lik. -162.8  -93.94  -10.90  -56.46  
         
p-values in parentheses. * p<0.15, ** p<0.10, *** p<0.05 
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The fear level clusters are distributed as follows, FearLevelG1 has 170 
members, or 46% of the total; FearLevelG2 and G3 have 109 and 91 respectively, 
about 29 and 25%. Violence level groups have similar distribution than fear level 
group, ViolenceLevelG1 has 173, ViolenceLevelG2 134 and ViolenceLevelG3 61; 
these numbers represent 47, 36 and 16% of the total.  The probability cluster however, 
has a very large density in the low values. ProbCrimeG1 has 215 members; 
ProbCrimeG2, 113, and ProbCrimeG3, 42; or 58, 30 and 11%. These numbers show 
that in general, farmers that overly concern about crimes in their community 
correspond to a small fraction. This number is even smaller when estimating 
probabilities of victimization.  
 
Testing for Ecological Psychology System and Dual Process Theory 
Following the conditions for a system to be considered of the ecological form, 
we prepare the analysis in this study in a way as to comply and test those conditions. 
Also, following the Dual Process Theory, we examine the mechanisms in which 
objective assessments of risk and emotional responses to risk affect actions. 
Testing the existence of an ecological system as defined by the ecological 
psychology theory in the context of this study require us to look at figure 1 and define 
under our context the mechanism to meet their conditions. We have already discussed 
the meaning of affordances under our context, a condition of the ecological system, 
and feel that the subjects of our study perceive and provide affordances; we are left to 
the task of meeting the condition of impredicativeness, which for our system means 
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that each subject in the field understands that others perceive their affordances, that is, 
each being in the system affects and is affected by other’s affordances. In our study we 
have two main groups of people: farmers and narcos. Testing if they both live in the 
same ecological system means that they are aware of each other’s existence, that the 
actions of one group affect the other group and vice versa. In figure 6.1 this 
relationship is the broken arrow going from actions to stimuli (which are the actions of 
the narcos). That is, the actions taken by the farmers affect the actions taken by the 
narcos. The method to test this relationship is by means of an endogeneity test of the 
stimuli variable. Our results show indication of endogeneity and thus the circle of 
causality in the ecological system is closed.  
Stimuli affect risk perceptions, but people perceive risk differently despite 
observing the same stimuli. How people react to stimuli is done through the 
classification of farmers according to their fear level using the cluster analysis 
previously mentioned. We believe that each group reacts different to the stimuli. This 
is the lower left corner of the triangle in figure 6.1. The actions taken depending on the 
group classification is the arrow connecting the lower left and right corners of figure 
6.1. The feedback between action and risk perception, group membership, is also 
tested in the Hausman test for endogeneity. 
A Similar approach follows for the analysis of the Dual Process System. Group 
membership broadly categorizes people into four groups according to their fear level 
and familiarity to risk. These categories represent the degree of risk perception. Using 
responses from the survey on probability of being victimized within the next 12 
months, we created interaction terms for each group. These interaction variables 
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measure the random effect of the probability assessment of victimization for each 
group. This is justified because each group has different fear measures, then each 
group is expected to react differently on actions taken according to their probability of 
victimization. For instance, we would expect that a person who believes he has a high 
probability of being victimized would react differently depending if he is in the fearful 
of confident group. This interaction term provides the deliberative effect on the Dual 
Process.  
Similar measures of group interaction and fear level are created. In this case, 
these interaction terms measure the effect of emotions on actions. Again, a person who 
is very afraid would react differently depending on his group. Within each group there 
are people with different levels of fear and probability of victimization. 
 
Results 
 Table 6.2 shows the results of logit regression for each of the four clusters 
with respect to demographic, economic and psychometric variables.  These clusters 
are defined only on the basis of the risk perception psychometric variables by Slovic. 
The numbers indicate the likelihood that someone belongs in any group given a value 
of a variable. A positive coefficient means that the effect of a variable to the likelihood 
of being in that group is positive. Looking at the column of Group 3, or fearful, we 
find a positive and significant coefficient for the variable sex (b= 1.27, p=0.008). The 
value is coded 0 for male and 1 for female.   Women are more likely to be in this 
group than men. This is consistent to the literature on risk perception and gender.  
Similarly, age is negative and significant (b= -0.035, p= 0.081); the older the person, 
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the less likely they belong in the fearful group. Education has a similar effect than age 
(b= -0.303, p= 0.049); the more educated, the less fearful. These results are also in 
accordance to previous research. However, the effect of total assets is small but 
positive and significant (b= 8.28*10
-7
, p= 0.046) for fearful. In the other groups this 
variable is not significant. Everything else equal, the more assets you have the more 
likely you be in the fearful group. A possible explanation is that people feel to be a 
target of crime if they have more wealth. Continuing on the fearful group, and on the 
questions on how they believe they are perceived by the community; being perceived 
as socially active has a negative and significant value (b= -1.035, p= 0.001), similarly 
for the confident group (b= -0.893, p= 0.001). The optimistic group has a positive 
value for this variable (b= 1.853, p= 0.000). Suggesting that the more socially active 
are less afraid.  With a significance level of 12 percent, being perceived as influential 
also has a negative effect on the fearful group (b= -0.530, p= 0.121); confident has a 
positive and significant value for this variable (b= 0.693, p= 0.008). The cluster 
variable FearLevelG3 has a positive effect on fearful (b= 1.529, p= 0.045) and 
optimist (b= 1.255, p= 0.047) and a negative on cautious (b= -1.793, p= 0.018) and 
confident (b= -0.970, p= 0.193). The reference value for FearLevel is group 1, or the 
lowest level of fear.  The sign of the ViolenceLevelG3 variable is negative for both 
fearful (b= -1.260, p= 0.058) and optimist (b= -1.392, p= 0.018) and positive for 
cautious (b= 2.163, p= 0.000). This variable is a rating people give to the violence 
level in their community and roads. People who rate the level of violence higher, are 
more likely to be cautious than fearful or optimistic. Optimistic on the other hand, is 
the only group that has significant positive coefficient on concern about crime on 
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roads (b= 0.758, p= 0.006), and negative coefficient in concern about crime in their 
community (b= -0.697, p= 0.004).  
Trust variables have significant values for fearful (b= -0.327, p= 0.102), 
cautious (b= -0.328, p=0.109) and optimist (b= 0.350, p= 0.062).  This is trust in 
army/navy, and not trust on local police. Here the less confident you are about the 
army/navy, the more likely you are in the fearful and cautious groups.   
Knowing a victim of crime has also a significant effect in fearful (b= 0.965, p= 
0.009) and cautious (b= -1.204, p= 0.017).  This variable measures the closeness to 
crime. People who have never experience crime, nor heard about it through a friend, 
are less likely to be afraid. Likewise, the closer you are to crime, the more real the 
violence would seem, and hence the more afraid you would be.  
Religion plays a role in relieving fear. Attending religious celebrations more 
often has a negative effect in being fearful (b= -0.139, p= 0.110) and a positive effect 
on being optimistic (b= 0.113, p= 0.055). To measure religiosity we use two variables, 
one describes the person as being a religious person, it is self-evaluating and 
subjective. The other variable is more objective since it asks the number of religious 
celebrations attended per month on average. This is regardless of religious 
denomination. For denomination, we have a variable for catholic and non-catholic.  In 
our sample, 82% of the total is catholic. This is not surprising given that it is the main 
religion in Mexico.  The results indicate that the more religious a person is, measured 
in celebrations attended on average per month, the less fearful they are. This group 
also shows not to trust authorities and that risk cannot be controlled. Optimistic do 
trust authorities and have a sense of control of risk.  
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The variable Risk Taking Production, measures the willingness to adopt new 
production technologies based on three questions: Are you willing to accept greater 
production risks to increase the chance of higher profits?, Are you willing to take risks 
with new technologies before you see good results in other farms?, and Are you 
willing to take risks with new management practices before I see good results in other 
farms? Cautious have a significant negative coefficient on this variable (b= -2.099, p= 
0.000), while optimistic is more willing to take risk (b= 1.864, p= 0.000). 
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Table 6.2.Logit regression of group clusters. 
 Group1 p Group2 p Group3 p Group4 p 
         
Sex -0.618 
 
(0.216) 0.0639 
 
(0.890) 1.273*** 
 
(0.008) -0.834* 
 
(0.135) 
Age 0.0273** 
 
(0.097) -0.00705 
 
(0.669) -0.0353** 
 
(0.081) 0.0121 
 
(0.467) 
Number of 
children 
-0.0223 
 
(0.709) -0.00816 
 
(0.893) 0.0292 
 
(0.714) 0.0132 
 
(0.822) 
Education 0.200* 
 
(0.123) -0.0317 
 
(0.795) -0.303*** 
 
(0.049) -0.0272 
 
(0.828) 
Size of group of 
friends 
-0.0121 
 
(0.409) 0.0251*** 
 
(0.005) -0.0122 
 
(0.231) -0.0113 
 
(0.445) 
Farm size -0.00115 
 
(0.977) -0.00138 
 
(0.972) -0.00721 
 
(0.849) -0.00643 
 
(0.845) 
Revenues from 
farming 
1.74e-06 
 
(0.825) -2.96e-06 
 
(0.630) 7.77e-06 
 
(0.254) -8.95e-06 
 
(0.321) 
Total revenue 
from all sources 
-4.13e-06 
 
(0.612) 3.14e-06 
 
(0.640) -8.35e-06 
 
(0.299) 1.15e-05 
 
(0.190) 
Amount of 
savings 
-3.34e-05* 
 
(0.125) 2.16e-06 
 
(0.877) 1.64e-05 
 
(0.352) 1.85e-05 
 
(0.236) 
Total asset value -4.69e-07 
 
(0.421) -3.00e-07 
 
(0.527) 8.28e-07*** 
 
(0.046) -3.63e-07 
 
(0.330) 
Risk perception 
of own family wrt 
others 
0.114 
 
(0.682) 0.0362 
 
(0.884) 0.227 
 
(0.477) -0.183 
 
(0.536) 
Believe own 
family is seen as 
asset rich 
0.152 
 
(0.643) 0.127 
 
(0.694) 0.429 
 
(0.291) -0.241 
 
(0.472) 
seen as 
vulnerable 
0.352 
 
(0.230) -0.717*** 
 
(0.009) 0.0159 
 
(0.959) 0.0548 
 
(0.854) 
seen as socially 
active 
0.146 
 
(0.627) -0.893*** 
 
(0.001) -1.035*** 
 
(0.001) 1.853*** 
 
(0.000) 
seen as cash rich -0.113 
 
(0.687) 0.499** 
 
(0.074) -0.0206 
 
(0.959) -0.200 
 
(0.512) 
seen as 
influential 
0.161 
 
(0.553) 0.693*** 
 
(0.008) -0.530* 
 
(0.121) -0.327 
 
(0.230) 
FearLevelG2 0.204 
 
(0.647) -0.351 
 
(0.423) 0.665 
 
(0.232) 0.300 
 
(0.501) 
FearLevelG3 -1.793*** 
 
(0.018) -0.970 
 
(0.193) 1.529*** 
 
(0.045) 1.255*** 
 
(0.047) 
ViolenceLevelG2 1.682*** 
 
(0.000) -0.0260 
 
(0.949) -1.266*** 
 
(0.011) -0.680* 
 
(0.137) 
ViolenceLevelG3 2.163*** 
 
(0.000) -0.739 
 
(0.176) -1.260** 
 
(0.058) -1.392*** 
 
(0.018) 
ProbCrimeG2 -0.148 
 
(0.756) -0.179 
 
(0.708) 0.541 
 
(0.299) 0.0399 
 
(0.927) 
ProbCrimeG3 -1.702 
 
(0.223) 1.544* 
 
(0.130) 0.645 
 
(0.481) -0.864 
 
(0.389) 
Concerned about 
crime in your 
community 
0.167 
 
(0.484) 0.185 
 
(0.418) 0.0966 
 
(0.744) -0.697*** 
 
(0.004) 
Concerned about 
crime on roads 
-0.319 
 
(0.222) -0.238 
 
(0.364) -0.187 
 
(0.613) 0.758*** 
 
(0.006) 
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 Group1 p Group2 p Group3 p Group4 p 
         
Feel crime in your community has 
increased from last year 
-0.0672 
 
(0.774) -0.579*** 
 
(0.010) 0.554** 
 
(0.061) 0.401** 
 
(0.076) 
Feel road crime has increased 
from last year 
-0.275 
 
(0.254) 0.0862 
 
(0.690) -0.0445 
 
(0.878) 0.157 
 
(0.491) 
Confidence in local police 0.676*** 
 
(0.002) -0.421** 
 
(0.063) -0.377 
 
(0.159) 0.0275 
 
(0.898) 
Confidence in army/navy -0.328* 
 
(0.109) 0.234 
 
(0.242) -0.327* 
 
(0.102) 0.350** 
 
(0.062) 
Know victim of violent crime -1.204*** 
 
(0.017) -0.509 
 
(0.267) 0.965*** 
 
(0.009) 0.256 
 
(0.463) 
Risk Taking Production -2.099*** 
 
(0.000) -0.206 
 
(0.550) 0.329 
 
(0.437) 1.864*** 
 
(0.000) 
Know anybody who moved to a 
safer town 
0.647 
 
(0.167) 0.729** 
 
(0.082) 0.0318 
 
(0.949) -1.122*** 
 
(0.017) 
Considered religious person 0.0671 
 
(0.637) -0.252** 
 
(0.056) 0.0187 
 
(0.905) 0.298*** 
 
(0.049) 
         
Religious celebrations per month -0.0528 
 
(0.447) 0.0620 
 
(0.301) -0.139* 
 
(0.110) 0.113** 
 
(0.055) 
Catholic -0.284 
 
(0.490) 0.675* 
 
(0.136) 0.137 
 
(0.802) -0.104 
 
(0.818) 
Constant -2.571 
 
(0.187) 2.645 
 
(0.158) 3.022 
 
(0.221) -10.69*** 
 
(0.000) 
Log Lik. -139.8  -151.2  -111.5  -138.7  
Chi-squared 162.1  71.11  168.4  149.3  
p-values in parentheses. * p<0.15, ** p<0.10, *** p<0.05 
 
From the results it seems that income, number of children and farm size has no 
effect in determining group inclusion. 
Since we want to see any effect that narco violence may have on production 
and rural life in this geographic area, we need to proceed to evaluate different actions 
taken, and intentions considered by farmers due to the violence level.  After generating 
the four distinct clusters based on some psychometric values, the effect that belonging 
to each cluster has on action and intentions is to be analyzed.  This is akin to the 
relationship of the graph in figure 6.1, which comes from the ecological psychology 
framework. We want to analyze violence and its effects on rural life from the 
perspective of ecological psychology. For this we have to follow the line of thought 
synthesized in figure 6.1. On top of the triangle we have the stimuli, in this case are 
the violent actions or fear generating actions of the narcos in the community.  The 
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stimuli are observed and perceived, based on these perceptions we created the four 
different group categories previously described, and based on our perception of the 
stimuli (group membership) we act or create intentions.  These acts and intentions at 
the same time alter our perception. This means that after we act or create an intention, 
our perception can be altered directly, by not changing the stimuli; or indirectly, if our 
actions can alter the stimuli. In other words, our actions and intentions are endogenous 
to our perception 
Following our analysis, we regressed actions and intentions on the dependent 
variables from the previous regression. Table 6.3 shows these results. The next step is 
to include as dependent variables three of the four clusters as dummy variables, and 
repeat the regression using a three-stage least square to correct for endogeneity caused 
by group membership, and testing using Hausman Test.  
In our survey, we asked four questions that indicate actions taken and intention 
of actions of farmers. These questions are: Have you considered moving to another 
town because of the risk of being victimized?, Have you changed your production 
decisions because of the risk of violence?, Have you changed your daily activities 
because of violence?, and If the current level of violence continues, would you change 
your production decisions? 
 
.
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Table 6.3. Regression of actions without group cluster variables. 
 Considered 
Moving 
p Changed 
Prod. 
Decision 
p Changed 
Daily 
Activities 
p Would 
Change 
Prod. 
Decision 
p 
Sex -0.0155 
 
(0.888) -0.0618* 
 
(0.132) 0.0185 
 
(0.729) 0.00427 
 
(0.952) 
Age 0.00264 
 
(0.485) 0.00362*** 
 
(0.011) 0.00187 
 
(0.310) 0.00282 
 
(0.249) 
Number of 
children 
-0.0115 
 
(0.414) -0.00621 
 
(0.239) -0.0112* 
 
(0.105) -0.00991 
 
(0.278) 
Education 0.0277 
 
(0.335) 0.0111 
 
(0.301) -0.00258 
 
(0.854) 0.0373*** 
 
(0.046) 
Size of group of 
friends 
0.00513*** 
 
(0.034) 0.00389*** 
 
(0.000) 0.00131 
 
(0.268) 0.000198 
 
(0.900) 
Farm size 0.0181*** 
 
(0.023) 0.00533** 
 
(0.073) 0.00629* 
 
(0.105) 0.00267 
 
(0.603) 
Revenues from 
farming 
4.60e-08 
 
(0.976) 5.50e-07 
 
(0.343) 8.68e-07 
 
(0.252) 1.05e-06 
 
(0.297) 
Total revenue 
from all sources 
-4.12e-07 
 
(0.809) -2.07e-07 
 
(0.745) -1.14e-07 
 
(0.891) -1.33e-06 
 
(0.230) 
Amount of 
savings 
-3.87e-06 
 
(0.303) -1.82e-06 
 
(0.196) -4.16e-
06*** 
 
(0.024) -2.90e-07 
 
(0.905) 
Total asset value 8.35e-09 
 
(0.930) 1.70e-09 
 
(0.962) -5.61e-08 
 
(0.225) -1.08e-08 
 
(0.859) 
Risk perception of 
own family wrt 
others 
0.230*** 
 
(0.000) 0.0313 
 
(0.174) -0.0260 
 
(0.386) 0.00494 
 
(0.901) 
Believe own 
family is seen as 
asset rich 
-0.118* 
 
(0.115) 0.0295 
 
(0.290) 0.0284 
 
(0.434) 0.0253 
 
(0.599) 
seen as 
vulnerable 
-0.108** 
 
(0.072) -0.0431** 
 
(0.055) -0.0189 
 
(0.517) -0.0622* 
 
(0.110) 
seen as socially 
active 
0.157*** 
 
(0.008) 0.0563*** 
 
(0.011) 0.0325 
 
(0.258) 0.164*** 
 
(0.000) 
seen as cash rich 0.0387 
 
(0.578) 0.0100 
 
(0.700) -0.00558 
 
(0.869) 0.0700* 
 
(0.120) 
seen as influential 0.0303 
 
(0.634) -0.00420 
 
(0.860) 0.0525** 
 
(0.092) 0.0112 
 
(0.787) 
FearLevelG2 -0.0285 
 
(0.792) 0.00122 
 
(0.976) 0.0847* 
 
(0.110) 0.237*** 
 
(0.001) 
FearLevelG3 0.184 
 
(0.232) 0.151*** 
 
(0.009) 0.112* 
 
(0.137) 0.342*** 
 
(0.001) 
ViolenceLevelG2 0.0353 
 
(0.740) 0.0205 
 
(0.607) 0.0164 
 
(0.753) -0.0398 
 
(0.564) 
ViolenceLevelG3 0.0801 
 
(0.543) -0.00498 
 
(0.920) -0.0540 
 
(0.401) -0.142** 
 
(0.096) 
ProbCrimeG2 0.0830 
 
(0.453) 0.0340 
 
(0.411) 0.106*** 
 
(0.050) -0.158*** 
 
(0.028) 
ProbCrimeG3 -0.0252 
 
(0.905) 0.0291 
 
(0.713) 0.117 
 
(0.258) -0.0525 
 
(0.702) 
Concerned about 
crime in your 
community 
-0.0298 
 
(0.590) -0.0125 
 
(0.547) 0.00247 
 
(0.927) -0.000118 
 
(0.997) 
Concerned about 
crime on roads 
0.0699 
 
(0.283) -0.00842 
 
(0.729) 0.00241 
 
(0.940) 0.0535 
 
(0.205) 
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 Considered 
Moving 
p Changed 
Prod. 
Decision 
p Changed 
Daily 
Activities 
p Would 
Change 
Prod. 
Decision 
p 
Feel crime in your 
community has 
increased from 
last year 
-0.00610 
 
(0.910) -0.000561 
 
(0.978) 0.0134 
 
(0.612) 0.0157 
 
(0.654) 
Feel road crime 
has incr. from last 
year 
-0.00876 
 
(0.873) 0.00308 
 
(0.881) -0.00631 
 
(0.814) -0.00704 
 
(0.843) 
Confidence in 
local police 
0.0289 
 
(0.560) -0.0326** 
 
(0.079) 0.0125 
 
(0.605) -0.0434 
 
(0.176) 
Confidence in 
army/navy 
0.0397 
 
(0.351) 0.00208 
 
(0.896) -0.00160 
 
(0.939) 0.0404* 
 
(0.144) 
Know victim of 
violent crime 
-0.0710 
 
(0.414) 0.0548** 
 
(0.092) 0.0886*** 
 
(0.037) 0.00636 
 
(0.910) 
Risk Taking 
Production 
-0.160** 
 
(0.056) -0.0164 
 
(0.599) -0.0451 
 
(0.269) 0.0671 
 
(0.216) 
Know anybody 
who moved to a 
safer town 
0.267*** 
 
(0.009) 0.0835*** 
 
(0.030) 0.162*** 
 
(0.001) 0.0559 
 
(0.399) 
Considered 
religious person 
0.0189 
 
(0.545) 0.0109 
 
(0.351) -0.00120 
 
(0.937) -0.0258 
 
(0.202) 
Religious 
celebrations per 
month 
0.00125 
 
(0.932) -0.00121 
 
(0.824) 0.00249 
 
(0.726) -0.00150 
 
(0.873) 
Catholic -0.0625 
 
(0.537) -0.0507 
 
(0.181) 0.0151 
 
(0.759) 0.0340 
 
(0.604) 
Constant -0.130 
 
(0.771) -0.351*** 
 
(0.036) -0.285 
 
(0.192) -0.709*** 
 
(0.015) 
Log Lik. -350.3  8.683  -88.52  -191.8  
p-values in parentheses. * p<0.15, ** p<0.10, *** p<0.05 
 
Looking at table 6.3, men are more likely to have changed production 
decisions than women (b= -0.0618, p= 0.132). Perhaps this reflects the roles of 
genders in the family. Older people are more likely to have changed production due to 
the risk of violence (b= 0.0036, p= 0.011). Education plays a role when considering 
changing production practices in the future if violence continues to the current level 
(b= 0.0373, p=0.046). More educated people would consider changing production 
practices. The size of group of friends has a positive effect in having considered 
moving (b= 0.0051, p= 0.034), and in people who changed production practices (b= 
0.0038, p= 0.000). Changes in our lives apparently are easier the more friends we 
have. Unlike the previous regression, here farm size has a positive and significant 
effect in having changed production decisions (b= 0.0053, p= 0.073), in having 
 227 
 
considered moving (b= 0.0181, p= 0.023), and in having changed daily activities (b= 
0.0062, p= 0.105). Income and asset value has no impact on actions and intentions. 
Social life also plays an important part in taking actions. It is significant for all actions 
except for having changed daily activity: considered moving (b= 0.157, p= 0.008), 
changed production decisions (b= 0.0563, p= 0.011), would change production 
decision if violence continues (b= 0.164, p=0.000). This may be related to the amount 
of support that we get through friends, like the size of group of friends, makes difficult 
decision-taking easier. Fear level is an important drive for changes in activities and 
intentions. Knowing someone who has moved out of town because of violence is a 
strong factor to take actions. It is significant for three actions at very low p-values: 
considered moving (b= 0.267, p= 0.009), changed production decisions (b= 0.0835, p= 
0.030), changed daily activities (b= 0.162, p=0.001). Like knowing a victim of crime, 
these variables tell us that the risk is real and next to us.  
Three-stage least squares is used because it is a method to solve a system of 
equations simultaneously in which some variables are endogenously determined and 
the error terms among equations are correlated. In the presence of correlation across 
the error terms, OLS estimates are inconsistent. Unlike two-stage least squares, which 
solve the system one equation at a time without considering the covariance structure 
across equations, 3SLS is more efficient when there is correlation among equations’ 
disturbances (P. Kennedy, 2003). After inspecting the covariance matrix of the set of 
equations, we found evidence of cross correlation among equations. For this, it is 
reasonable to use the 3SLS to account for non-diagonal covariance matrix 
. 
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Hausman Test for Endogeneity in the Ecological Psychology System 
To justify the use of a 2SLS or 3SLS model, we need to show that endogeneity 
exists in our set of equations. This can occur is there is simultaneity in our model, for 
instance, if in a system of equations two regressands affect each other. Endogeneity 
can be tested using a Hausman test. In this test, if we have a set of equations with the 
regressands being endogenous to the system, first we need to regress a variable that is 
believed to be endogenous with respect to all exogenous variables. Then using the 
estimated value of that endogenous variable, perform the original regression with both 
the empirical and the estimated value of the endogenous variable as regressors 
including all exogenous variables. If the coefficient of the estimated variable is not 
statistically different from zero, we can say that there is evidence of endogeneity and 
the use of 2 or 3SLS is justified.  
In our model, the original equations are actions dependent on group 
membership and stimuli. 
   
 
 
 
 
To test for endogeneity of  and  we need to regress each endogenous 
variable with respect to the exogenous variables.  
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 and  are the stimuli that farmers perceive in regarding to the violence in 
their community. Specifically, they are the answers to the questions: Do you know 
somebody who has been a victim of violent crime?, and Do you know somebody who 
has moved to another town for fear of being victim of crime? From the 
impredicativeness condition of the ecological system, we test a feedback effect 
between the beings in the environment, farmers and narcos. We need to test if actions 
affect the stimuli which in turn affect risk perception as well. This feedback effect is 
crucial in determining if a given social system comprises an ecological psychology 
system. The vector of independent variables  includes all control and independent 
variables that determine actions taken. This vector should be included in the regression 
of each endogenous variable. 
 to are dummy variables indicating each individual’s group. is used as a 
baseline for comparison, thus it is not included in the equations. These regressions also 
include the vector of independent variables , and another vector  of instruments. 
These instruments are the variables used in determining each cluster (group) of 
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farmers. They are the Slovic variables to measure degree of fear and understanding of 
risks.  
From the previous regressions, we obtain the estimated value of each outcome 
variable  and , and use those estimated variables as regressors as part of the original 
equations. The estimated values  and  become instruments in the original structural 
equation. We use their estimates as well as their original values to run an OLS 
regression. 
 
 
 
 
Once we have estimates of the coefficients for each regressor, we can perform 
a F-test for  . If this hypothesis is rejected, we 
can say that the variables are endogenous; otherwise it is evidence that they are 
exogenous. The resulting p-value of our F-test performed is 0.00 indicating that we 
can treat those variables as endogenous. Rejecting the test provides evidence of 
endogeneity in the system (Gujarati, 2003; Kennedy, 2003). In this case, it means that 
perception in the form of group membership is endogenously determined in the 
system. Rejecting the test complies with the condition of impredicativeness in the 
ecological psychology framework. It provides support of a feedback between action 
and stimuli also.   
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Intentions and Actions in the Dual Process Theory 
The results of the three-stage least squares (3SLS) are presented in tables 6.4 
and 6.5. Table 6.4 shows the result of the regression of actions and intentions with 
respect to group membership and other risk and control variables. Table 6.5 shows the 
results of regressing demographic variables on group membership. The results are 
consistent to the results from table 6.2, using a Logit regression. Since it is not 
included in the 3SLS regression, results for group 2 were estimated separately using 
OLS regression. These results were already commented in table 6.2 and are shown 
here for illustration of the different regressions.  
Results from table 6.4 are used to measure the effect of emotions and rational 
assessment of an event on people’s actions. Using each group as a category to 
individual risk perception, and interaction terms that denote group effects on 
probability assessment of risk, and on emotional reaction to risks, we are able to 
determine the effect for each group of these two mechanisms.   
Other variables used as regressors in table 6.4 are mostly about perception of 
current violence conditions, likelihood of victimization, fear of victimization, trust in 
authorities, how own family is perceived with respect to others in the community, 
knowledge of anybody who has been victimized and on risk taking attitudes toward 
production. Group membership on its own shows significance for some actions and 
intentions in relation to Group 2 (confident). For instance,  fearful (Group 3) are more 
likely to have changed production due to crime (b= 0.765, p=0.112) compared to 
confident. Similarly, cautious (b=0.643, p=0.184) and optimistic (b=0.486, p=0.166) 
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also have positive coefficients but marginally significant. for change production if 
crime continues (b= -0.751, p= 0.116). We exclude Group 2 from the analysis to avoid 
dummy trap, thus the results are in relation to this group. Group 2 was selected since it 
doesn’t show extreme values of fear that the other groups have, results are easier to 
compare when the benchmark is low fear level.  
None of the groups show significance from the first action: have considered 
moving out of town. This means that all of the groups are equally likely to take this 
action. In the second action however, being fearful is negatively significant (b = -
0.691; p=0.004), and in the fourth action/intention being optimistic is also negatively 
significant (b= -0.751; p=0.116). This means that compared to confident, a fearful is 
less likely to have changed production due to crime; and an optimist is also less likely 
to change his production if crime continues.   
Fear level, independent of group membership, plays an important role in 
deciding actions and intentions. Having a high level of fear of becoming a crime 
victim has a positive effect in the likelihood of taking an action/intention to prevent it, 
from changing production practices, to changes in daily life and considering moving to 
another town.  By the same token, if you perceive your family to be more at risk with 
respect to other families in the community, you are more likely to have considered 
moving (b= 0.252, p= 0.00), and to have changed production decisions (b= 0.047, p= 
0.06). 
The variables used to determine the effects of the two systems in the dual 
process are explained next. Under the Dual Process theory the emotional effect 
(system 1) on actions are given by the variables FearLevel Low and FearLevel High, 
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and their interaction for each group. For instance, for group 1 they are G1LowFear, 
G1HighFear, and similarly for the other groups. The deliberative effect (system 2), or 
rational, are given by the variables PLI and PHL which stands for probability of low 
impact crime, and high impact crime, and their corresponding interaction for each 
group. Low impact crimes are theft and physical aggression; high impact crimes are 
kidnapping, extortion and homicide. The marginal effect of the emotional or 
deliberative response on each group is the sum of that variable and their interaction 
term. The effect of each decision process (emotional and deliberative) on action is 
measured by the size of their marginal effect. From these values we can determine 
which decision component dominates each group. The marginal effects are given in 
table 6.6. For clarity, only the marginal effects of high level of fear (system 1) and 
probability of being a victim of a high impact crime in the next 12 months (system 2) 
are presented. For groups 1, 3 and 4, only the p-values of the interaction term are 
reported. 
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Table 6.4.Three-stage least squares regression of actions on groups membership and farmer characteristics. Results are in relation to group 2. 
 Have Considered Moving 
Out of Town 
Changed Production due to 
Crime 
Change Lifestyle due to 
Crime 
Change Production If Crime 
Continues 
 Coefficient p Coefficient p Coefficient      p Coefficient p 
Female -0.000570 (0.996) -0.0446 (0.317) 0.000994 (0.986) -0.0310 (0.651) 
Age 0.00511 (0.195) 0.00280** (0.082) 0.00116 (0.565) 0.00354 (0.152) 
Number of children -0.0145 (0.300) -0.00693 (0.226) -0.0138** (0.054) -0.00927 (0.292) 
Education 0.0511* (0.111) -0.00193 (0.883) -0.0127 (0.439) 0.0405*** (0.044) 
Size of group of friends 0.00385 (0.172) 0.00259*** (0.025) 0.000924 (0.523) -0.00123 (0.486) 
Farm Size 0.0218*** (0.007) 0.00771*** (0.020) 0.00496 (0.232) 0.00524 (0.302) 
Farm Revenue 0.00000138 (0.380) 0.000000480 (0.456) 0.00000066 (0.413) 0.00000105 (0.288) 
Total Revenue  -0.00000193 (0.277) -0.000000743 (0.305) 0.00000014 (0.875) -0.0000019** (0.091) 
Total Savings -0.00000310 (0.431) -0.00000202 (0.209) -0.0000039** (0.054) -0.0000004 (0.858) 
Asset Value 3.44e-08 (0.721) -3.58e-09 (0.927) -6.04e-08 (0.221) -3.45e-08 (0.568) 
Group 1 -2.393*** (0.043) 0.643 (0.184) 0.822 (0.175) -0.102 (0.891) 
Group 3 -0.991 (0.401) 0.765* (0.112) 0.486 (0.421) 0.281 (0.702) 
Group 4 -1.180 (0.172) 0.489 (0.166) 0.197 (0.657) 0.0155 (0.977) 
Pr. Low Impact Crime (PLI) -0.613 (0.181) 0.340** (0.069) 0.199 (0.396) 0.255 (0.373) 
Pr. High Impact Crime (PHI) -0.0599 (0.783) -0.116 (0.191) 0.0485 (0.662) -0.240** (0.077) 
G1 PLI  1.101** (0.085) -0.397* (0.128) -0.359 (0.272) -0.280 (0.483) 
G1 PHI 0.137 (0.609) 0.0997 (0.361) -0.0484 (0.724) 0.264* (0.114) 
G3 PLI 0.581 (0.303) -0.467*** (0.042) -0.257 (0.371) -0.409 (0.244) 
G3 PHI -0.0893 (0.707) 0.133 (0.171) -0.00963 (0.937) 0.297*** (0.046) 
G4 PLI 0.538 (0.276) -0.353** (0.080) -0.0752 (0.766) -0.418 (0.175) 
G4 PHI 0.280 (0.250) 0.132 (0.184) -0.0225 (0.856) 0.333*** (0.029) 
FearLevel Low 0.358 (0.253) -0.173 (0.178) 0.0374 (0.816) 0.0331 (0.866) 
FearLevel High 1.599*** (0.034) -0.0927 (0.763) -0.181 (0.639) 0.461 (0.327) 
G1Low Fear -0.589* (0.138) 0.345*** (0.034) 0.0858 (0.673) 0.0585 (0.814) 
G1High Fear -2.283*** (0.022) 0.0801 (0.844) 0.473 (0.356) -0.137 (0.826) 
G3Low Fear -0.171 (0.646) 0.0814 (0.593) 0.290* (0.129) 0.0213 (0.927) 
G3High Fear -0.902 (0.260) 0.276 (0.400) 0.407 (0.322) -0.260 (0.604) 
G4Low Fear -0.262 (0.479) 0.124 (0.410) -0.0949 (0.616) 0.357* (0.123) 
G4High Fear -1.689*** (0.033) 0.291 (0.367) 0.201 (0.618) -0.122 (0.805) 
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 Have Considered Moving 
Out of Town 
Changed Production due to 
Crime 
Change Lifestyle due to 
Crime 
Change Production If Crime 
Continues 
 Coefficient p Coefficient p Coefficient      p Coefficient p 
Risk perception wrt others 0.191*** (0.006) 0.0343 (0.223) -0.0350 (0.322) -0.00309 (0.943) 
Perc. Family as  Asset Rich -0.146** (0.054) 0.0349 (0.259) 0.0383 (0.325) 0.0187 (0.694) 
Perc. Family as  Vulnerable -0.0866* (0.148) -0.0372* (0.127) -0.00951 (0.756) -0.0268 (0.474) 
Perc. Family as Influential 0.0266 (0.686) -0.000581 (0.983) 0.0424 (0.207) 0.0157 (0.702) 
ViolenceLevel Low 0.133 (0.273) 0.0493 (0.320) 0.0106 (0.864) 0.00460 (0.952) 
ViolenceLevel High 0.151 (0.343) 0.0773 (0.235) -0.0648 (0.427) -0.0772 (0.439) 
Concerned Crime in Town -0.0216 (0.715) -0.0169 (0.484) 0.00849 (0.779) -0.00866 (0.815) 
Concerned Crime on Roads -0.0193 (0.780) -0.0270 (0.338) -0.00567 (0.873) 0.0570 (0.188) 
Feel Crime in Town has Increased 
from Last Year 
-0.00166 (0.980) -0.0388 (0.159) 0.00448 (0.897) 0.00431 (0.919) 
Feel Road Crime has Increased 
from Last Year 
-0.0278 (0.618) -0.00861 (0.705) -0.00701 (0.806) -0.0156 (0.656) 
Confidence in Police 0.0355 (0.500) -0.0177 (0.410) 0.0198 (0.463) -0.0331 (0.316) 
Confidence in Army/Navy 0.0257 (0.596) 0.0229 (0.248) -0.00253 (0.919) 0.0532** (0.080) 
Know Victim of Crime -0.354 (0.249) 0.463*** (0.000) 0.302** (0.055) 0.414*** (0.031) 
Know Anybody who moved to a 
Safer Town 
0.603** (0.094) 0.532*** (0.000) -0.0297 (0.872) 0.0754 (0.737) 
Constant 1.350** (0.078) -0.554** (0.076) -0.628* (0.109) -0.782* (0.101) 
Chi Squared 128.49  208.80  93.60  182.15  
p-values in parentheses.    * p < 0.15, ** p < 0.10, *** p < 0.05 
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Table 6.5.Three-stage least squares regression of demographic characteristics on group membership. 
 Group 1 
(Cautious) 
Group 2
a 
(Confident) 
Group 3 
(Fearful) 
Group 4 
(Optimistic) 
 Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
Sex -0.0639 (0.333) -0.0194 (0.761) 0.190*** (0.002) -0.123** (0.055) 
Age 0.00301 (0.179) -0.000727 (0.743) 0.00436*** (0.041) 0.000806 (0.710) 
Number of children -0.0189*** (0.019) -0.00415 (0.611) 0.0139** (0.071) 0.0103 (0.185) 
Education 0.0214 (0.216) -0.0106 (0.541) -0.0194 (0.240) 0.00525 (0.755) 
Size of group of friends -0.00189 (0.190) 0.00224* (0.105) -0.000985 (0.468) -0.000529 (0.707) 
Farm size 0.000866 (0.849) -0.00201 (0.666) 0.00215 (0.622) -0.00257 (0.558) 
Revenue from farming 0.00000015 (0.863) 9.33e-08 (0.919) 0.00000084 (0.325) 0.0000014** (0.100) 
Total revenue from all sources 0.00000043 (0.658) 0.000000123 (0.901) 0.00000099 (0.285) 0.0000016** (0.083) 
Savings 0.0000036* (0.105) 0.000000924 (0.681) 0.00000161 (0.450) 0.00000118 (0.589) 
Total asset value -6.58e-08 (0.239) -4.15e-08 (0.458) 4.87e-08 (0.359) 3.40e-08 (0.529) 
Considered religious  0.0126 (0.500) -0.0219 (0.234) -0.0245 (0.167) 0.0290* (0.112) 
Religious celebrations  -0.00432 (0.609) -0.0000977 (0.991) -0.00128 (0.873) 0.00833 (0.310) 
Catholic -0.105** (0.068) 0.0442 (0.448) 0.0957** (0.082) -0.0206 (0.711) 
Constant 0.300** (0.075) 0.356*** (0.034) 0.408*** (0.011) 0.0333 (0.839) 
Chi Squared 21.55    23.88  16.18  
p-values in parentheses. * p<0.15, ** p<0.10,*** p<0.05    
a. Group 2 was the reference in the three-stage least squared regression, thus, it was not included in the model. The results shown here are from an ols regression and no Chi 
Squared value is provided. 
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The type of action taken also determines what decision processes are more 
important for each group. We focus, for the rest of the dual process analysis, on the 
variable FearLevel High as indicator of the magnitude of emotional response, and PHI 
(Probability of High Impact Crime) as indicator of the magnitude of the deliberative 
process.  
Consider the action “Changed Production due to Crime”; by looking at the 
significance level of the coefficients we see that all groups are more dependent on the 
emotional decision mechanism than on the rational. From the coefficient of group 1 
(cautious), it is shown that it changed its production due to crime, albeit with a 
marginal significance. However, looking at its components of the dual process, the 
rational process of this group has more weight than the emotional process in this 
decision, again, marginally. This is estimated by the marginal effect of rational process 
(-0.016) and that of the emotional process (-0.012). Group 3, or fearful, responded 
more to the emotional process (0.183) than the rational process (0.017) in changing 
production due to crime. Group 4, optimistic, like group 3 responded more to emotions 
than to rational assessments of risks; the marginal effects of the two systems are 0.198 
and 0.016 respectively.  
The response to “Have Considered Moving out of Town”, however, resulted in 
the system 1 dominating the decision making process. All groups, except group 3, 
show significant coefficients for system 1.For instance, the marginal effects of the 
rational and emotional systems for group 1 are 0.077 (p= 0.609) and -0.684 (p= 0.022) 
respectively. The negative sign in the emotional response indicates that high fear level 
decreased the chance of having considered moving out of town, acting in opposite 
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direction as the rational system, which has a positive effect on the decision (0.077). 
However, only the coefficient in the emotional system is significant. Group 4, 
optimistic, behaves in a similar way. Its coefficient for the emotional component is 
negative and significant (b= -0.090, p= 0.033); its rational component is positive but 
not significant (b= 0.220, p= 0.250). Just like group 1, group 4 reacted to a high level 
of fear by not considered moving out of town. Only group 2, confident, reacted to a 
high level of fear by considering moving out of town. Group 3, albeit statistically 
insignificant, also have large and positive coefficient for the emotional component (b= 
0.697) while the rational process is negative and smaller in magnitude (-0.149).  That 
is, fearful group would act positively to moving out of town because of emotions, but 
their rational system would act in opposite direction (by not moving out of town) but 
at a much smaller magnitude.  
The action “Changed Production due to Crime”, similar to “Change Production 
if Crime Continues”, has the system 2 dominating the decision making process, 
although the statistical significance is lower. The sign of the coefficients for groups 2, 
3 and 4 for system 2 remains the same as in the fourth action. Group 1 has a negative 
sign for system 2; however the p-value is 0.36. The coefficients and p-values, in 
parenthesis, for groups 2, 3 and 4 in system 2 are the following: -0.116 (0.191); 0.017 
(0.171) and 0.016 (0.184). The coefficients for the system 1 have p-values larger than 
0.367. This is evidence that for this particular action, system 2 dominates system 1 in 
the decision process.  
The third action, “Changed Lifestyle due to Crime”, does not have a system 
dominating the other in the decision making process. This does not indicate that either 
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system is not present in the decision process but rather that the weights of each system 
in the decision may be the same. 
 
Table 6.6. Marginal effect of each system on actions. P-values in parenthesis.  
 Have Considered 
Moving out of Town 
Changed 
Production due to 
Crime 
Changed 
Lifestyle due to 
Crime 
Change Production 
if Crime Continues 
System 1 
High Fear 
Level 
    
Group 1 -0.684 
(0.022) 
-0.0126 
(0.844) 
0.292 
(0.356) 
0.324 
(0.826) 
Group 2 1.599 
(0.034) 
-0.0927 
(0.763) 
-0.181 
(0.639) 
0.461 
(0.327) 
Group 3 0.697 
(0.260) 
0.1833 
(0.400) 
0.226 
(0.322) 
0.201 
(0.604) 
Group 4 -0.090 
(0.033) 
0.1983 
(0.367) 
0.020 
(0.618) 
0.339 
(0.805) 
System 2 
Prob. High 
Impact Crime 
 
   
Group 1 0.0771 
(0.609) 
-0.0163 
(0.361) 
0.0001 
(0.724) 
0.024 
(0.114) 
Group 2 -0.0599 
(0.783) 
-0.116 
(0.191) 
0.0485 
(0.662) 
-0.240 
(0.077) 
Group 3 -0.1492 
(0.707) 
0.017 
(0.171) 
0.0388 
(0.937) 
0.057 
(0.046) 
Group 4 0.2201 
(0.250) 
0.016 
(0.184) 
0.026 
(0.856) 
0.093 
(0.029) 
 
An important observation is that for almost every group and action, the 
emotional system has a much larger magnitude than the rational system. A caveat in 
this statement is that we look at magnitudes of the coefficients without considering 
statistical significance. One possible reason for this is that all subjects, by being 
exposed to violence, have their emotional part of the decision making process more 
active than their rational part. Their emotional component of the decision making 
process might be overwhelmed by the exposure to negative stimuli (narco violence). 
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This finding is similar to the findings in Schulze and Wansink (2012), where by 
lowering individual’s cognitive load, their deliberative system has more effect in their 
decisions. In our study, farmers are overwhelmed by the amount of negative stimuli. 
In their example, participants who were given less tasks, and thus using their 
deliberative system less, has less reaction to stigma. 
The influence of positive emotions on stigma is also observed by our results. In 
an experimental work on stigma and the offsetting influence of positive emotions, 
Messer et al. (2010), find that the stigma of mad cow disease (BSE) on willingness to 
pay for a hamburger can be offset by positive advertising on beef. In their study, 
participants were shown various advertisements to after watching a news clip on BSE. 
The positive emotional treatment was a generic advertisement for beef. We found 
similarities in our study to that experiment. In our individual categorizations, each 
group member shares certain characteristics about their attitudes towards risk 
(cautious, confident, fearful and optimistic) which also represents their optimism and 
pessimism about their current situation. This is related to the offsetting of stigma by 
positive emotions; however, in the group case these positive emotions are endogenous 
within each group. Following the results of Messer et al., offsetting the negative 
stigma created by the presence of narcos by means of positive emotions might be a 
way to reduce anxiety in the community. How these positive emotions are to be 
conveyed to the farmers is a matter of further discussion.  
 
Control variables that also play a role in decision making but not included in 
the Dual Process model are given next. Age, for instance, has a positive effect on all 
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actions, and statistically significant, or marginally significant at p < 0.195, for three of 
the four actions. The older a person is, the more likely he is taking an action. Number 
of children has a negative value for all actions, but significant for changing lifestyle 
with p = 0.54. Education is positive and significant for considering moving out of 
town (p = 0.11), and for changing production if violence continues (p = 0.04). More 
educated people can adopt different production technologies more easily than less 
educated people. Having a large group of friends has a positive effect on considering 
moving out of town and on having changed production. This may be the case if by 
having more friends the opportunity to know somebody in another town who can help 
them move increases. The effect on having changed production can be explained by 
group support in adopting new technology. It is easier to change production if 
somebody in your group of friends already has or has access to the required 
technology. Having a large farm increases the chance of moving out of town and on 
changing production as well. Knowing a victim of a crime or knowing someone who 
has moved out of town because of violence is a significant indicator of 
actions/intentions.  People who know somebody who has been victimized, under the 
context of this research, is more likely to change production decisions if crime 
continues (b= 0.414, p=0.031), more likely to have changed daily activities (b= 0.302, 
p=0.055), and to have changed production (b = 0.463, p = 0.00). Knowing somebody 
who has moved out of town because of fear of crime have an effect in considering 
moving out of town too (b= 0.603, p=0.094), and in having changed production 
practices (b= 0.532, p=0.00).  
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Conclusion and Further Discussion 
 
This chapter analyses the effect of drug violence in a rural area in Mexico 
where this type of violence is relatively new, using the framework of the ecological 
psychology and dual theory process. We found various significant factors that explain 
fear among farmers, and how that fear is affecting rural life and production decisions.  
In this analysis, using a variety of established psychometric models to 
determine degree of fear developed by Slovic, I was able to create through cluster 
analysis four groups that classify people according to their fear perception and feeling 
of control. These groups are labeled Optimistic, Fearful, Pessimistic and Confident. 
We analyze the effect of demographic and economic variables in determining group 
membership, and on actions/intentions in response to fear. Using a Hausman Test, we 
found evidence that stimuli are endogenously determined by actions.  
Another interesting finding of this study is that decisions of the subject can be 
explained under the Dual Process approach. This theory, although does not substitute 
the ecological psychology approach, is contained in the ecological framework. Dual 
process explains behavior under risk as the result of two decision making mechanisms: 
an emotional, irrational, reaction based mechanism; and a deliberated, rational, non-
emotional mechanism. I was able to measure the degree of emotional response and 
deliberative response to risk according for each action. The emotional response to risk 
is determined by group membership. Group membership categorizes people according 
to their degree of fear and control of risky events. That is, it measures the fear level, of 
farmers. The measure of deliberate response to risk is related to their probability 
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assessments of risky events. Farmers responded to the degree of likelihood that they, 
or their family members, would become a victim of narco related crimes within the 
next 12 months. The coefficient of the probabilistic estimations of adverse events on 
actions provides a measure of the effect of the rational mechanism in decision making. 
The combination of these coefficients (group membership and probability of 
victimization) gives the elements for decision making under the dual process model.     
This chapter also contributes to the application of the ecological psychology 
paradigm. To our knowledge this is the first study that supports the existence of an 
ecological environment in a social study. How we respond to the environment is 
determined by our perception of them. Our actions resulting from our perception of 
those forces alters our perception in a circular way. Our results are in accordance to 
the conditions under the ecological psychology framework. Our system is in the scale 
of perception-action, farmers respond to drug violence; they connect to the formalism 
of affordances, they refer to the exogenous variables in our model; they are more 
general than the laws of inanimate systems; and they make reference to themselves, in 
our case the system is endogenously determined.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation offers a description, analysis and management of various risks 
faced by grain farmers in Northeastern Mexico.  Although the geographic location of 
this study is very specific, most of these risks are also present in other developing 
countries. Many agricultural risks are common to both developed and developing 
countries. However, due to the financial and social infrastructure and political stability 
of the former, farmers in developing countries have access to different tools to deal 
with risk. These tools can be market based or part of government policy. Some risks 
specific to developing countries, unfortunately, cannot be completely hedged away; 
however, by understanding their nature actions can be suggested to decrease their 
effect.   
How people perceive risk can take many dimensions: from objective, based on 
a probabilistic assessment, to subjective, based on fear and emotions, and a 
combination of both. Objective risks assessments are done through historical analysis 
of events or through expert opinion. For instance, environmental risks, which are one 
of the main causes of production variation, are assessed on historical probability of 
events and through modeling of future scenarios. Price risk, also a source of major 
concern among producers, is measured from its past values and from the possible 
effects of diverse policies. These risks can be hedged using market based tools like 
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insurance products, a common practice in rich countries. Subjective risks are based on 
emotions and are the reactions to some stimuli.  When people behavior is based on 
emotions, the probability of unlikely events tends to be exaggerated. In this study, for 
instance, farmers’ fear of being victimized depends on social and demographic 
characteristics and not on objective assessment. People can also evaluate risk based on 
a combination of both objective and subjective assessments. Refraining from 
borrowing for fear of losing collateral despite having demand for credit (i.e. risk 
rationing) can be interpreted as both, an objective assessment on the probability of 
default and as the emotional response that the idea of losing collateral invokes.  This 
system of decision making is based on the dual process: emotional and deliberative.  
All these aspects of risk analysis are considered in this thesis.  
Chapter 2 This chapter presents the results of a survey on Mexican grain 
farmers conducted in 2011. The importance of this survey is that it provides a 
summary on the conditions of these farmers as well as other information related to the 
current violence level caused by the war on drugs. This survey provides information 
on demographics, production, risk taking behavior, and risk perception on violence 
that was previously not known.  
 
Chapter 3 discusses price risk faced by Mexican farmers, and also provides a 
market based mechanism for protecting against adverse price changes. This type of 
risk is based entirely on objective assessments, i.e. probability analysis. Although in 
developed economies agricultural price hedging mechanisms exist, due to the 
sophistication of their financial system compared to poor countries, this is not 
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necessary the case for developing countries. The model created in Chapter 3 takes 
advantage of the price dependency of grain prices in Mexico to the futures price of 
yellow corn in the US. The resulting quanto options developed shows to be priced 
consistently with the corresponding options in the US.  This model takes into account 
all factors affecting local prices in Mexico: futures price in the US, exchange rate and 
transportation costs. Moreover, this model, by providing the theoretical price for 
agricultural options in Mexico, can provide a reference price for use in current 
government programs. 
Chapter 4 analyzes the characteristics for risk rationing and to provide a 
specific test of the risk rationing theory proposed by BCG. The prevalence of risk 
rationing in Mexico and a comparative analysis in China are discussed in this chapter. 
Risk rationing occurs when people abstain from borrowing formally for fear of losing 
their collateral, despite having demand for credit at the current interest rates. Risk 
rationed farmers prefer to stay in a low income-low risk activity, because the risk of 
losing collateral if they borrow is deemed to be sufficiently large.  
Among all respondents, the total proportion of risk rationed, quantity rationed 
and price rationed farmers are approximately 6.2%, 14% and 79.9% respectively for 
China and 34.67%, 9.94% and 55.37% respectively for Mexico. The results verify the 
existence of risk rationing in both China and Mexico rural credit markets. There is a 
strong support to the theory that the financial poor are more likely to be quantity 
rationed but the financial wealthy are more likely to be risk rationed. However, 
productive wealth appears to have to no impact on all types of credit constraint 
typologies. We find that risk averse and prudent individuals are more likely to be risk 
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rationed. This is likely due to innate risk judgments made by individuals. Our study is 
among the first that we are aware that has been able to provide evidence that in fact 
risk rationing behavior can take place in the presence of insurance markets. This 
evidence is not consistent with BCG, which stated that risk rationing occurs when 
insurance markets are absent. Combining the results, risk adverse households tend to 
have a higher willingness to pay for insurance and participate in insurance markets and 
are more likely to be risk rationed. 
The elasticity of demand for credit has a strong implication for credit markets 
and we find that credit demand elasticities differ amongst rationing typologies. We 
find that a large proportion of risk rationed farmers have perfectly inelastic demand for 
credit but at lower interest rates even risk rationed farmers might enter the credit 
market. 
What we have learned from studying risk rationing is that efforts to enhance 
the working of rural credit markets and credit access in order to increase agricultural 
investment and alleviate poverty must also deal with risk. BCG argue that failure to 
account for risk rationed agents, who have profitable projects but are discouraged from 
implementing them because of the riskiness of the available loan contracts, may lead 
to a distortion of the rural financial system. We agree. One policy remedy is to 
maintain lower interest rates since we find that risk rationed groups may enter the 
credit market. Such a policy is not without its critics however.  In addition, BCG 
considers at length the role of ambiguous property rights. This is the current state of 
land use in China. The current debate in China regarding transferability and 
mortgagability of land use rights might be successful if collateral played a key role in 
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borrowing agreements. However, land use right reform in China will be only partially 
effective to encourage risk rationed borrowers to enter the credit market since our 
results do not indicate that using land use rights for collateral can differentiate risk 
rationed farmers from other typologies. As a result, policies that decrease the risk 
associated with loan contract to rural households would be more appropriate in the 
presence of risk rationing. 
 
Chapter 5 looks into a new approach in understanding risk rationing. Risk 
rationing is based on both objective and subjective risk assessments. Objective 
because farmers estimate a probability distribution to their future income under debt, 
and from there, they estimate the probability of default. Subjective because they may 
react negatively to the idea of losing collateral, and so make the decision of borrowing 
based on their emotions. The approach used in chapter 5 depends on the probability 
distribution of income and on the discount rate.  
This new approach is formulated from Mason’s disutility jump and the 
implications of the jump in the preference for skewness, which imply a large downside 
risk aversion. In this paper we estimated farmer’s expected revenue distribution 
through means of simulation a Pert distribution with three parameters that we 
observed from a previous survey in Mexico. Using the simulated distributions’ 
moments we performed a random utility analysis between people classified as risk 
rationed and price rationed. Risk rationing preference depends on expected 
distribution, skewness preference and on discount rate.  
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Following the jump disutility theory proposed by Mason, we created a model 
where this jump disutility refers to the collateral loss that risks rationed avoid by not 
entering into the formal credit market. From there we have two possible distributions 
of future revenue, one under debt and one without debt. A formal debt would create, 
or increase, a disutility jump at a given revenue threshold, which if reached, triggers 
the jump disutility in the form of collateral loss. Reaching the threshold level of 
revenue is avoided at all costs under risk rationing. On the other hand, the distribution 
of future revenues without debt does not have this significant disutility jump. Thereby, 
making that distribution less negatively skewed compared to under risk rationed. Risk 
rationed have a stronger preference for skewness, and their expected revenue 
distribution is less positively skewed, or more negatively skewed, than that of price 
rationed.  
Through a random utility model analysis, we estimated the preferences for 
expected revenue moments, and for present consumption. By looking at the 
differences in utilities and their derivatives between credit groups, given by the 
coefficients of the random utility model, we estimated that risk rationed have a higher 
discount factor that price rationed. This suggests that risk rationing can also be 
explained by the preference of current consumption. Price rationed, on the other hand, 
sacrifices current consumption in hopes to have a larger future consumption. This is 
measured by the difference between utility at initial wealth level. This difference is the 
constant term in the regressions. 
The expected revenue moments were estimated by Monte Carlo analysis. From 
the results of a 2011 survey of Mexican grain farmers we obtained their minimum 
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possible, maximum possible and most likely revenue for their next season. With these 
three parameters we simulated a Pert distribution for each farmer. From these 
distributions we obtained their first three moments. These moments were used as 
independent variables for our random utility analysis. This approach of simulating 
expected distributions based on farmers’ responses have not been fully exploited in the 
literature. 
A novel approach to classifying credit rationing is also done in this study. 
Unlike previous research that establish risk rationing status a posteriori, here we use a 
survey specifically design to unambiguously classify credit rationing status (see figure 
8, chapter 5). Using this method, we eliminate potential problems of endogeneity. For 
instance, observing no credit demand does not imply risk rationing, it can be a price 
rationed that does not demand credit at current interest rates, or it may be a quantity 
rationed person, someone who was rejected from a formal loan.  
Although the analysis of risk rationing through the use of a random utility 
model shed lights on time preference of consumption, skewness preference, and 
degree of risk aversion and downside risk aversion, we believe that there are other 
approaches to understanding risk rationing. One approach worth exploring is the 
application of the Dual Process theory in risk rationing. Farmers’ response to the risk 
of losing collateral by not borrowing needs to be examined through the interaction of 
emotions and calculative probabilities of default. This is a natural extension of this 
topic that can provide further insights on the relationship between risk preferences and 
emotions. 
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The last analysis, chapter 6, is based mostly on the emotional response to 
stimuli in the farmers’ environment. For this, we used the approach to behavior based 
on the ecological psychology theory. This school of thought analyses behavior in the 
context of each individual’s environment. This theory provides a methodology for 
understanding perception and action. This analysis is the first, to my knowledge, that 
incorporates Slovic analysis of fear perception into the ecological psychology 
framework. Also, it is the first to prove the existence of the axioms for an ecological 
psychology system. I found an indication of simultaneity between risk perception and 
actions. That is, our actions affect our perception of risk. My analysis was conducted 
in a region in Mexico that at that time was a conflict zone for two major drug cartels. 
Therefore, the presence of the narcos was known and fear. These fear perceptions are 
analyzed and also various actions taken by the farmers under our study. Although 
most of these farmers are not at risk from the narcos, since most of them are small 
scale farmers, many show fear of being victimized and had altered their daily activities 
in some way or another. Furthermore, demographic characteristics are found to affect 
fear level and perception. For instance, I found that farmers who attend religious 
activities regularly fear much less than those who don’t. To my knowledge this is the 
first survey conducted in a conflict area of narcos in Mexico. 
In order to understand risk, we shouldn’t limit ourselves with objective 
assessments, but need to understand that there are more than just economic risks that 
dictate production behavior. It is very important to look at subjective risks as well as 
price and yield risks. If a producer has a high emotional response to risks, then market 
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mechanisms may not bring the desired results. Other actions may be required to 
reduce risk perception, like community involvement and support.  
Risk has many dimensions that have not yet been fully understand nor 
accepted. This thesis contributes in a small way to understanding risk as a broader 
concept than traditionally used. The analysis done here are not limited to agricultural 
risks, but can be extended to other activities as well and to the analysis of risk in 
general.  
This paper analyses the effect of drug violence in a rural area in Mexico where 
this type of violence is relatively new, using the framework of the ecological 
psychology and dual theory process. We found various significant factors that explain 
fear among farmers, and how that fear is affecting rural life and production decisions.  
In this analysis, using a variety of established psychometric models to 
determine degree of fear developed by Slovic, I was able to create through cluster 
analysis four groups that classify people according to their fear perception and feeling 
of control. These groups are labeled Optimistic, Fearful, Pessimistic and Confident. 
We analyze the effect of demographic and economic variables in determining group 
membership, and on actions/intentions in response to fear. Using a Hausman Test, we 
found evidence that stimuli are endogenously determined by actions.  
Another interesting finding of this study is that decisions of the subjects can be 
explained following the Dual Process approach. This theory, although does not 
substitute the ecological psychology approach, clarifies the ecological framework. 
Dual process explains behavior under risk as the result of two decision making 
mechanisms: an emotional, irrational, reaction based mechanism; and a deliberated, 
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rational, non-emotional mechanism. I was able to measure the degree of emotional 
response and deliberative response to risk according for each action. The emotional 
response to risk by each group is given by its interaction of group dummy and the 
degree of fear, high or low, stated in the survey. These variables provide a measure of 
how much a low of high fear state affect decisions by each group. The measure of 
deliberate response to risk is related to their probability assessments of risky events. 
Farmers responded to the degree of likelihood that they, or their family members, 
would become a victim of narco related crimes within the next 12 months. The 
coefficient of the probabilistic estimations of adverse events on actions provides a 
measure of the effect of the rational mechanism in decision making. These coefficients 
give the elements for decision making under the dual process model. 
Dual process theory is used to measure the dominant decision process for the 
farmers in this study. I find that for all groups emotions have a larger effect than 
probability assessments of risks. This may be due because all subjects of study live 
under constant emotional stimuli caused by the narcos. My results suggests that fear 
based stimuli increases the use of the emotional decision process compared the 
rational system. This is analogous to results given by Schulze and Wansink (2012), in 
Chapter 6, on cognition overload and emotional process dominating the rational.    
This paper also contributes to the application of the ecological psychology 
paradigm. To our knowledge this is the first study that supports the existence of an 
ecological environment in a social study. How we respond to the environment is 
determined by our perception of them. Our actions resulting from our perception of 
those forces alters our perception in a circular way. Our results are in accordance to 
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the conditions under the ecological psychology framework. Our system is in the scale 
of perception-action, farmers respond to drug violence; they connect to the formalism 
of affordances, they refer to the exogenous variables in our model; they are more 
general than the laws of inanimate systems; and they make reference to themselves, in 
our case the system is endogenously determined.  
This thesis provides novel approaches to risk, provides a market based option 
pricing mechanism novel to Mexico, and proves established theories never proven in 
the field.  Moreover, the field study of Mexican farmers reported here is, to our 
knowledge, the first study on agricultural life, production and risk (on a wide 
spectrum) conducted in a real time narco conflict zone in Mexico. The data collected 
provides a snapshot of risk assessments of people living under a violent environment.  
These results provide some bases for new directions of study on risk perception and 
the decision making process. Alternatively, some results can have policy implications 
to farming insurance, adoption of new technology, and mitigation of fear due the 
stigma of narcos. 
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APPENDIX A 
MEXICAN FARMERS' SURVEY IN ENGLISH 
 
Mexican Farmer’s Survey 
A. Farm Characteristics and Farmer Risk Attitude 
Date: month____, day____, year____ 
Interviewer initials:_________   Name of Village:_________________ 
 
1. Sex of Respondent: ________Male; ___________Female.  
2. Age of Respondent: ________ 
3. Marital Status:  Single___, Married___, Divorced___, Widowed___, Union___ 
4. Are you a head of the household?  Yes_____, No_____ 
5. Do you have any children? Yes___,No___ 
i. How many?_____ 
6. Including yourself how many people live in this house ________________ 
(INTERVIEWER: this is the total number of people sharing the house of the respondent 
including children, parents etc.) 
i. How many are younger than 6 years old?______ 
1. How many of them are your children?______ 
ii. How many are between 6 and 18 years old (age 6 and 18 inclusive)?______ 
1. How many of them work______, study_______, or both________ 
2. How many of them are your children?______ 
iii. How many are older than 18 years old?______ 
1. How many of them work______, study_______, or both________ 
2. How many of them are your children?______ 
iv. What is the age of the oldest and youngest person living in your house? 
Oldest______, Youngest______ 
   
7. What is your highest education level:  
a) Never went to school_____  
b) Some elementary school _____ 
c) Completed elementary school_____ 
d) Some middle school_____ 
e) Completed middle school_____ 
f) Some high school_____  
g) Completed high school _____  
h) Some university or technical school_____ 
i) Completed university or technical school_____  
 
8. Do you have a group of friends that regularly meets for social activities? (dinner, drinks, 
games, coffee): Yes_____,No______ 
 
9. How many times do you gather with your group of friends per month?______ 
i. How large is your group gathering?_______  
 
10. How many times do you gather for social activities with your family or relatives per 
month?______ 
i. How large is your family and relatives gathering?_______  
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11. Do you belong to any social groups in your community (e.g. religious, volunteer group, 
clubs, etc.)?    YES_____, NO_____  (this do not include any producer’s association) 
 
12. Do you consider yourself well informed about the daily events in your community or 
region? 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree ___ Agree ____ Disagree ____ Strongly Disagree ____  
 
13. Do you consider yourself a religious person? 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree ___ Agree ____ Disagree ____ Strongly Disagree ____ 
 
14. How many times on average do you attend religious celebrations per month?________ 
 
15. What is your religion?  Catholic_____, Baptist____, Pentecostal____, 7th Day 
Adventists____,  Mormon____, Jehovah’s Witness____, 
Other_______________(please specify) 
 
16. How many years have you been farming?     ________ 
 
17. Was your farm? Bought by you_____, Inherited_____, Given to you by a social 
group/government_____, Other__________ 
i. If you inherited your farm, was it from your parents? YES___,NO____ 
ii. How many generations has the farm belonged to your family?______ 
              (If parents bought it, then it is 2
nd
 generation, and so on.) 
 
18. Regarding your farm, do you? 
i. Own it alone ______ 
ii. Rent it only _____ 
iii. Own it in a partnership (multiple owners)____ 
iv. Own and rent _______ 
 
19. What is the total size in hectares of your household farm excluding rented?  
__________ 
 
20. Do you rent additional land for production? Yes___, No___  
i. If Yes, How many additional Hectares do you rent alone? ____________ 
ii. How many additional hectares do you rent in a partnership?___________ 
 
21. If you rent land do you pay cash______, a fraction of the production _________, or 
both______? 
a) If you pay cash, how much do you pay on average per Ha per Year? __________ 
b) If you pay by sharing production, what fraction, in percentage, do you give as 
payment on average per crop?_______ % 
 
22. Does any other member of your household own or rent land for production? Yes___, 
No___ 
i. If Yes, What is the total amount of land, owned and rented, used for 
production of all members of your family excluding yourself?_______ (this 
excludes any rental partnership among household member). 
 263 
 
 
23. Do you live in your farm? Yes___, No___ 
i. If No, How far do you live from your farm, or main farm?_______ Km. 
ii. How long does it take you to get to your farm, or main farm? _____ min. 
24. During crop season, how many times per week did you go to your farm to check on the 
crop? Please fill in the boxes. 
 
Stage of Crop 2009 2010 2011 
Planting    
Growing    
Harvest    
 
 
25. Do you have irrigation in your farm? Yes____, No___ 
26. Do you use fertilizers? Yes____, No_____ 
27. Do you use pesticides? Yes____, No_____ 
28. Do you own____, part-own_____ or rent ______ tractors? (Select all that apply) 
29. On average I have __________paid employees, and __________ unpaid family 
laborers.  
30. How long, in months, do you hire them on average per year? Paid employees______, 
Unpaid_______ 
31. Do you have any farm loans? Yes____, No_____  
i. If Yes, What is the total amount? ____________ 
ii. Approximately what is the percentage rate interest? ______% per month, 
_______% per year. (fill only one) 
 
32. During rainy season I can access ________ % (0 - 100%) of my farm? (write a 
percentage) 
 
33. In general, how would you describe the business climate, from 1 to 5, for farmers in 
your area in the following years? For 2012 please indicate your expectations. 
1=extremely bad, 2= very bad, 3=bad, 4= normal, 5= good, 6= very good, 7= extremely 
good. (please fill in the boxes) 
2009 2010 2011 2012 
    
 
34. If you belong to an Ejido, are you an active member in its decision making process? 
Yes__,No__ 
 
35. Please list the top five crops and livestock you have grown in the last 2 years and your 
plan for next year by the amount of land used for each crop, its yields (ton/ha) and its 
sales price (mxp/ ton) 
 
Year Rank Crop/ 
Livestock 
Total 
Land 
(Ha) 
Yields 
(ton/ ha); 
Number 
of Heads 
Price (mxp/ 
ton) or (mxp 
/head) 
 
2009 
1     
2     
3     
4     
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5     
  
Year Rank Crop/ 
Livestock 
Total 
Land 
(Ha) 
Yields 
(ton/ ha); 
Number 
of Heads 
Price (mxp/ 
ton) or (mxp 
/head) 
 
2010 
1     
2     
3     
4     
5     
 
Year Rank Crop/ 
Livestock 
Total 
Land 
(Ha) 
Yields 
(ton/ ha); 
Number 
of Heads 
Price (mxp/ 
ton) or (mxp 
/head) 
 
2011 
1     
2     
3     
4     
5     
 
Plan for next year: 
Year Rank Crop/ 
Livestock 
Total 
Land 
(Ha) 
Yields 
(ton/ ha); 
Number 
of Heads 
Price (mxp/ 
ton) or (mxp 
/head) 
 
2012 
1     
2     
3     
4     
5     
 
36. Approximately how much was your total revenue from farming activities in the past 12 
months? $_________ 
 
37. Approximately, what percentage of your total revenue comes from your farming 
activities? ___% 
 
38.  Do you receive Procampo subsidies?   Yes_____, No_____ 
i. If Yes, how much did you receive from Procampo last year?___________ 
ii. Did you: A) farm on your Procampo subsidized land, B) rent your 
Procampo-subsidized land, or C) lend your Procampo-subsidized land to 
other farmers to farm? ________ (Write all that apply: A, B or C). 
 
39. Do you receive any other cash subsidy besides Procampo? Yes____, No_____ 
i. Do you or any member of your household receive Progresa? Yes___, No___ 
1. If Yes, How much did you receive from Progresa last year?_______  
ii. How much did you receive from other cash subsidies last year?_______ 
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40. What was the total household revenue in the past year from all sources including 
farming, government programs, part time labor, livestock, and remittances (best guess)? 
$________ 
 
41. What was the total household net income/ profit in the past year from all sources 
including farming, part time labor, cattle raising, and remittances (best guess)? 
$_____________             (This is equal to revenues (Q40) minus all expenses (rent, 
salaries, inputs)) 
 
42. How much do you spend on average per month in your household? (This includes food, 
school, electricity, gas) $________ 
 
43. How much do you save on average per year? $______ 
 
44. Please approximate the percent of your total farming income that comes from livestock 
____________%   (INTERVIEWER: Prod for this number. If they do not know exactly 
then say “we do not need an exact number just an approximate number” or “was it less 
or more than 50%, less than 25% etc. until a number is obtained.)  
B.  Sources of Risk and Risk Perceptions 
 
 
45. Please indicate if you are willing or not willing to take risks (Circle the most 
appropriate response). 
Statement Not 
Willing to 
Take 
Risk 
 Neutral 
to Take 
risk 
 Willin
g to 
Take 
Risk 
I am willing to accept greater 
production risks to increase the 
chance of higher profits  
1 2 3 4 5 
I am willing to take risks with 
new technologies before I see 
good results in other farms 
1 2 3 4 5 
I am willing to take risks with 
new management practices before 
I see good results in other farms 
1 2 3 4 5 
(Technologies refer to new seeds, fertilizers, etc; Management practices refer to crop 
rotation, forward contracts, insurance) 
 
46. If you grow corn, sorghum or soybeans identify the lowest price you believe possible, 
the price that you believe is most likely to be received, and the highest possible price 
you believe possible in the next crop year (2011/12)  
(INTERVIEWER: for each crop production the respondent for lowest, most likely and highest: 
you may say things like ‘we do not need the exact numbers, just your own personal judgment 
about what the prices might be’ by most likely price ask them what price they expect to receive 
in the next harvest. Note: most likely can be the same as lowest and highest) 
(Please fill in the boxes) 
 Crop Lowest possible 
price 
Most likely price 
(mxp/ton) 
Highest possible 
price 
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(mxp/ ton) (mxp/ton) 
 Corn    
Sorghum    
Soybeans    
 
47. If you grow corn, sorghum or soybeans, identify the lowest yield you believe possible, 
the yield that you believe is most likely to be received, and the highest possible yield 
you believe possible in the next crop year (2011/12).  
(INTERVIEWER: for each crop production the respondent for lowest, most likely and highest: 
you may say things like ‘we do not need the exact numbers, just your own personal judgment 
about what the yields might be’ by most likely yield ask them what yield they expect to receive 
in the next harvest. Note: most likely can be the same as lowest and highest) 
(Please fill in the boxes) 
 
 Crop Lowest possible 
yield 
(ton/Ha) 
Most likely yield 
(ton/Ha) 
Highest possible 
yield 
(ton/Ha) 
Corn    
Sorghum    
Soybeans    
 
 
48. If you grow corn, sorghum or soybeans what is the lowest and highest yield (ton/Ha) 
that you recall from your years in farming? (INTERVIEWER: if cannot recall exact 
year, ask how ago many years and decode year it occurred = 2011 – number of years 
ago) 
(Please fill in the boxes) 
 
 Crop Lowest 
historical 
yield 
(ton/Ha) 
Year it 
occurred 
 
Highest 
historical 
yield 
(ton/Ha) 
Year it 
occurred 
 
Average 
yield 
across 
year 
(ton/Ha) 
Corn      
Sorghum      
Soybeans      
 
C. Risk Management Options Use and Perceptions  
 
49. Please indicate how important you believe each item to be in terms of risk 
management in your farm. Then, mark a “0” if you do not use this to manage risk in 
your operation. Select: 1 = not important, 2 = less important, 3 = neutral, 4 = important, 
and 5 = very important (Circle the most appropriate response).  
Circle from 1 – 5 even if you don’t use the option to manage risk. 
Risk Management 
Options 
0 if not 
used 
Not 
Important 
   Very 
Important 
More than one crop, 
animal, or farm 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
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diversification 
Fields or farms in 
different locations 
(geographic 
diversification) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
Irrigation 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Spreading sales: selling 
each product over a 
period of time rather 
than all at once 
(diversified marketing) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
Using contracts to 
market your crop in 
advance at a fixed price 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
Government programs  0 1 2 3 4 5 
Maintaining financial 
reserves: having cash 
and readily convertible 
assets(e.g. machineries, 
livestock) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
Investing off-farm for 
other sources of income 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
Working off-farm 0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
50.  
51.  
52. When I choose what crops to grow, I base my decision on: (Please circle the appropriate 
number from 1 - 5). 
 Not a 
factor 
   Very 
Important 
factor 
The current price of the crop 1 2 3 4 5 
The variability in price 1 2 3 4 5 
Average yield per Ha 1 2 3 4 5 
The variability in yield per Ha 1 2 3 4 5 
The average cost per Ha 1 2 3 4 5 
The variability in cost per Ha 1 2 3 4 5 
The degree of violence in the 
area 
1 2 3 4 5 
D. Crop Insurance Use and Perceptions 
 
INTERVIEWER: Crop insurance is a common tool used by Americans farmers. Crop insurance will pay 
you if your crop yield falls below some percentage of your average yields. For example if your average 
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yield is 2 ton/ha for a particular crop, insurance may provide a payment if actual crop yield falls below 
this average. For example if actual yield is 1ton/ha then you would receive a payment based on the 
difference between 2 ton and 1ton (=1 ton) times the average harvest price. If the price is $2,000/ ton 
then you would receive $2,000*(2-1) = $2,000 but if yields are above 2 ton/ha you receive nothing from 
the insurer. 
53. Is crop insurance currently available to you?    
Yes_____ ,  No_____ (if No,  skip to Q56) 
 
54. (If answer to Q53 is Yes) Do you purchase crop insurance?   
Yes_____ , No_____ (if No, skip to Q57) 
 
55. (If answer to Q53 is Yes) List crops covered. How much do you pay per Ha?  
 
 Crop covered Insurance premium (mxp/ Ha) 
1   
2   
3  
4  
5  
 
56. (If answer to Q53 is No) If crop insurance were offered to you, do you think that you 
would purchase it?    Yes_____,  No_____ 
 
57. If you grow corn, sorghum or soybean, which do you believe has a higher chance of a 
significant yield loss next year: Corn________, Sorghum_______, Soybean_______?  
(Only one can be selected. If only one crop is grown select that crop) 
 
 Please select Q58, 59 or 60 based on the crop you chose in Q57) 
58. (If Selected CORN in Q57) Imagine a crop insurance product that would guarantee 
that your revenue per ha never falls below $6,500/ha for Corn. Taking into account 
all past crop yields, and what you believe about next year’s crop yield,  
 
a)   Would you be willing to pay $1,470 /ha to guarantee a minimum of $9,800/ha.? 
Definitely buy__ ,Might buy ___ ,Would unlikely buy ___ ,Definitely would not 
buy_____ 
 
b) Would you be willing to pay $785 /ha to guarantee a minimum of $9,800/ha? 
 Definitely buy__ ,Might buy ___ ,Would unlikely buy ___ ,Definitely would not buy_____ 
 
c)   Would you be willing to pay $295 /ha to guarantee a minimum of $9,800/ha? 
 Definitely buy__ ,Might buy ___ ,Would unlikely buy ___ ,Definitely would not buy_____ 
 
d) Would you be willing to pay $50/ha to guarantee a minimum of $9,800/ha? 
Definitely buy__ ,Might buy ___ ,Would unlikely buy ___ ,Definitely would not buy_____ 
59. (If Selected SORGHUM in Q57)Imagine a crop insurance product that would 
guarantee that your revenue per ha on (for crop indicated in Q56) never falls below 
$6,500/ha for Corn. Taking into account all past crop yields, and what you believe 
about next year’s crop yield,  
 
e)   Would you be willing to pay $975 /ha to guarantee a minimum of $6,500/ha.? 
Definitely Buy___ Might Buy ___ Would Unlikely Buy ____ Definitely would not 
buy_____ 
 
f) Would you be willing to pay $520 /ha to guarantee a minimum of $6,500/ha? 
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Definitely Buy___ Might Buy ___ Would Unlikely Buy ____ Definitely would not 
buy_____ 
 
g)  Would you be willing to pay $195 /ha to guarantee a minimum of $6,500/ha? 
Definitely Buy___ Might Buy ___ Would Unlikely Buy ____ Definitely would not 
buy_____ 
 
h) Would you be willing to pay $32/ha to guarantee a minimum of $6,500/ha? 
Definitely Buy___ Might Buy ___ Would Unlikely Buy ____ Definitely would not 
buy_____ 
 
60. (If Selected SOYBEANS in Q57)Imagine a crop insurance product that would 
guarantee that your revenue per ha on (for crop indicated in Q56) never falls below 
$8,600/ha for Corn. Taking into account all past crop yields, and what you believe 
about next year’s crop yield,  
 
i)   Would you be willing to pay $1,290 /ha to guarantee a minimum of $8,600/ha.? 
Definitely Buy___ Might Buy ___ Would Unlikely Buy ____ Definitely would not 
buy_____ 
 
j) Would you be willing to pay $670 /ha to guarantee a minimum of $8,600/ha? 
Definitely Buy___ Might Buy ___ Would Unlikely Buy ____ Definitely would not 
buy_____ 
 
k)  Would you be willing to pay $260 /ha to guarantee a minimum of $8,600/ha? 
Definitely Buy___ Might Buy ___ Would Unlikely Buy ____ Definitely would not 
buy_____ 
 
l) Would you be willing to pay $43/ha to guarantee a minimum of $8,600/ha? 
Definitely Buy___ Might Buy ___ Would Unlikely Buy ____ Definitely would not 
buy_____ 
Considering all aspects of the household including the farm, operations, house, 
contents, automobiles, machinery and equipment do you regularly purchase insurance 
for any of the following items (Leave blank if not applicable): 
 
a. Life Insurance       Yes_____ No____ 
b. Fire insurance for home and contents     Yes_____ No____ 
c. Automobile Insurance      Yes_____ No____ 
d. Health/Medical Insurance (not social sec)   Yes_____ No____ 
e. Protection against crop loss (crop insurance)   Yes_____ No____ 
f. Protection against livestock loss (livestock insurance) Yes_____ No____ 
g. Other ___________________________________________________ 
 
61. Imagine a new loan product that had a built-in insurance mechanism so that when a 
severe drought occurs, the amount of debt you have to repay decreases as the intensity 
of the drought increases. Would you be interested in such a loan product even if it 
required an increased interest rate? For instance, if your harvest is lost due to a drought 
you will not need to repay your loan. 
 
a) Not at all interested_____,      b) Moderately interested______,     c) Very Interested_____ 
62.   
63.  
E. Farm Finance and Risk Management 
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64. Do you have any debt outstanding? Yes____, No _____ 
 
a. IF YES, please indicate the total amount of money you owe $___________ 
b. Please indicate the total amount of money that you owe and the interest rate being charged from: 
 
 Loan Amount $ Annual Interest Rate % 
a.Friends   
b.Relatives   
c.Formal Lenders (Financial Instit.)    
d.Money Lenders/ Pawn Shop   
e.Government loans   
f.Grain Buyer   
g. Input Suppliers   
h.Other   
 
65. If you sell all your assets (home, land, livestock, agricultural produce, etc.) how much 
will you estimate to get?  $_____________________.  
 
66. Regarding to your current total amount of debts, assets and productivity, what do you 
think about your debt level? (Circle one) 
1) very low     2) low      3) adequate       4) high      5) very high 
 
2) Have you ever been denied a loan by the Government, bank or other 
financial institutions?  Yes____, No____ 
a. If YES, what are the major reasons you were denied credit?  
    (Answer more than one if necessary) 
i. insufficient collateral ___________ 
ii. Main source of income subject to too much price risk _________ 
iii. I have failed to repay a loan in the past __________ 
iv. Bank does not believe I am trustworthy ___________ 
v. The repayment schedule required by the bank / lender does not match the timing of 
sales from my small business ________ 
 
67. Have you been able to obtain as much credit as you need from banks/ lenders? (Circle 
only one) 
i. Never _________________________ 
ii. Sometimes ______________________ 
if selected ii., Approximately what percentage of loans that you asked for 
were provided in the full amount that you requested? ___________% 
iii. Always _________________________ 
 
68. Have you ever been late in repaying a loan? (INTERVIEWER: By ‘being late’ we 
mean that payment was not promptly paid as agreed upon by the lender, but payment 
was eventually made.) 
a. Relative YES_____ NO______ 
b. Friend YES_____ NO______ 
c. Money Lender YES_____ NO______ 
d. Government        YES_____ NO______ 
e. Grain buyers   YES_____ NO______ 
f. Input Suppliers   YES_____ NO______ 
g. Commercial Bank     YES_____ NO______ 
h. Other  YES_____ NO______ 
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69. Have you ever defaulted on a loan? (INTERVIEWER: By defaulting we mean that loan 
was NEVER repaid as agreed upon by the lender) 
 
a. Relative Yes_____, No______ 
b. Friend Yes_____, No______ 
c. Money Lender Yes_____, No______ 
d. Government        Yes_____, No______ 
e. Grain buyers   Yes_____, No______ 
f. Input Suppliers   Yes_____, No______ 
g. Commercial Bank     Yes_____, No______ 
h. Other  Yes_____, No______ 
 
70. In your region, which of these two statements is most correct? 
 
A)  Grain buyers or banks evaluates my creditworthiness and offers me a loan or credit card without 
me requesting it. TRUE___________, FALSE__________ 
 
B) I must formally request a loan from my buyer or bank:  TRUE______, FALSE______ 
     (Surveyor: Q70 A and B are mutually exclusive: If one is False the other is True) 
  
 IF Q70 B is TRUE skip to Q77 
 
71. (if answer to Q70 A is TRUE) On the most recent loan of credit card OFFER, 
approximately how much did your buyer or Bank OFFER to lend you?$__________ 
(credit card limit or loan offer) 
 
72. Of the amount offered in Q71, how much of loan (mxp) did you ACTUALLY use?                   
(Do not leave blank. put 0 if no loan was used, If don’t know put 
9999)________________ 
 
73. (If answer to Q72 is greater than zero) What are the purposes of loan in Q72 that you 
ACTUALLY used (answer more than one if necessary)? 
 
a. Agricultural production    Yes_____ No____ 
b. House construction/renovation  Yes_____ No____ 
c. Purchase of car/motorcycle/bicycle    Yes_____ No____ 
d. Household consumption   Yes_____ No____ 
e. Medical expenses      Yes_____ No____ 
f. Education expenses     Yes_____ No____ 
g. Other?_______ 
 
74. Is the amount of loan you used in Q72  less than, equal to or more than the amount that 
you ACTUALLY NEEDED for the purpose stated in Q73? (INTERVIEWER: remind 
the respondent of answer to Q72) 
   Less than _____   Equal to ______ More than _______   
 
75. (If answer to Q72 is less than Q71) If the amount you actually borrowed was less than 
the amount that the lender was willing to provide you, what do you believe are the 
major reasons you did not use the total amount of credit made available to you (answer 
more than one if necessary)?  
a. I do not need loan/ I do not invest   Yes_____ No____ 
b. I have own money and saving to invest   Yes_____ No____ 
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c. I borrowed from friends     Yes_____ No____ 
d. Interest rate is too high     Yes_____ No____ 
e. I am afraid of losing collateral    Yes_____ No____ 
f. I am not  credit worthy     Yes_____ No____ 
g. I cannot get a guarantee     Yes_____ No____ 
h. Loan products are not flexible enough  
to meet my ability to repay    Yes_____ No____ 
i. Other      Yes_____ No____ 
 
76. Do you think you have sufficient collateral to secure a higher loan amount than you 
identified in Q71?  Yes______ No______ 
 
SKIP TO Q89 
 
77. (If answer to Q70 B is TRUE) Have you applied for a loan from your buyer or bank 
within the past 2 years?  Yes____, No_______(If No, skip to Q86) 
 
78. (If answer to Q77 is YES) On the most recent loan request approximately how much 
loan did you request?  $_______  
 
79. How much money did your grain buyer or bank offer you? $_________ (zero if loan 
fully denied) 
 
80. (If answer to Q79 is greater than zero) Did you accept the offered loan? Yes______  
No_______(If No, skip to Q83) 
 
81. (If answer to Q80 is Yes) For what purposes you used the offered loan (answer more 
than one if necessary)? 
a. Agricultural production    Yes_____ No____ 
b. House construction/renovation  Yes_____ No____ 
c. Purchase of car/motorcycle/bicycle   Yes_____ No____ 
d. Household consumption   Yes_____ No____ 
e. Medical expenses      Yes_____ No____ 
f. Education expenses     Yes_____ No____ 
g. Other     Yes_____ No____ 
 
82. Is the amount of loan you received in Q79 less than, equal to or more than the amount 
that you ACTUALLY NEEDED for the purpose stated in Q78? (INTERVIWER: 
remind the respondent of answer to Q79) 
   Less than _____ ,     Equal to ______,    More than _______   
 
83. (If answer to Q80 is No) Why didn’t you accept the offered loan (answer more than one 
if necessary)? 
a. The amount of offered loan is too little for what I planned to invest   Yes_____ No____ 
b. I borrowed from friends instead      Yes_____
 No____ 
c. Interest rate is too high      Yes_____
 No____ 
d. I am afraid of losing collateral     Yes_____ No____ 
e. Loan products are not flexible enough to meet my ability to repay   Yes_____ No____ 
f. Other         Yes_____
 No____ 
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84. Do you think you have sufficient collateral to secure a higher loan amount than you 
identified in Q79?  Yes______,   No______ 
 
85. (If your answer to Q78 is less than Q79) what do you believe are the major reasons you 
were denied your partial or full credit request (answer more than one if necessary)? 
 
Reasons Very 
Likely 
Moderately 
likely 
Likely Not 
likely 
Not very 
likely 
a. Insufficient collateral        
b.Crops/Livestock subject to too 
much price risk   
     
c.Subject to too much yield risk      
d.The crop grown are vulnerable 
to the extreme weather 
     
e.I have failed to repay the loan in 
the past 
     
f.Bank does not believe I am 
trustworthy 
     
g.My bank doesn’t believe that I 
earned enough income   
     
h.The repayment schedule 
required by RCC does not match 
the timing of sales from my farm 
     
i.Could not find someone to 
guarantee loan 
     
j.Other      
 
SKIP TO Q89 
86.  (If answer to Q77 is No) Why you have not applied for loan from your buyer or bank 
in the last 2 years (answer more than one if necessary)? 
a. I do not need loan/ I do not invest  Yes_____ No____ 
b. I have own money and saving to invest  Yes_____ No____ 
c. I borrowed from friends    Yes_____ No____ 
d. Interest rate is too high    Yes_____ No____ 
e. I am afraid of losing collateral   Yes_____ No____ 
f. I am not a credit worthy    Yes_____ No____ 
g. I cannot get a guarantee    Yes_____ No____ 
h. Loan products are not flexible enough  
to meet my ability to repay  Yes_____ No____ 
i. Other      Yes_____ No____  
 
87. Do you believe you have sufficient collateral to obtain adequate farm credit? 
Yes ________,     No ________,     Not sure ________ 
 
88. (If answer to Q84 is No or Not sure) assuming that you had sufficient collateral to 
secure any amount of loan that you need to borrow. Would you borrow more? 
Yes ________,       No ________,      Not sure ________ 
 
CONTINUE TO Q89 
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89. When I make a decision of whether to borrow and how much to borrow, I consider the 
following: (Select only one option from each statement). 
 
a. I cannot risk losing my business. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____ 
 
b. I cannot risk not sending my kids to school. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____ 
 
c. I cannot risk not having enough money to buy food. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____ 
 
d. I cannot risk not having enough money for medical expenses. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____ 
 
e. I cannot risk not having a place to live. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree ___ Agree ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____ 
 
f. I cannot risk not having enough money when I am retired/old. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____ 
 
g. I cannot risk losing a chance for future credit. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____ 
 
h. I cannot risk losing my social reputation within the village. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____ 
 
i. I cannot risk not having enough savings to cover collateral losses. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____ 
 
j. I am old and I want to live securely. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____ 
 
k. I do not have skill outside off-farming. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  
____ 
 
90. (If answer to Q75 (g) OR Q86 (g) is Yes) If you could get guarantee, would you apply 
for loan?  Yes ____,   No ____ 
 
91. Are you currently considered a “Credit Worthy” borrower by your local bank or grain 
buyer? YES____,NO____ (e.g. have you received unsolicited credit cards or being 
offered line of credit) 
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92. How much do you currently owe to grain buyers or banks? $ __________ 
 
93.  Suppose that the current bank rate of interest is 20% per year. Assume that you can 
borrow as much as you need at this interest rate so that all of you credit needs are 
satisfied, if interest rates changed from 20% to the following rate, you would 
Monthly 
interest 
rate % 
Annual 
interest 
rate %  
Definitely 
Borrow a lot 
more  
(Yes) 
Definitely 
Borrow 
some  
Maybe 
borrow 
some 
Maybe 
borrow a 
little  
Definitely 
would not 
borrow 
(No) 
0.42% 5 % 1 2 3 4 5 
1.25% 15 %  1 2 3 4 5 
2.08% 25 % 1 2 3 4 5 
2.92% 35% 1 2 3 4 5 
3.75% 45 % 1 2 3 4 5 
4.58% 55 % 1 2 3 4 5 
5.83% 70 % 1 2 3 4 5 
7.50% 90 % 1 2 3 4 5 
 
94. If I could borrow more from my lender than I am currently borrowing at the same 
interest rate I would be more likely to borrow from my lender. 
Strongly Agree____ Moderately Agree_____ Agree_____ Disagree_____ Strongly Disagree ____ 
 
 
95. I would be willing to pay more than the current interest rate in order to obtain loan 
larger than my Bank or buyer currently provides. 
Strongly Agree____ Moderately Agree_____ Agree_____ Disagree_____ Strongly Disagree ____ 
 
96. If interest rates were lower than current interest rates I would be more likely to 
borrow from a lender. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____ 
 
97. If the cost of obtaining a loan (fees, non-interest charges) on buyers and bank loans 
were lower than current costs I would be more likely to borrow from a bank or a buyer. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
 
98. Have you ever been late in repaying a loan to the following lender? (INTERVIEWER: 
By ‘being late’ we mean that payment was not promptly paid as agreed upon by the 
lender, but payment was eventually made) 
 
 Yes No 
a.Friends,    
b.Relatives   
c.Formal Lenders (Financial Instit.)   
d.Suppliers/ Grain Buyers   
e.Money Lenders/ Pawn Shop   
f.Cooperative   
g.Other   
99. Have you ever defaulted (that is not repaid) on a loan from the following lender? 
(INTERVIEWER: By defaulting we mean that the loan was NEVER fully repaid as 
agreed upon by the lender) 
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 Yes No 
a.Friends,    
b.Relatives   
c.Formal Lenders (Fin. Instit)   
d.Suppliers/ Grain Buyers   
e.Money Lenders/ Pawn Shop   
f.Cooperative   
g.Other   
 
 
INTERVIEWER: Now I would like to ask you some questions about the saving and borrowing 
environment.  
 
100. What proportion of Household income are you able to save in a year? 
a) None         b) Less than 5% c) Between 5 and 10%  d) More than 10% 
 
101. What are the purposes of your savings (answer more than one if necessary)? 
a. I save because I have nothing to spend money on 
Strongly Agree____ Moderately Agree_____ Agree_____ Disagree_____ Strongly Disagree _____ 
 
b. I save to buy a house. 
Strongly Agree____ Moderately Agree_____ Agree_____ Disagree_____ Strongly Disagree _____ 
 
c. I save to purchase automobile 
Strongly Agree____ Moderately Agree_____ Agree_____ Disagree_____ Strongly Disagree _____ 
 
d. I save in case my automobile break down 
Strongly Agree____ Moderately Agree_____ Agree_____ Disagree_____ Strongly Disagree _____ 
 
e. I save for traveling/leisure expenses 
Strongly Agree____ Moderately Agree_____ Agree_____ Disagree_____ Strongly Disagree _____ 
 
f. I use my saving for future off-farm investment 
Strongly Agree____ Moderately Agree_____ Agree_____ Disagree_____ Strongly Disagree _____ 
 
g. I want to make sure that savings cover my loan  
Strongly Agree____ Moderately Agree_____ Agree_____ Disagree_____ Strongly Disagree _____ 
 
h. I save for unexpected medical emergency  
Strongly Agree____ Moderately Agree_____ Agree_____ Disagree_____ Strongly Disagree _____ 
 
i. I save to send kids to school/university  
Strongly Agree____ Moderately Agree_____ Agree_____ Disagree_____ Strongly Disagree _____ 
j. I save for child marriage 
Strongly Agree____ Moderately Agree_____ Agree_____ Disagree_____ Strongly Disagree _____ 
 
k. I save to take care of my parents  
Strongly Agree____ Moderately Agree_____ Agree_____ Disagree_____ Strongly Disagree _____ 
 
l. I save to protect job loss  
Strongly Agree____ Moderately Agree_____ Agree_____ Disagree_____ Strongly Disagree _____ 
 
m. I save for unanticipated crop loss 
Strongly Agree____ Moderately Agree_____ Agree_____ Disagree_____ Strongly Disagree _____ 
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n. I save to have ransom money 
Strongly Agree____ Moderately Agree_____ Agree_____ Disagree_____ Strongly Disagree _____ 
 
o. Other______________________________ 
Strongly Agree____ Moderately Agree_____ Agree_____ Disagree_____ Strongly Disagree _____ 
  
102. In your opinion, do you think saving is important? 
 Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree ___ Agree ____ Disagree ____ Strongly Disagree ____  
 
103.  
(a) I have any apprehension of obtaining a loan from a Bank or Buyers  
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
 
(b) I have unpaid debts on previous loans from bank or buyers. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
 
(c) Interest rates on buyers or bank loans are higher than interest rates on loans from friends or 
relatives. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
 
(d) Interest rates on buyers or bank loans are higher than I am able to pay. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
 
(e) I would prefer to borrow from a friend or relative. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
 
(f)  I do not like to be indebted to a bank or buyers. 
 Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
 
F. Credit Rationing Impact 
 
Please answer the following questions. Interviewer here we use the term ‘borrowing constraint’. By 
borrowing constraint we mean that the farmer cannot obtain all of the funds requested from a buyer 
or bank in the amounts or time frame required. 
104. If I faced a borrowing constraint I would use less input than is required for 
maximizing farm income. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
 
105. If I faced a borrowing constraint I would need wages from off-farm employment.  
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
 
106. If I faced a borrowing constraint I would not be able to provide a strong education and 
adequate health care for my children. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
 
107. If I faced a borrowing constraint my family members (including me) would not be 
able to get adequate food throughout the year. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
 
108. If I could get adequate credit as much credit as I needed from a bank or buyer, I 
would be more likely to (choose YES only one) 
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a) leave agriculture and start a non-farm enterprise    Yes_____ No____ 
b) leave agriculture and work as off-farm labor    Yes_____ No____ 
c) Remain in agriculture and expand agricultural production  Yes_____ No____ 
d) Remain in agriculture and also start a non farm business  Yes_____ No____ 
e) None of the above        Yes_____
 No____ 
 
109. I would prefer getting a loan at very low interest rate rather than borrow from 
relative. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
 
110. I would prefer getting a loan at the current market interest rate rather than borrow 
from a relative. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
 
111. I would prefer getting a loan at very low interest rate rather than borrow from a 
friend. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
 
112. I would prefer getting a loan at the current market interest rate rather than borrow 
from a friend. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
G. Land Use Rights 
113.  On average what is the price of a hectare in good conditions in your region? $_____ 
114.  We would like to turn our attention to the news media and learn about sources of 
communication in your community.  Please indicate how reliable you think each 
source of information is by marking your answer. 
 
   Source of Information       (Please circle your answer) 
1 Newspaper……………....………. 
 
Not 
Reliable 
Slightly 
Reliable 
Reliable Quite 
Reliable 
Very 
Reliable 
2 Tv/radio ……. …………………. 
 
Not 
Reliable 
 
Slightly 
Reliable 
 
Reliable 
 
Quite 
Reliable 
 
Very 
Reliable 
3 Internet…………. ….…………. Not 
Reliable 
 
Slightly 
Reliable 
 
Reliable 
 
Quite 
Reliable 
Very 
Reliable 
4 Family member 
……………..……. 
Not 
Reliable 
 
Slightly 
Reliable 
 
Reliable 
 
Quite 
Reliable 
Very 
Reliable 
5 Friend…….………………… 
 
Not 
Reliable 
 
Slightly 
Reliable 
 
Reliable 
 
Quite 
Reliable 
Very 
Reliable 
6 Local government official … Not 
Reliable 
Slightly 
Reliable 
Reliable Quite 
Reliable 
Very 
Reliable 
       
7 Local university/college……… Not 
Reliable 
Slightly 
Reliable 
Reliable Quite 
Reliable 
Very 
Reliable 
       
8 Village/local lender…………… Not 
Reliable 
Slightly 
Reliable 
Reliable Quite 
Reliable 
Very 
Reliable 
       
       
H. Risk Perceptions and Risk Motives         
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115. "Imagine an honest stranger comes up to you and offers a gamble with the payout 
depending on the flip of a coin. If the coin lands heads you get the amount in the first 
column and if it lands tails you get the amount in the second column. Each has a 50% 
chance of occurring. If the gamble was repeated by many flips of the coin you would 
expect to receive the amount in the third column. While the odds of receiving the 
amount in the first column are the same as the odds in the second column the high and 
low values are different. Study the six gambles in the table and select the one 
gamble that you would prefer".__________ 
Choice Gain in Good luck: 
50% chance 
Gain in Bad luck: 
50% chance 
Expected value: 
1 500 500 500 
2 950 450 700 
3 1200 400 800 
4 1500 300 900 
5 1900 100 1000 
6 2000 0 1000 
 
The following questions are voluntary. It would help to understand your situation by asking about 
important events that may have occurred in your life recently.   
116.  
117.  
118.  
119. In your house, is there a family member (within past 3 years) getting divorce?  
               Yes_____,  No_____ 
 
120. In your house, have you experienced (within past 3 years) death of a family member?   
Yes_____,    No_____ 
I. Perception of Insecurity 
 
121. Are you aware of the country’s current Drug War? 
Yes ________,  No ________,  Not sure ________ 
 
122. How safe do you think it is to live in your town / city? 
 
Very safe Completely 
safe 
Somewhat 
safe 
Not very 
safe 
Not safe at 
all 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
123. How concern are you regarding crime in your town? 
 
Not concerned 
at all 
Not 
much 
Little 
concerned 
A lot  A great 
deal 
1 2 3 4 5 
  
124. How concern are you regarding crime in your roads and highways? 
 
Not concerned 
at all 
Not much Little 
concerned 
A lot  A great 
deal 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
125. How much do you feel crime in your community has changed with respect to 2010? 
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Crime has 
decreased a lot 
Crime has 
decreased a 
little 
Remains 
the same  
Crime has 
increased a 
little 
Crime 
has 
increased 
a lot 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
126. How do you rate the level of violence in your town / city during the following years: 
 
Year Very Low Low  Normal High Very 
High 
2010      
2009      
2008      
127. How much do you feel crime in your roads / highways has changed with respect to 
2010? 
 
Crime has 
decreased a lot 
Crime has 
decreased a 
little 
Remains 
the same  
Crime has 
increased a little 
Crime has 
increased a 
lot 
1 2 3 4 5 
128. How do you rate the level of violence in your roads / highways during the following 
years: 
Year Very Low Low  Normal High Very 
High 
2010      
2009      
2008      
129. How confident are you that the County/State Police can respond and control a violent 
act by the criminals? 
Not at all 
confident 
Not very 
confident 
Somewhat 
confident 
Very confident Completely 
confident 
1 2 3 4 5 
130. How confident are you that the Mexican Army and Navy can respond and control a 
violent act by the criminals? 
Not at all 
confident 
Not very 
confident 
Somewhat 
confident 
Very confident Completely 
confident 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
131. Have you or do you know anybody that has been a victim of a violent crime within 
the last year? Yes____, No___ ; If YES, please select from the table the type of crime 
and whether it involved physical violence.  
 Carjack Armed 
Robbery 
Kidnap Extortion Homici
de 
 Viol
ence 
Non-
Viole
nce 
Violen
ce 
Non-
Viole
nce 
Violen
ce 
Non-
Viole
nce 
Vio
len
ce 
No
n-
Vio
len
ce 
 
Acquaintance          
Friend          
Relative          
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Family          
Self         ----------
- 
 
132. How concerned are you about you and your family’s safety? 
Not concerned 
at all 
Not much Little 
concerned 
A lot  A great deal 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
133. Do you feel that you or your family can become a victim of the followings crimes in 
the next 12 months? 
 Not at all 
likely 
Not very 
likely 
Somewhat 
likely 
Very 
likely 
Extremely 
likely 
Homicide      
Kidnapping      
Extortion      
Armed Robbery      
Carjack      
Beating       
 
134. How much do you dread your family being the victim of the following crimes in the 
next 12 months? 
 Not at all 
afraid 
Not very 
afraid 
Somewhat 
afraid 
Very 
afraid 
Extremely 
afraid 
Homicide      
Kidnapping      
Extortion      
Armed Robbery      
Carjack      
Beating       
 
135. How much do you dread being the victim of the following crimes in the next 12 
months? 
 Not at all 
afraid 
Not very 
afraid 
Somewhat 
afraid 
Very 
afraid 
Extremely 
afraid 
Homicide      
Kidnapping      
Extortion      
Armed Robbery      
Carjack      
Beating       
 
136. Do you feel that you or your family is at a greater risk of being a victim of a violent 
crime than other families in your town / city?   
Not at all Not much 
higher 
About the 
same 
Higher Much higher 
risk 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
137. Compared to the rest of the families in your town, do you feel that your family is 
perceived ? 
 Much less A little less About the 
same 
A little 
more 
Much 
more 
Wealthy (land)      
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Vulnerable      
Socially Active      
Having Liquid 
Assets (cash) 
     
 
I’m going to read to you some statements concerning narco violence. Please indicate how 
much you agree or disagree with each statement. The responses are from 1 to 5:  1= strongly 
disagree, 2= somewhat disagree, 3= somewhat agree, 4= strongly agree. 
 INTERVIEWER: IF THE PERSON DOESN’T KNOW OR REFUSES TO ANSWER PLEASE 
STATE IT. 
 
138. If I am stopped by a narco, it is certain that I will die._______ 
139. There are things that I can do in order to avoid being killed by narcos.________ 
140. If I am being extorted by a narco, I can sell my farm and move to a different town to 
build a new farm.________ 
141. A deliberated shooting by the narcos in town can kill many people._______ 
142. Living in a region where narco crime is common is a new type of risk to me._______ 
143. The Mexican Army can identify where narcos are located.________ 
144. I know a lot about the modus operandi of the narcos._______ 
145. The crimes from widespread activities of narcos can be controlled._______ 
146. The presence of narcos in my region can threaten future generations.________ 
147. Since I work at the farm, I am personally at risk by the presence of narcos in my 
region.______ 
148. Since I transit on the local roads, I am personally at risk by the presence of narcos in 
my region.______ 
149. Widespread presence of the narcos in the country can cause a national 
catastrophe._____ 
150. When narcos commit violent crimes, the Mexican Army can react quickly to prevent 
further damage.______ 
151. The risk of me being kidnap by narcos is increasing.________ 
152. The risk of me being kidnap by narcos can be easily reduced.________ 
153. The risk of me being carjacked by narcos is increasing.________ 
154. The risk of me being carjacked by narcos can be easily reduced.________ 
155. I can minimize the risk of being a victim of narco crime.________ 
156. Have you consider moving to a different town because of the risk of being a victim of 
violent crime?  
Never A few times Sometimes Many times All the time 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
157. Do you know anybody that has moved to a different town / city because of the fear of 
being victimized by the narcos? Yes____, No_____ 
i. If YES, what is your relation with them? Acquaintance______, 
Friend______, Relative______, Family_____ 
 
158. Have you changed your farming decisions because of the risk of violence?   
Yes___ ,  No____ 
 
159. Have you changed your daily activities because of the risk of violence? Yes____, 
No___ 
160. If the current level of violence continues, will you change your farming decisions?   
Yes___, No___ 
161. Please rank how much your farming decisions are affected by the following factors: 
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 Not 
Important  
  Neither    Extremely 
important 
Drought 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Hurricanes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Crop Price 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Input Prices 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Government 
Programs 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Yields 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Narco Violence 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Carjack  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
 
To be answered by interviewer only 
 
a) In your opinion the respondent was engaged in this survey and answered truthfully all 
questions? 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
 
b) In your opinion the quality of answers provided in this survey is adequate to include 
in any written reports. 
Strongly Agree ___ Moderately Agree  ___ Agree  ____ Disagree  ____ Strongly Disagree  ____  
 
Please make any other relevant comments here: 
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APPENDIX B 
MEXICAN FARMERS' SURVEY IN SPANISH 
Encuesta a Productores Agropecuarios 
A. Características Agrícolas y Actitud ante el Riesgo 
Fecha: mes____, día_____, año____ 
Clave del Entrevistador:________                       Nombre del Ejido__________________ 
1. Sexo del Entrevistado: 1) Masculino ________,  2) Femenino_______  
2. Edad: ________  
3. Estado civil: 1)Soltero___, 2)Casado___, 3)Divorciado___, 4)Viudo___, 5)Union Libre___  
4. Es usted jefe de familia? Sí_____, No_____  
5. ¿Tiene hijos?   A) 1. Si___, 2. No___  ;      B) ¿Cuántos?_____ 
6. Incluyéndose a usted mismo ¿Cuántas personas viven en su casa?_________ (este es el número total 
de personas que comparten la casa del entrevistado, incluidos niños, padres, etc)  
     A) ¿Cuántos son menores de 6 años de edad ?______;  1. ¿Cuántos de ellos son sus hijos ?____     
     B) ¿Cuántos son entre 6 y 18 años de edad (incluyen 6 y 18 años de edad)?______;  
           1. ¿Cuántos de ellos son sus hijos ?______  
           2. ¿Cuántos de ellos trabajan____, estudian____, ambos___ 
     C) ¿Cuántos son mayores de 18 años de edad ?______  
           1. ¿Cuántos de ellos son sus hijos ?______ 
           2. ¿Cuántos de ellos trabajan___, estudian____, ambos?___  
      D) ¿Cuáles son las edades de las personas más grande y más joven que viven en su casa?  
           1. Más grande______, 2. Más joven______  
7. ¿Cuál es su nivel de educación más alto? (Seleccione solo una opción): 
a. Nunca fue a la escuela_____  0 
b. Cursó algo de escuela primaria _____ 1 
c. Terminó la escuela primaria _____  2 
d. Cursó algo de escuela secundaria _____  3 
e. Terminó la escuela secundaria _____  4 
f. Cursó algo de bachillerato_____  5 
g. Terminó el bachillerato_____ 6 
h. Cursó algo de escuela tecnológica o universidad_____  7 
i. Terminó la escuela tecnológica o universidad _____  8 
 
8. ¿Tiene algún grupo de amigos con el cual se reúne regularmente para actividades sociales? 
(Comida, bebidas, juegos, café): Sí_____, No_____ 
9. Conteste si respondió Sí en P8,   A) ¿Cuántas veces se reúne con su grupo de amigos al mes 
?______ ;      B)  ¿Qué tan grande es su grupo de amigos?_______  
10. A) ¿Cuántas veces al mes, se reúne para actividades sociales con su familia o parientes ?______ ;   
B)  ¿Qué tan grandes son sus reuniones con su familia o parientes?_______  
11. ¿Usted pertenece a algún grupo social en su comunidad (por ejemplo, religioso, grupo de 
voluntarios, clubes, etc.)?    Si_____, No_____ (esto no incluye alguna asociación de productores)  
12. ¿Usted se considera bien informado sobre los acontecimientos diarios en su comunidad o región? 
(seleccione solo una): 
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1) Total desacuerdo____,   2) Poco de acuerdo___,   3) Más o menos de acuerdo_____,   
4) De Acuerdo___, 5) Totalmente de acuerdo_____ 
13. ¿Se considera usted una persona religiosa?  
1) Total desacuerdo____,   2) Poco de acuerdo___,   3) Más o menos de acuerdo_____,   
4) De Acuerdo___, 5) Totalmente de acuerdo_____ 
14. ¿Cuántas veces en promedio asiste usted a celebraciones religiosas al mes? __ 
15. ¿Cuál es su religión? 1).Católica_____, 2).Bautista____, 3).Pentecostal____, 4). Mormón____, 
4). Adventistas del 7 
º
 día____, 6). Testigo de Jehová____, 7). Otro_____________ (especificar)  
16. ¿Durante cuántos años se ha dedicado a la agricultura? ________  
17. Su predio: 1). Fue comprado por usted _____, 2). Heredado_____, 3). Asignado por un grupo 
social o por el gobierno_____, 4). Otro__________  
 
A) Si usted heredó su predio, ¿Era de sus padres? SI___, NO____  
B) ¿Cuantas generaciones ha pertenecido el predio a su familia?____  (Si los padres lo compraron, 
entonces es de 2 
ª
 generación, y así sucesivamente.)  
 
18. En cuanto a su predio, Usted : (seleccione solo una opción) 
1. Es propietario único ______  
2. No es propietario pero renta tierra____ 
3. Es propietario en asociación (varios propietarios )____  
4. Es propietario y renta tierra _______  
19. ¿Cuál es el tamaño total en hectáreas de la finca, o fincas, de su propiedad excluyendo lo 
rentado? ______________ 
 
 
20. ¿Usted renta tierra adicional a la suya para producción? Si___, No___  
A) En caso afirmativo, ¿Cuántas hectáreas adicionales renta usted solo?_________ 
 
B) ¿Cuántas hectáreas adicionales renta en sociedad?_____________ 
 
21. Si usted renta tierra, ¿Paga un precio por hectárea 1) ______, una fracción de la producción 
2)______, o ambos 3) ______?  (Seleccione solo uno)  A). Si paga en efectivo, ¿cuánto paga en 
promedio por hectárea al año? $________   B). Si usted paga con parte de la producción, ¿Qué 
fracción, en porcentaje, da al propietario como pago por la renta?_______%  
 
22. ¿Algún otro miembro de su hogar es propietario o renta tierra para la producción? Si___, No___ 
A). En caso afirmativo, ¿Cuál es la cantidad total de tierra en ha, en propiedad o arrendamiento, 
que se utiliza para la producción por todos los miembros de su familia excepto a usted mismo? 
___ 
 
23. ¿Vive usted en su finca? Si___, No___  
A). Si no, ¿A qué distancia vive usted de su finca, o finca principal, en kilómetros?_______Km.  
B). ¿Cuánto tiempo le toma llegar a su finca, o finca principal? _____ Min.  
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24. Durante la temporada agrícola, ¿cuántas veces por semana fue a su finca para verificar la siembra? 
(Por favor, rellene los cuadros) 
Etapa de la producción 2009  2010  2011  
A)Preparación y Siembra    
B)Crecimiento    
C)Cosecha     
 
25. ¿Cuenta con riego en su finca? Si____, No___   
26. ¿Usa usted fertilizantes? Si____, No_____  
27. ¿Usa usted plaguicidas? Si____, No_____  
28. ¿Es usted propietario único 1)____, Propietario parcial 2)_____ ,o renta3) ______ tractores 
agrícolas? (Seleccione todas las que correspondan).  
29. En promedio, tengo _________ empleados pagados, y ________ trabajadores familiares no 
remunerados.  (Por favor escriba un número en cada espacio). 
30. ¿Aproximadamente por cuánto tiempo, en meses, los contrata en promedio por año? empleados 
pagados ______, trabajadores familiares no remunerados _______ (Escriba el número aproximado 
en meses que los emplea) 
31. ¿Tiene algún préstamo agrícola? Si____, No_____  
A) En caso afirmativo, ¿Cuál es el monto total aproximado? ________ 
B) Aproximadamente, ¿Cuál es la tasa de interés porcentual que paga?1) ______% por mes, o  
2)_______% por año. (Llenar sólo una)  
32. Durante la temporada de lluvias puedo acceder al________% (0 - 100%) de mi finca (Escribir un 
porcentaje)  
33. En general, ¿Cómo describiría el clima de negocios, de 1 a 5, para los agricultores de su región en 
los años que se indican? Para el año 2012 por favor indique sus expectativas.  
1 = muy mala, 2 = mala, 3 = normal, 4 = buena,  5 =muy buena.  
(Por favor, rellene en los cuadros con la respuesta del 1 al 5)  
2009  2010  2011  2012  
    
 
34. Si usted pertenece a un ejido, ¿Es miembro activo en el proceso de toma de decisiones?  
Sí__, No__  
35. Por favor escriba los cinco cultivos principales, ganado o renta que percibe de sus tierras, en 
los cuadros a la derecha de cada número (1-5), que haya producido en los años 2009, 2010, 2011 
y su plan para el próximo año, 2012, por cantidad de tierra utilizada para cada cultivo o cría, sus 
rendimientos (ton / ha) y su precio de venta (pesos / ton) Si no conoce exactamente los valores, 
indique un aproximado.  
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Por ejemplo, si sembró maíz, crio ganado y rentó tierra, entonces puede poner: 1) Maíz 30Ha 
2ton/ha $5,500/ton; 2) ganado 20Ha 10vacas $4,000; 3) Renta 50Ha   $1,500/ Ha  
Año  Orden de 
importancia   
Cultivo / 
ganadería  / 
renta 
Superficie 
total (Ha) 
Rendimientos (ton / 
ha) / número de 
cabezas de ganado 
Precio (pesos 
/ ton) o 
(pesos / 
cabeza   
 
2009 
1     
2     
3     
4     
5     
 
Año  Orden de 
importancia   
Cultivo / 
ganadería  / 
renta 
Superficie 
total (Ha) 
Rendimientos (ton / ha) / 
número de cabezas de 
ganado 
Precio (pesos / 
ton) o (pesos / 
cabeza 
 
2010 
1     
2     
3     
4     
5     
 
Año  Orden de 
importancia   
Cultivo / 
ganadería  / 
renta 
Superficie 
total (Ha) 
Rendimientos (ton / 
ha) / número de 
cabezas de ganado 
Precio (pesos 
/ ton) o 
(pesos / 
cabeza) 
 
2011 
1     
2     
3     
4     
5     
Plan para el próximo año:  
Año Orden de 
importancia 
Cultivo / 
ganadería  / 
renta 
Superficie 
total (Ha) 
Rendimientos (ton / 
ha) / número de 
cabezas de ganado 
Precio (pesos / 
ton) o (pesos / 
cabeza) 
 
2012 
1     
2     
3     
4     
5     
 
36. Aproximadamente, ¿cuánto fue el total de ingresos (ventas) de sus actividades agrícolas o de sus 
tierras en los últimos 12 meses? $_______________________ 
A) Aproximadamente cual fue su costo total de producción agrícola en los últimos 12 meses? 
$________ 
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37. Aproximadamente, ¿qué porcentaje de sus ingresos totales proviene de sus actividades agrícolas? 
_____%   
38. ¿Recibe usted apoyos de Procampo? Sí_____, No_____  
A)En caso afirmativo, ¿cuánto recibió de Procampo el año pasado? $______ 
B)¿Usted: 1) Produce en su tierra con Procampo, 2) renta su tierra con Procampo, o 3) presta ,sin 
recibir pago, su tierra con Procampo a otros agricultores para que ellos la trabajen? ________ 
(Escriba todas las que correspondan: 1, 2 o 3).  
39. ¿Recibe usted algún otro subsidio en efectivo, además de Procampo? Si____, No_____  
A).  ¿Usted o algún miembro de su familia reciben Progresa? Si___, No___  
B).  En caso afirmativo, ¿Cuánto recibió de Progresa el año pasado? $__________  
C).  ¿Cuánto recibió de otros apoyos en efectivo el año pasado? $_______  
40. ¿Cuál fue su ingreso total en el último año de todas sus fuentes de ingresos, incluidos los 
ingresos de trabajo formal e informal, empleo, agricultura, programas de gobierno, ganadería y 
remesas (por favor de su mejor estimación)?  (no incluye gastos) $_____________________ 
 
 
41. ¿Cuál fue el ingreso total neto, (descontando de su ingreso total  todos sus gastos de 
producción agrícola), en el último año a partir de cualquier fuente, incluidos la agricultura, trabajo 
formal e informal, la ganadería, y las remesas (por favor de su mejor estimación)?  
(Esto es igual a los ingresos (P40) menos todos los gastos de producción (salarios, insumos, 
preparación de tierra) $________________ 
 
 
 
42. ¿Cuánto gasta en promedio por mes en su casa? (Esto incluye comida, escuela, electricidad, gas, 
salarios, diversión) $________   
43. ¿Cuánto ahorra en promedio por año? $______   
44. Por favor de aproximadamente el porcentaje de sus ingresos agrícolas totales que provienen de 
ganado ____________%  
(Estime este número si no sabe exactamente) 
 
B. Fuentes y Percepciones de riesgo 
45. Por favor, indique del 1 al 5 si está dispuesto o no a asumir riesgos (Marque la respuesta más 
apropiada). 1= Total desacuerdo (NO), 2= Poco de acuerdo, 3= Mas o menos de acuerdo,  
4= De acuerdo, 5= Totalmente de acuerdo (SI).   Seleccione un número por cada declaración. 
Declaración NO  Tal Vez  SI 
A) Estoy dispuesto a aceptar mayores riesgos de 
producción para aumentar la posibilidad de 
mayores ganancias  
1 2 3 4 5 
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B) Estoy dispuesto a correr riesgos con nuevas 
tecnologías antes de ver buenos resultados en 
otras fincas 
1 2 3 4 5 
C) Estoy dispuesto a correr riesgos con nuevas 
prácticas de manejo antes de ver buenos 
resultados en otras fincas 
1 2 3 4 5 
(Tecnologías se refieren a nuevas semillas, fertilizantes, etc., las prácticas de manejo 
se refiere a la rotación de cultivos, uso de contratos, uso de seguros agrícolas) 
46. Si usted cultiva maíz, sorgo o soya por favor indique el precio más bajo que cree sea posible, el 
precio que usted crea que tenga más probabilidades de ser, y el precio más alto que usted crea 
posible para la temporada siguiente para todos los cultivos (2011/ 2012)  
(Para cada cultivo, las respuestas del más bajo, lo más probable y la más alta, queremos sólo 
su  juicio personal acerca de lo que los precios podrían ser. El precio más probable es el 
precio  esperan recibir en la próxima cosecha.  Nota: Lo más probable puede ser la misma 
que lo más bajo o más alto)  
(Por favor, rellene las casillas)  
Cultivo  1) Precio más bajo 
posible  
(pesos / ton)  
2) Precio más 
probable  
(pesos / ton)  
3) Precio más alto 
posible  
(pesos / ton)  
A) Maíz     
B) Sorgo     
C) Soya     
47. Si usted cultiva maíz, sorgo o soya, por favor indique el rendimiento más bajo que considere sea 
posible, el rendimiento que usted considere sea el más probable que reciba, y el rendimiento más 
alto que considere posible para la temporada siguiente para todos los cultivos (2011/ 2012). 
Nota: Lo más probable puede ser la misma como lo más bajo o más alto)  
(Por favor, rellene las casillas)  
Cultivo  1) Rendimiento más bajo 
posible  
(ton / ha)  
2) Rendimiento más 
probable  
(ton / ha)  
3) Rendimiento más alto 
posible  
(ton / ha)  
A) Maíz     
B) Sorgo     
C) Soya     
48. Si usted cultiva maíz, sorgo o soya cuál ha sido el menor y mayor rendimiento de estos cultivos 
(ton / ha) que usted recuerde en todos sus años en la agricultura?  
(Por favor, rellene las casillas)  
Cultivo  1) Menor 
rendimiento 
2) Año en 
que se 
3) Mayor 
rendimiento 
4) Año en que 
se produjo  
5)  Rendimiento 
promedio 
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histórico  
(Ton / ha)  
produjo  histórico  
(Ton / ha)  
histórico. 
(rendimiento 
normal) 
 
(Ton / ha) 
A) Maíz       
B) Sorgo       
C) Soya       
C. Opciones y Percepciones para Manejo de Riesgos 
49. Por favor, indique la importancia que usted cree que cada artículo tenga en términos de manejo 
de riesgos en su finca. También marque en el espacio si usted utiliza la opción para manejo de 
riesgo en su operación. Seleccione:  
1 = Nada importante,  2 = Poco importante,  3 = Neutral, 4 = Importante,   5 = Muy importante 
(Marque la respuesta más apropiada).  seleccione en el cuadro en blanco si utiliza la opción. 
Circule del 1 al 5, incluso si usted no utiliza la opción de manejo de riesgo.  
Opciones de gestión de riesgos 
Marqu
e si lo 
utiliza  
Nada importante                Muy 
Importante  
A) Sembrar más de un cultivo, cría de 
animales, o la diversificación agrícola  
 1 2 3 4 5 
B) Tierra o fincas en diferentes ubicaciones 
(diversificación geográfica)  
 1 2 3 4 5 
C) Riego   1 2 3 4 5 
D) Difusión de las ventas: Vender cada 
producto a lo largo del año en lugar de todo 
a la misma vez  
 1 2 3 4 5 
E) El uso de contratos para comercializar su 
cosecha por adelantado a un precio fijo  
 1 2 3 4 5 
F) Los programas de gobierno   1 2 3 4 5 
G) El mantenimiento de las reservas 
financieras: tener dinero en efectivo y 
activos líquidos (por ejemplo, maquinarias, 
ganado)  
 1 2 3 4 5 
H) La inversión no agrícola para tener otras 
fuentes de ingresos  
 1 2 3 4 5 
I) Trabajo formal fuera de la finca, 
empleado.  
 1 2 3 4 5 
 
50.  
51.  
52. Cuando elijo qué cultivos sembrar, tomo mi  decisión en base a: 
 (Por favor circule el número apropiado de 1 - 5).  
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D. Uso de Seguros para Cultivos y Percepciones  
El seguro de cosecha es una herramienta común utilizada por los agricultores estadounidenses. El 
seguro de cosecha se paga si el rendimiento de la cosecha cae por debajo de un cierto porcentaje de su 
rendimiento promedio. Por ejemplo, si su rendimiento promedio es de 2 ton / ha para un cultivo en 
particular, el seguro puede proporcionar un pago si el rendimiento del cultivo actual cae por debajo de 
este promedio. Por ejemplo, si el rendimiento real es 1ton/ha entonces usted recibirá un pago basado 
en la diferencia entre las dos toneladas y 1ton (= 1 tonelada),  por el precio promedio de la cosecha. Si 
el precio es de $ 2,000 / ton entonces usted recibirá $ 2,000 * (2-1) = $ 2,000, pero si los rendimientos 
son superiores a 2 toneladas / ha no recibe nada de la aseguradora.  
53. ¿Hay seguros de cultivos actualmente disponibles para usted?  
Sí_____, No_____ (Si no, pase a P 56)  
54. (Conteste si la respuesta a P 53 es afirmativa) ¿Usted compra seguros de cosecha?  
Sí_____, No_____ (Si no, pase a P 57)  
55. (Conteste si la respuesta es Sí a P 53) Liste los cultivos para los cuales compra seguros de 
cosecha. ¿Cuánto paga de prima de seguro por hectárea?  
Cultivos  Prima del seguro (pesos / Ha)  
1   
2   
3   
4   
5   
56. (Si la respuesta a P 53 es No) En caso de que le ofrezcan seguros de cosecha, ¿Cree usted que los 
compraría? Sí_____, No_____  
57. Si usted cultiva maíz, sorgo o soya, ¿cuál cultivo cree usted que tenga una mayor probabilidad de 
una pérdida significativa de rendimiento en el próximo año?  
Maíz ________, Sorgo _______, Soya _______  
Factores No es un 
factor  
   Factor muy 
importante  
A)El precio actual de la cosecha  1 2 3 4 5 
B) La variación en el precio  1 2 3 4 5 
C)El rendimiento medio por 
hectárea  
1 2 3 4 5 
D)La variación en el rendimiento 
por hectárea  
1 2 3 4 5 
E)El costo promedio por hectárea 1 2 3 4 5 
F)La variación en el costo por 
hectárea  
1 2 3 4 5 
G)El grado de violencia en la zona  1 2 3 4 5 
 292 
 
(Sólo puede seleccionar uno. Seleccione el cultivo que siembra si sólo siembra uno)  
Por favor, seleccione P 58, P 59 o P 60 basado en el cultivo que eligió en el P 57.  
58. (Conteste si selecciono MAIZ en P 57) Imagine un producto de seguro de cosechas que garanticen 
que sus ingresos de ventas por hectárea nunca serán inferiores a $ 9,800 / ha para el maíz. 
Teniendo en cuenta todos los rendimientos de las cosechas anteriores, y lo que usted cree sobre el 
rendimiento del cultivo para el próximo año. Producto puesto en reciba. 
A)¿Estaría usted dispuesto a pagar $1,470 / ha para garantizar un mínimo de venta de $9,800 / ha.?  
1) Definitivamente lo compro (Si)__, 2) Probablemente lo compro ___,  
3) Probablemente no lo compro_____, 4) Definitivamente no lo compro (No)_____  
B)¿Estaría usted dispuesto a pagar $785/ ha para garantizar un mínimo de venta de $9,800 / ha.?  
1) Definitivamente lo compro (Si)__, 2) Probablemente lo compro ___,  
3) Probablemente no lo compro_____, 4) Definitivamente no lo compro (No)_____ 
C)¿Estaría usted dispuesto a pagar $295 / ha para garantizar un mínimo de venta de $9,800 / ha.?  
1) Definitivamente lo compro (Si)__, 2) Probablemente lo compro ___,  
3) Probablemente no lo compro_____, 4) Definitivamente no lo compro (No)_____ 
D)¿Estaría usted dispuesto a pagar $50/ ha para garantizar un mínimo de venta de $9,800 / ha.?  
1) Definitivamente lo compro (Si)__, 2) Probablemente lo compro ___,  
3) Probablemente no lo compro_____, 4) Definitivamente no lo compro (No)_____ 
59. (Conteste si selecciono SORGO en P 57) Imagine un producto de seguro de cosechas que 
garanticen que sus ingresos de ventas por hectárea nunca serán inferiores a $ 6,500 / ha para el 
sorgo. Teniendo en cuenta todos los rendimientos de las cosechas anteriores, y lo que usted cree 
sobre el rendimiento del cultivo para el próximo año. Producto puesto en reciba. 
A). ¿Estaría usted dispuesto a pagar $975 / ha para garantizar un mínimo de venta de $6,500 / ha.?  
1) Definitivamente lo compro (Si)__, 2) Probablemente lo compro ___,  
3) Probablemente no lo compro_____, 4) Definitivamente no lo compro (No)_____  
B)¿Estaría usted dispuesto a pagar $520/ ha para garantizar un mínimo de venta de $6,500 / ha.?  
1) Definitivamente lo compro (Si)__, 2) Probablemente lo compro ___,  
3) Probablemente no lo compro_____, 4) Definitivamente no lo compro (No)_____ 
C).¿Estaría usted dispuesto a pagar $195/ ha para garantizar un mínimo de venta de $6,500 / ha.?  
1) Definitivamente lo compro (Si)__, 2) Probablemente lo compro ___,  
3) Probablemente no lo compro_____, 4) Definitivamente no lo compro (No)_____ 
D)¿Estaría usted dispuesto a pagar $32 / ha para garantizar un mínimo de venta de $6,500 / ha.?  
1) Definitivamente lo compro (Si)__, 2) Probablemente lo compro ___,  
3) Probablemente no lo compro_____, 4) Definitivamente no lo compro (No)_____ 
60. (Conteste si selecciono SOYA en P 57) Imagine un producto de seguro de cosechas que garanticen 
que sus ingresos de ventas por hectárea nunca serán inferiores a $ 8,600 / ha para la soya. 
Teniendo en cuenta todos los rendimientos de las cosechas anteriores, y lo que usted cree sobre el 
rendimiento del cultivo para el próximo año. Producto puesto en reciba. 
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A).¿Estaría usted dispuesto a pagar $1,290 / ha para garantizar un mínimo de venta de $8,600 / ha.?  
1) Definitivamente lo compro (Si)__, 2) Probablemente lo compro ___,  
3) Probablemente no lo compro_____, 4) Definitivamente no lo compro (No)_____  
B).¿Estaría usted dispuesto a pagar $670/ ha para garantizar un mínimo de venta de $8,600 / ha.?  
1) Definitivamente lo compro (Si)__, 2) Probablemente lo compro ___,  
3) Probablemente no lo compro_____, 4) Definitivamente no lo compro (No)_____ 
C).¿Estaría usted dispuesto a pagar $260 / ha para garantizar un mínimo de venta de $8,600 / ha.?  
1) Definitivamente lo compro (Si)__, 2) Probablemente lo compro ___,  
3) Probablemente no lo compro_____, 4) Definitivamente no lo compro (No)_____ 
D).¿Estaría usted dispuesto a pagar $43 / ha para garantizar un mínimo de venta de $8,600 / ha.?  
1) Definitivamente lo compro (Si)__, 2) Probablemente lo compro ___,  
3) Probablemente no lo compro_____, 4) Definitivamente no lo compro (No)_____ 
  
Continúe con la P61 
61. Teniendo en cuenta todos los aspectos del hogar, incluyendo su finca, consultas medicas y 
operaciones, su casa y contenidos, automóviles, maquinaria y equipo ¿Suele comprar un seguro 
para cualquiera de los siguientes elementos? (Dejar en blanco si no aplica):  
a. Seguro de Vida: Sí_____ No____  
b. Seguro contra incendios para el hogar y su contenido: Sí_____ No____  
c. Seguro de Automóviles: Sí_____ No____  
d. Seguro médico (no seguro social): Sí_____ No____  
e. Protección contra la pérdida de cultivos (seguro de cosechas): Sí_____ No____  
f. Protección contra la pérdida de ganado (seguro ganadero): Sí_____ No____  
g. Otros ____________________________________________  
62. Si existiera un tipo de préstamo que le  proteja contra el exceso de lluvia o duración de la sequía, de 
tal manera que su deuda disminuyese al aumentar la duración de la sequía o la intensidad de las 
lluvias. ¿Estaría usted interesado en un préstamo con este tipo de seguro aunque tuviera que pagar 
una mayor tasa de interés?  
1). No, en absoluto ____,  2). Moderadamente interesado_____,  3). Muy Interesado_____  
 
 
63.  
E. Finanzas y Gestión de Riesgos 
64. ¿Tiene usted alguna deuda pendiente? Si____,  No _____  
A).EN CASO AFIRMATIVO, indique la cantidad total de dinero que debe $___________  
B). Por favor, indique la cantidad total de dinero que usted debe y la tasa de interés que le cobran de:  
1   2 
 Monto del préstamo 
$  
Tasa de interés anual 
%  
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A) Amigos   
B)  Familiares    
C)  Instituciones financieras    
D) Prestamistas / Casa de empeño    
E) Préstamos del gobierno   
F) Compradores   
G) Proveedores de Insumos    
H) Asociación de productores   
I) Otros   
 
 
65. Si usted vendiera todos sus bienes (casa, tierras, ganado, productos agrícolas, etc.) ¿Cuánto 
estima usted que pueda recibir? $______________ 
  
 
66. En cuanto al monto total actual de sus deudas, activos y productividad, ¿qué piensa usted acerca de 
su nivel de endeudamiento? (Marque solamente uno)  
A).           1). Muy bajo___,     2) Bajo___,    3) Adecuado___,   4) Alto___,  5) Muy alto___  
B).  ¿Alguna vez le han negado un préstamo el Comprador, Banco, Gobierno o cualquier institución 
financiera?    Si____,   No____  
C).  En caso afirmativo, ¿cuáles son las razones principales por las que se le negó el crédito? 
(Responda a más de uno si es necesario)  
1). Garantías insuficientes ___________  
2). Mi principal fuente de ingresos tiene demasiado riesgo en el precio ______ 
3). No he podido pagar un préstamo en el pasado __________  
4). El banco no cree que yo pueda pagar ___________  
5). Las fechas de pagos requeridos por el banco / prestamista no coincide con las fechas de venta de mis 
productos ________  
 
67. ¿Ha podido obtener un crédito de compradores, bancos o prestamistas, para todo lo que necesita? 
(Marque sólo uno) :   1). Nunca ____,  2). A veces ___,  3) Siempre_____ 
A). Conteste si selecciono 2) A veces, ¿Qué porcentaje aproximado de los préstamos que ha pedido se 
le otorgaron en la cantidad total que usted solicitó? ______%  
68. ¿Alguna vez se ha atrasado en el pago de un préstamo de las siguientes fuentes?  
(Por "atrasar" nos referimos a que el pago no fue pagado puntualmente según lo acordado por el 
prestamista, pero el pago se hizo después.)  
a. Parientes:  Sí_____,  No______  
b. Amigos:    Sí_____,  No______  
c. Prestamistas:  Sí_____,  No______  
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d. Gobierno:  Sí_____,  No______  
e. Compradores:  Sí_____,  No______  
f. Proveedores de Insumos: Sí_____,  No______  
g. Banco Comercial:  Sí_____,  No______  
h. Asociación de Productores:   Si_____,   No_____ 
i. Otros   Sí_____,  No______  
69. ¿Alguna vez ha dejado de pagar un préstamo de las siguientes fuentes? (ENTREVISTADOR: Por 
incumplimiento se entiende que el préstamo nunca fue reembolsado según lo acordado por el 
prestamista)  
a. Parientes:   Sí_____,  No______  
b. Amigos:     Sí ____,  No______  
c. Prestamistas: Sí_____,  No______  
d. Gobierno: Sí_____,  No______  
e. Compradores:  Sí_____,  No______  
f. Proveedores de Insumos: Sí_____,  No______  
g. Banco Comercial: Sí_____,  No______  
h. Asociación de Productores: Sí_____,  No______ 
i. Otros: Sí_____,  No______  
70. En su región, ¿Cuál de estas dos afirmaciones es la correcta?  
A) Los compradores o  los bancos evalúan mi solvencia  y me ofrecen un préstamo o tarjeta 
de crédito sin que yo lo solicite. VERDADERO______,  FALSO________ 
B) Debo solicitar formalmente un préstamo de mi comprador o banco: 
VERDADERO_______,  FALSO_______ 
(P 70 A y B son mutuamente excluyentes: si uno es falso el otro es verdadero)  
SI  P 70 B es verdadero pase a la P 77, de lo contrario continúe en la P71. 
 
71. (Conteste si la respuesta a la P 70 A es VERDADERO) Sobre la OFERTA más reciente de 
préstamo o de tarjeta de crédito, aproximadamente ¿cuánto le ofreció el comprador o el banco 
prestarle? $__________ (límite de la tarjeta de crédito u oferta de préstamo)  
72. De la cantidad ofrecida en P 71, ¿Qué cantidad del préstamo (en Pesos) utilizó? (No deje en blanco. 
Ponga 0 si no se utilizó, si no sabe ponga 9999) $_______________  
73. (Conteste si la respuesta a P 72 es mayor a cero) ¿En que se utilizó el préstamo mencionado en la 
P 72  (marque más de una respuesta si es necesario)?  
a. Producción agrícola:    Sí_____,  No____  
b. Construcción / renovación de la casa:   Sí_____,  No____  
c. Compra de coche / moto / bicicleta:    Sí_____,  No____  
d. Gasto diario de la casa:     Sí_____,  No____  
e. Gastos médicos:              Sí_____,  No____  
f. Gastos de educación:       Sí_____,  No____  
g. Otros:    Sí_____,     No____ 
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74. ¿Es la cantidad del préstamo que utilizó en P 72 menor, igual o mayor a la cantidad que realmente 
necesitó para el propósito indicado en la P 73? (ENTREVISTADOR: recordar al entrevistado la 
respuesta a P 72)  
                         A) Menor _____,              B) Igual ______,          C) Mayor  _______  
75. (Conteste si la respuesta a P 72 es menor a P 71) Si la cantidad utilizada fue menor que la 
cantidad que el prestamista le ofreció, ¿Cuales cree usted que son las principales razones de que no 
haya utilizado el importe total del crédito ofrecido? (responda más de uno si es necesario)  
a. Yo no necesito de préstamos / No invierto:  Sí_____,  No____  
b. Tengo dinero y ahorros para invertir:        Sí_____,  No____  
c. Me prestaron mis amigos:              Sí_____,  No____  
d. La tasa de interés es muy alta:       Sí_____,  No____  
e. Tengo miedo de perder la garantía:     Sí_____,  No____  
f. No creen que pueda pagar el préstamo:  Sí_____,   No____  
g. No puedo obtener una garantía:       Sí_____,  No____  
h. Los prestamos no son lo suficientemente flexibles para cumplir con mi capacidad de 
pago:     Sí_____,  No____  
i. Otros:     Sí_____,   No____   
76. ¿Cree usted que tiene una garantía suficiente para asegurar un monto de préstamo más alto que el 
identifico en la P 71?  Sí________,   No______  
PASE A LA P 89  
 
77. (Conteste si la respuesta a P 70 B es verdadero) ¿Ha solicitado un préstamo de su banco o 
comprador en  los últimos 2 años?        Sí____,    No_______    (Si la respuesta es Sí, continúe 
con la P 78; Si no, pase a P 86)  
78. (Conteste si respuesta a P 77 es Sí) En la solicitud de préstamo más reciente ¿Cuál es la cantidad 
que solicitó aproximadamente? $__________  
79. ¿Cuánto dinero le ofreció el comprador o el banco? $____________         
 (escriba 0 si el préstamo fue negado)  
80. (Conteste si la respuesta a P 79 es mayor a cero) ¿Aceptó el préstamo ofrecido?  
   Sí______,   No_______         (Si la respuesta es Sí, continúe con la P 81; Si no, pase a P 83)  
81. (Conteste si la respuesta a P 80 es Sí) ¿Para qué fines utilizó el préstamo ofrecido?  (responda a 
más de uno si es necesario)  
a. Producción agrícola:   Sí_____,    No____  
b. Construcción / renovación de la casa:    Sí_____,   No____  
c. Compra de coche / moto / bicicleta:   Sí_____,   No____  
d. Gasto diario de la casa:     Sí_____,  No____  
e. Gastos médicos:              Sí_____,   No____  
f. Gastos de educación:       Sí_____,   No____  
g. Otros:    Sí_____,    No____ 
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82. ¿Es la cantidad del préstamo que recibió en la P 79 menor,  igual o mayor que la cantidad que 
realmente necesitó para lo indicado en la P 81? (ENTREVISTADOR: recordar al entrevistado su  
respuesta a P 79)  
A) Menor _____,               B) Igual ______,                C) Mayor _______  
83. (Conteste si la respuesta a la P 80 es No) ¿Por qué no aceptó el préstamo ofrecido? (responda a 
más de uno si es necesario)  
a. El importe del préstamo ofrecido es muy poco para lo que planeaba invertir: Sí_____,   
No____  
b. Me prestaron mis amigos:    Sí_____,   No____  
c. La tasa de interés es muy alta:     Sí_____,   No____  
d. Tengo miedo de perder la garantía:   Sí_____,   No____  
e. Los prestamos no son lo suficientemente flexibles para cumplir con mi capacidad de 
pago:  Sí_____,   No____  
f. Otros:    Sí_____,  No____  
84. ¿Cree usted que tiene una garantía suficiente para asegurar un préstamo más alto del que mencionó 
en la P 79?   Sí______,    No______  
 
 
 
85. (Conteste si su respuesta a la P 78 es menor a la P 79) ¿Cuáles cree usted que sean las principales 
razones por las que se le negó total o parcialmente su solicitud de crédito? (conteste más de una 
respuesta si es necesario)  
                                1                   2            3                 4               5      
Razones Altamente 
probable  
Muy 
probable  
Probable  Poco 
probable  
No es 
probable  
a. Garantía insuficiente      
b. Demasiado riesgo en el precio      
c. Demasiado riesgo en la 
producción 
     
d. El cultivo es demasiado 
vulnerable al clima 
     
e. Yo no he podido pagar un 
préstamo en el pasado 
     
f. El banco cree que yo no puedo 
pagar el préstamo 
     
g. El banco cree que no tengo un 
ingreso suficiente 
     
h. Las fechas de pago requerido 
por el banco no coincide con las 
fechas de venta de mis 
productos. 
     
i. No tuve aval para el préstamo.      
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j. Otros      
 
PASE A LA P89  
86. (Conteste si la respuesta a P 77 es No) ¿Por qué no ha solicitado un préstamo de su comprador o 
banco en los últimos 2 años? (conteste más de una respuesta si es necesario)  
a. Yo no necesito de préstamos / No invierto:  Sí_____,  No____  
b. Tengo dinero y ahorro para invertir:    Sí_____,   No____ 
c. Me prestaron mis amigos:     Sí_____,   No____  
d. La tasa de interés es muy alta:   Sí_____,   No____  
e. Tengo miedo de perder la garantía:   Sí_____,   No____  
f. No creen que pueda pagar el préstamo:  Sí_____,   No____  
g. No puedo obtener una garantía:         Sí_____,    No____  
h. Los prestamos no son lo suficientemente flexibles para cumplir con mi capacidad de 
pago:   Sí_____,    No____  
i. Otros:   Sí_____,    No____  
87. ¿Cree usted que usted tiene una garantía suficiente para obtener un crédito agrícola adecuado?  
              A) Sí ________,            B)  No ________,       C)  No estoy seguro ________  
88. (Conteste si la respuesta a P 87 es No, o No está seguro), Suponiendo que tenga las garantías 
suficientes para obtener cualquier préstamo que necesite. ¿Pediría prestado una cantidad mayor? 
A)  Sí ________,            B)  No ________,       C)  No estoy seguro ________  
CONTINUE EN LA P 89   
89. Cuando usted toma una decisión sobre si pedir un préstamo y cuánto pedir prestado, ¿Qué tan 
importantes son las siguientes declaraciones?: (Seleccione una opción de cada declaración).  Al 
Pedir un Préstamo considera que, 
Declaración Nada 
Importante 
Poco 
Importante 
Importante Muy 
Importante 
Demasiado 
Importante 
A)  El riesgo de perder 
mi negocio es 
importante para mí. 
1 2 3 4 5 
B)  El riesgo de no 
enviar a mis hijos a la 
escuela es importante 
para mí. 
1 2 3 4 5 
C El riesgo de a no 
tener suficiente dinero 
para comprar comida 
es importante para mí. 
1 2 3 4 5 
D)  El riesgo de no 
tener suficiente dinero 
para gastos médicos es 
importante para mí. 
1 2 3 4 5 
E)  El riesgo de no 
tener un lugar para 
vivir es importante 
para mí. 
1 2 3 4 5 
F) El riesgo de no 
tener suficiente dinero 
cuando me jubile es 
1 2 3 4 5 
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importante para mí. 
G)  El riesgo de perder 
oportunidades para 
pedir préstamos en el 
futuro es importante 
para mí. 
1 2 3 4 5 
H)  El riesgo de perder 
mi reputación social 
dentro de mi 
comunidad es 
importante para mí. 
1 2 3 4 5 
I)  El riesgo de no 
tener suficientes 
ahorros para cubrir 
pérdidas es importante 
para mí. 
1 2 3 4 5 
J)  El riesgo de no 
poder vivir de forma 
segura ahora que estoy 
grande es importante 
para mí. 
1 2 3 4 5 
K)  El riesgo de no 
poder trabajar fuera de 
la agricultura debido a 
que no tengo 
conocimientos es 
importante para mí. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
90. (Conteste si su respuesta a P75 (g) o Q86 (g) es Sí) ¿Si usted pudiera obtener una  garantía, 
solicitaría un préstamo?  Sí_____,    No _____ 
 
91. ¿Ha recibido tarjetas de crédito no solicitadas, o le han ofrecido una línea de crédito sin solicitarla 
de cualquier fuente, incluye asociación de productores y compradores?   
Sí_____,    No _____ 
92. ¿Cuánto debe actualmente en préstamos de compradores o bancos? $ __________  
93.  Supongamos que usted puede pedir prestado tanto como usted necesite para cubrir  todas sus  
necesidades de crédito. ¿Solicitaría crédito bajo las siguientes tasas de interés anuales? 
 (Por favor circule para cada tasa de interés una de las cinco opciones del 1 al 5) 
 
Tasa de 
interés 
mensual 
% 
Tasa de 
interés 
anual  
%  
Definitivamente 
pediría prestado 
para todo lo que 
necesite 
(Si) 
Posiblemente 
pediría 
prestado  
Tal vez 
pediría 
prestado  
Tal vez 
pediría 
prestado un 
poco  
Definitivamente 
no pediría 
prestado  
(No) 
0.42% 5 % 1 2 3 4 5 
1.25% 15 %  1 2 3 4 5 
2.08% 25 % 1 2 3 4 5 
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2.92% 35% 1 2 3 4 5 
3.75% 45 % 1 2 3 4 5 
4.58% 55 % 1 2 3 4 5 
5.83% 70 % 1 2 3 4 5 
7.50% 90 % 1 2 3 4 5 
 
94. Si pudiera pedir más dinero prestado de lo que puedo pedir ahora con la misma tasa de interés, 
sería  probable que pidiera más prestado. 
1) Totalmente de acuerdo (Si)____, 2) De acuerdo_____, 3) Mas o menos de acuerdo_____,  
4) Poco de acuerdo ____, 5) Totalmente en desacuerdo (No)____  
95. Estaría dispuesto a pagar mayores  intereses para poder obtener un préstamo más grande del que 
actualmente le ofrecen. 
1) Totalmente de acuerdo (Si)____, 2) De acuerdo_____, 3) Mas o menos de acuerdo_____,  
4) Poco de acuerdo ____, 5) Totalmente en desacuerdo (No)____  
96. Si las tasas de interés fueran más bajas que las  actuales,  Seria muy probable que pidiera 
prestado más.  
1) Totalmente de acuerdo (Si)____, 2) De acuerdo_____, 3) Mas o menos de acuerdo_____,  
4) Poco de acuerdo ____, 5) Totalmente en desacuerdo (No)____  
97. Si el costo de obtener un préstamo (cuotas, cargos por solicitud, no incluye intereses) de los 
compradores o bancos fueran inferiores a los costos actuales,  sería muy probable que yo les 
pidiera prestado a ellos. 
1) Totalmente de acuerdo (Si)____, 2) De acuerdo_____, 3) Mas o menos de acuerdo_____,  
4) Poco de acuerdo ____,   5) Totalmente en desacuerdo (No)____  
98. ¿Alguna vez se ha atrasado en el pago de un préstamo de las siguientes fuentes? (Por "atrasado" 
nos referimos a que el pago no fue pagado puntualmente según lo acordado por el prestamista, pero 
el pago se hizo después)  
           1          0 
 Sí No 
a. Amigos   
b.Familiares    
c.Bancos/ Instituciones financieras   
d.Proveedores de insumos / Compradores   
e. Casa de empeño    
g.Otros   
 
99. ¿Alguna vez ha incumplido en el pago de algún préstamo? (Por incumplimiento se entiende que el 
préstamo nunca fue reembolsado en su totalidad según lo acordado por el prestamista)  
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 Sí  (1) No 
(0) 
a. Amigos   
b. Familiares    
c. Bancos/ Instituciones financieras.    
d. Proveedores/ compradores de grano    
e. Casa de empeño    
g. Otros   
 
 
Las siguientes preguntas son sobre su ahorro. 
 
100. ¿Qué proporción de los ingresos totales en su hogar ahorra en un año? 
1) Nada___,      2) Menos del 5%___,     3) Entre el 5 y el 10%___,      4) Más del 10%___ 
 
101. ¿Cuáles son las razones principales de sus ahorros? (Seleccione un numero por cada declaración) 
 
Declaración Total 
Desacuerdo 
(NO) 
Poco de 
Acuerdo 
Más o 
menos de 
acuerdo 
(Tal Vez) 
De 
Acuerdo 
Totalmente 
de 
Acuerdo 
(SI) 
A) Guardo porque no 
tengo nada en que gastar 
dinero. 
1 2 3 4 5 
B)  Ahorro para comprar 
una casa 
1 2 3 4 5 
C)  Ahorro para la 
comprar un automóvil 
1 2 3 4 5 
D)  Ahorro para cuando 
se descomponga mi 
automóvil 
1 2 3 4 5 
E)  Ahorro para viajar o 
divertirme 
1 2 3 4 5 
F)  Ahorro para poder 
invertir fuera de la 
agricultura y ganadería 
en el futuro 
1 2 3 4 5 
G)  Ahorro para poder 
pagar mi préstamo 
1 2 3 4 5 
H)  Ahorro para 
emergencias medicas 
1 2 3 4 5 
I)  Ahorro para poder 
enviar a mis hijos a la 
escuela 
1 2 3 4 5 
J)  Ahorro para la boda 
de mis hijos 
1 2 3 4 5 
K)  Ahorro para poder 
cuidar a mis padres 
1 2 3 4 5 
L) Ahorro para 
protegerme si pierdo mi 
trabajo 
1 2 3 4 5 
 302 
 
M) Ahorro para las 
cubrir las perdidas 
agrícolas 
1 2 3 4 5 
N) Ahorro para tener 
dinero de protección o 
rescate 
1 2 3 4 5 
O) Ahorro por otros 
motivos 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
102. En su opinión, ¿cree que el ahorro es importante? 
 
1) Total desacuerdo (No)____,   2) Poco de acuerdo___,   3) Más o menos de acuerdo_____,   
4) De Acuerdo___, 5) Totalmente de acuerdo (Si)_____ 
 
103. Por favor seleccione el grado de acuerdo de cada una de las siguientes declaraciones. 
Declaración Total 
Desacuerdo 
(NO) 
Poco de 
Acuerdo 
Mas o 
menos de 
acuerdo 
(Tal Vez) 
De 
Acuerdo 
Totalmente 
de Acuerdo 
(SI) 
A) No tengo miedo de 
pedir prestado a bancos o 
compradores 
1 2 3 4 5 
B)  Tengo deudas 
pendientes de con 
bancos o compradores 
1 2 3 4 5 
C)  Las tasas de interés 
de los bancos o 
compradores son más 
altas que las tasas de 
interés de los préstamos 
de amigos o familiares 
1 2 3 4 5 
D)  Las tasas de interés 
de los bancos o 
compradores son más 
altas de lo que puedo 
pagar 
1 2 3 4 5 
E) Yo preferiría  pedir 
prestado a un amigo o 
familiar 
1 2 3 4 5 
F)  No me gusta estar en 
deuda con bancos o 
compradores 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
F. Impacto en Racionamiento de Crédito 
 
Restricción crediticia significa que el productor no puede obtener todos los fondos solicitados a un 
banco o comprador en las cantidades o en el tiempo requerido. 
 
104. Por favor seleccione el grado de acuerdo de cada una de las siguientes declaraciones 
Declaración Total Poco de Más o De Totalmen
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Desacue
rdo 
(NO) 
 
Acuerdo menos de 
acuerdo 
(Tal Vez) 
Acuerdo te de 
Acuerdo 
(SI) 
A) Si no me prestan el dinero 
que solicito, usaría menos 
insumos de los requeridos 
1 2 3 4 5 
B)  Si no me prestan el dinero 
que solicito, necesitare buscar 
empleo para conseguir dinero 
1 2 3 4 5 
C)  Si no me prestan el dinero 
que solicito, no podría dar 
educación y atención médica 
para mi familia 
1 2 3 4 5 
D)  Si no me prestan el dinero 
que solicito, mi familia y yo 
no seríamos capaces de 
obtener una buena 
alimentación todo el año 
1 2 3 4 5 
E) Yo preferiría pedir prestado 
a un banco a una tasa de 
interés muy baja en vez de 
pedirle prestado a algún 
familiar o pariente 
1 2 3 4 5 
F)  Yo preferiría pedir 
prestado a un banco a la tasa 
de interés actual, en vez de 
pedirle prestado a algún 
familiar o pariente 
1 2 3 4 5 
G) Yo preferiría pedir prestado 
a un banco a una tasa de 
interés muy baja en vez de 
pedirle prestado a algún amigo 
1 2 3 4 5 
H) Yo preferiría pedir prestado 
a un banco a la tasa de interés 
actual en vez de pedirle 
prestado a algún amigo 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
105. Si pudiera conseguir tanto crédito como yo necesitara de un banco o del comprador, ¿Que sería lo 
más probable que haga? (elija sólo una) 
 
1) Dejar la agricultura e iniciar un negocio no agrícola:    _____ 
2) Dejar la agricultura y trabajar como empleado fuera de la finca:  _____ 
3) Permanecer en la agricultura y aumentar la producción agrícola: ______ 
4) Permanecer en la agricultura, e iniciar un negocio no agrícola: ____ 
5) Ninguna de las anteriores _____ 
 
105 A) Si le ofrecieran trabajo. Cuál sería el menor salario mensual que usted aceptaría para que usted 
deje de trabajar su tierra, ya sea que la venda o rente, para irse a trabajar de empleado de tiempo 
completo? $_____________ 
G. Derechos de Uso de Tierra 
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106. Tiene usted la posesión legal de sus tierras? esto es, puede vender o hipotecar su tierra libremente? 
Si___,   No___ 
107.  
108.  
109. 
110. 
111. 
112. 
 
113. En promedio, ¿cuál es el precio de una hectárea en buenas condiciones en su región? $________ 
114. Nos gustaría saber acerca de las fuentes de información en su comunidad. Por favor, indique el 
grado de confiabilidad que usted cree de cada fuente de información.  
Seleccione de cada fuente de información del 1 al 5. 
 
 Fuente de 
Información 
Nada 
Confiable 
Poco 
Confiable 
Confiable Muy 
Confiable 
Totalmente 
Confiable 
A Periódicos 1 2 3 4 5 
B TV/ Radio 1 2 3 4 5 
C Internet 1 2 3 4 5 
D Familia 1 2 3 4 5 
E Gobierno Local 1 2 3 4 5 
F Universidades, 
Tecnológicos, 
Escuelas  
1 2 3 4 5 
G Prestamista 
Local, 
Comprador 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
H. Percepción y Motivos Riesgo 
 
115. Imagine que alguien le ofrece jugar un volado. Cada resultado del volado, águila o sol, tiene 50% 
de probabilidad de salir. Dependiendo de lo que salga usted puede recibir dinero o no. En este juego 
usted no pierde dinero, solo que los pagos varían Por ejemplo, si sale águila ganara la cantidad de la 
primera columna, y si sale sol obtendrá la cantidad de la segunda columna, o al revés. Usted solamente 
escoge el volado con los pagos que prefiera. Si el juego se repitiera por muchas veces se esperaría 
recibir la cantidad en la tercera columna. Si bien las probabilidades de recibir la cantidad de la primera 
columna son las mismas que las probabilidades de la segunda columna los valores de cada una, son 
diferentes.  
Estudie los seis volados en la tabla siguiente y seleccione el que usted prefiera.  
Seleccione el juego del 1 al 6 que prefiera.________ 
 
Volado Ganancia con 
buena suerte 
(50% 
probabilidad) 
Ganancia con mala 
suerte (50% 
probabilidad) 
Valor esperado 
1 $500 $500 $500 
2 $950 $450 $700 
3 $1,200 $400 $800 
4 $1,500 $300 $900 
5 $1,900 $100 $1000 
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6 $2,000 0 $1000 
 
 
116.  
117.  
118.   
 
Las siguientes preguntas son de carácter voluntario. Sería de gran ayuda para entender su situación, 
preguntándole sobre los acontecimientos importantes que puedan haber ocurrido en su vida 
recientemente. 
 
119. En su casa, ¿hay algún miembro de su familia (en los últimos 3 años) que se haya divorciado? 
             Sí_____,    No_____ 
 
120. En su casa, ¿ha experimentado (en los últimos 3 años) la muerte de algún miembro de la familia?   
Sí_____,  No_____ 
 
I Percepción de Inseguridad 
 
121. ¿Está usted consciente de la actual Guerra contra las Drogas en el país? 
             1) Sí ______,    2) No ______,    3) No estoy seguro ________  
 
 
122. ¿Qué tan seguro crees que haya sido vivir en tu comunidad  / ciudad en los siguientes años? 
(circule un número del 1 al 5 por cada año) 
 
Años Totalmente 
Inseguro 
Muy 
inseguro 
Inseguro Seguro Totalmente 
seguro 
A) 2011 1 2 3 4 5 
B) 2010 1 2 3 4 5 
C) 2009 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
123. ¿Qué tan preocupado está usted respecto al crimen en su comunidad  /  ciudad? (circule el número 
correspondiente) 
 
No estoy 
preocupado 
No muy 
preocupado 
Un poco 
preocupado 
Muy 
preocupado 
Demasiado 
preocupado 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
124. ¿Qué tan preocupado está usted respecto al crimen en los caminos y carreteras que utiliza? 
 
No estoy 
preocupado 
No muy 
preocupado 
Un poco 
preocupado 
Muy 
preocupado 
Demasiado 
preocupado 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
125. ¿Cuánto cree que el crimen en su comunidad  o ciudad haya cambiado con respecto a 2010? 
 
El crimen ha 
disminuido mucho 
El crimen ha 
Disminuido poco 
El crimen se ha 
mantenido igual  
El crimen ha 
aumentado poco 
El crimen 
ha 
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aumentado 
mucho 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
126. ¿Cómo califica el nivel de violencia en tu comunidad o ciudad durante los siguientes años? 
(Circule un numero por cada año) 
 
Año Muy bajo Bajo  Normal Alto Muy Alto 
2011 1 2 3 4 5 
2010 1 2 3 4 5 
2009 1 2 3 4 5 
2008 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
127. ¿Cuánto cree que el crimen en los caminos y carreteras que utiliza haya cambiado con respecto a 
2010? 
 
El crimen ha 
disminuido 
mucho 
El crimen ha 
Disminuido 
poco 
El crimen ha 
se ha 
mantenido 
igual  
El crimen ha 
aumentado 
poco 
El crimen ha 
aumentado 
mucho 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
128. ¿Cómo califica el nivel de violencia en los caminos y carreteras que utiliza durante los siguientes 
años? (Circule un numero por cada año) 
 
Año Muy bajo Bajo  Normal Alto Muy Alto 
2011 1 2 3 4 5 
2010 1 2 3 4 5 
2009 1 2 3 4 5 
2008 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
129. ¿Qué tan seguro está usted de que la Policía Municipal o la Policía del Estado pueda responder y 
controlar un acto de violencia de los criminales? 
 
 
Nada Seguro No muy 
seguro 
Poco seguro Muy seguro Completamente 
seguro 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
130. ¿Qué tan seguro está usted de que la Marina y Armada de México pueda responder y controlar 
un acto de violencia de los criminales? 
 
Nada Seguro No muy seguro Poco seguro Muy seguro Completam
ente seguro 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
131. ¿Usted conoce a alguien que haya sido víctima de un crimen violento en los últimos 12 meses?    
         Si____,     No____ 
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En caso afirmativo, por favor seleccione de la tabla el tipo de delito y si hubo violencia física. 
(Seleccione todas las que apliquen) 
 Robo de Auto 
1         2 
Robo Personal 
3            4  
Secuestro 
5             6  
Extorción 
7             8 
Homicidio 
9 
 Viole
ncia 
Sin 
Viole
ncia 
Viole
ncia 
Sin 
Violen
cia 
Viol
encia 
Sin 
Violen
cia 
Vi
ole
nci
a 
Sin 
Viol
enci
a 
 
A)Conocido          
B)Amigo          
C)Pariente          
D)Familiar          
E)Yo mismo         ------------- 
 
132. ¿Qué tan preocupado está usted acerca de su seguridad y la de su familia? 
 
No estoy 
preocupado 
No muy 
preocupado 
Un poco 
preocupado 
Muy 
preocupado 
Demasiado 
preocupado 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
133. ¿Siente que usted o su familia pueda ser víctima de los siguientes crímenes en los próximos 12 
meses? 
                                                    1                       2                      3                 4                          5 
 No, nada 
probable 
Muy poco 
probable 
Probable Muy 
probable 
Si, 
totalmente 
A) Robo de Auto      
B) Robo Personal      
C) Extorcion      
D) Secuestro      
E) Homicidio      
F) Agresion Fisica      
 
134. ¿Cuánto teme / que tanto miedo tiene usted ser víctima de los siguientes delitos en los próximos 
12 meses? 
 
 
 No temo 
nada 
Temo 
poco  
Tengo 
temor 
Temo 
mucho 
Temo 
demasiado 
A) Robo de Auto 1 2 3 4 5 
B) Robo Personal 1 2 3 4 5 
C) Extorcion 1 2 3 4 5 
D) Secuestro 1 2 3 4 5 
E) Homicidio 1 2 3 4 5 
F) Agresion 
Fisica 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
135. ¿Cuánto teme / que tanto miedo tiene usted que su familia sea víctima de los siguientes delitos 
en los próximos 12 meses? 
 
 
 No temo 
nada 
Temo 
poco  
Tengo 
temor 
Temo 
mucho 
Temo 
demasiado 
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A) Robo de Auto 1 2 3 4 5 
B) Robo Personal 1 2 3 4 5 
C) Extorcion 1 2 3 4 5 
D) Secuestro 1 2 3 4 5 
E) Homicidio 1 2 3 4 5 
F) Agresion 
Fisica 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
 
136. ¿Cómo percibe el riesgo de que usted o su familia sea víctima de un crimen o asalto violento 
comparado con otras familias de su comunidad o ciudad? 
 
Mucho menor 
riesgo 
Menor riesgo Igual  Mayor 
riesgo 
Mucho 
mayor 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
137. En comparación con el resto de las familias de su comunidad o ciudad, ¿Cómo cree usted que su 
familia es percibida en cuanto a los siguientes aspectos? 
 
 Mucho 
menos 
Poco 
menos 
Igual Poco 
mas 
Mucho 
mas 
A)Rica (propiedades) 1 2 3 4 5 
B)Vulnerable 1 2 3 4 5 
C)Socialmente Activa 1 2 3 4 5 
D)Rica (efectivo) 1 2 3 4 5 
E)Con influencias 1 2 3 4 5 
 
Voy a leer algunas declaraciones acerca de la violencia. Por favor, indique qué tan de acuerdo o en 
desacuerdo esta con cada declaración. Las respuestas van del 1 a 5.  
1 = Totalmente en desacuerdo (NO),    2 = Poco de acuerdo,    3 = Mas o menos de acuerdo,   
 4 = De acuerdo, 5= Totalmente de acuerdo (SI) 
 SI NO SABE O PREFIERE NO RESPONDER POR FAVOR INDIQUELO. 
Por favor escriba en la línea el número del 1 a 5 de acuerdo con su nivel de acuerdo o desacuerdo. 
 
138. Si soy detenido por un criminal, lo cierto es que yo muera._______ 
139. Hay cosas que puedo hacer para evitar ser asesinado por criminales.________ 
140. Si estoy siendo extorsionado por un criminal, puedo vender mi finca e irme a otra zona a comprar 
otra finca. ____ 
141. Una balacera deliberada por los criminales en la ciudad puede matar a mucha gente inocente.__ 
142. Vivir en una región donde el crimen es común es un nuevo tipo de riesgo para mi._______ 
143. El Ejército Mexicano puede identificar dónde están los criminales ubicados.________ 
144. Yo sé sobre el modo de operación de la criminales._______ 
145. Los crímenes de las actividades de los criminales puede ser controlada._______ 
146. La presencia de criminales en mi región puede poner en peligro futuras generaciones.________ 
147. Debido a que trabajo en una finca, personalmente estoy en una situación de riesgo por la presencia 
de criminales en mi región.______ 
148. Debido a que transito en las carreteras locales, personalmente estoy en una situación de riesgo por 
la presencia de criminales en mi región.______ 
149. La presencia generalizada de los criminales en el país puede causar una catástrofe nacional._____  
150. Cuando los criminales cometen crímenes violentos, el Ejército Mexicano puede reaccionar con 
rapidez para evitar una catástrofe mayor.______ 
151. El riesgo de que me secuestren los criminales está aumentando.________ 
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152. El riesgo de que me secuestren los criminales puede ser fácilmente reducido________ 
153. El riesgo de que me roben los criminales está aumentando.________ 
154. El riesgo de que me roben los criminales puede ser fácilmente reducido.________ 
155. Yo puedo minimizar el riesgo de ser víctima de un crimen.________ 
 
 
 
156. ¿Ha considerado mudarse a otra ciudad debido al riesgo de ser víctima de crímenes violentos? 
 
Nunca Pocas veces Algunas 
veces 
Muchas 
veces 
Todo el 
tiempo 
1 2 3 4 5 
157. ¿Conoce a alguien que se ha mudado a otra comunidad o ciudad debido al temor de ser víctima de 
los narcos?  Si____,    No_____ 
 
A). En caso afirmativo, ¿cuál es su relación con ellos?  
        1). Conocido______,        2). Amigo______,   3). Pariente______,     4). Familia_____ 
 
158. ¿Ha cambiado sus decisiones de producción en su finca debido al riesgo de la violencia?     
        Si___,    No____ 
159. ¿Ha cambiado sus actividades diarias debido al riesgo de la violencia? Si____,   No___ 
160. Si el nivel actual de la violencia continúa, cambiará sus decisiones de producción en su finca?        
        Si___,     No___ 
161. Por favor, indique la importancia de los siguientes factores en sus decisiones de producción. 
 
Factores Nada 
Importante  
  Indiferente   Demasiado 
Importante 
A) Sequías 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
B) Huracanes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
C) Precio de 
venta de 
cultivos 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
D) Precios de 
insumos 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
E) Programas 
de gobierno 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
F) Producción 
por hectárea 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
G) Violencia 
de narcos 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
H) Robo de 
coche  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
162. ¿Es usted socio de Interagro de las Huastecas? 
         Si_____,   No_____ 
 
Para ser respondidas solamente por el entrevistador  
a) En su opinión, el entrevistado estaba interesado en el estudio y respondió con sinceridad a todas las 
preguntas? 
1) Total desacuerdo____,   2) Poco de acuerdo___,   3) Más o menos de acuerdo_____,   
4) De Acuerdo___, 5) Totalmente de acuerdo_____ 
 
b) En su opinión la calidad de las respuestas dadas en esta encuesta es el adecuado para incluir en los 
informes escritos. 
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1) Total desacuerdo____,   2) Poco de acuerdo___,   3) Más o menos de acuerdo_____,   
4) De Acuerdo___, 5) Totalmente de acuerdo_____ 
Por favor escriba cualquier otro comentario aquí: 
Muchas gracias por participar en esta encuesta.  
